The End?

The Kremlin strategy in the Polish question had been basically simple. It was: to tire out both the London Poles and the Allies by patiently insisting on a solution which the Poles could not accept. Since Russia was in possession and had the power, she could afford patience.

Last week Stanislaw Mikolajczyk tired first, resigned his post as Premier of the Polish Government in Exile. Out of the London Polish Government with him went the Polish Peasant Party, the strongest of the four coalition parties which make it up. President Wladislaw Rackiewicz asked Vice Premier Jan Kwapinski, a Socialist (and Russophobe), to form a new government. But with the Peasant Party gone, it did not look as if he would succeed. For ex-Premier Mikolajczyk there were two courses open: 1) he could go into permanent political exile; 2) he could join the Lublin Government, for whom his prestige made him a great catch.

For the Polish Government in Exile, it looked like the beginning of the end.

But not only Russia was to blame for the Polish situation. In the absence of any effective check, Stalin was acting realistically from motives of hard self-interest. To the very end, the Poles had hoped that the U.S. would exert pressure in their behalf. But last week Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius announced: "This Government's traditional policy of not guaranteeing specific frontiers of Europe is well known." Specific frontiers were not the point. Clearly if the U.S. had stood firmly with Britain against Russia on the Polish question, the chances of an equitable solution would have been much greater. Against Russia, Britain alone could do little or nothing for the Poles.

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