Crisis--New Style

The warring U.S. faced a new kind of crisis. It was not one of shortages, as in 1941, or one of bottlenecks, as in 1942. It was rather that the U.S. war machine had been caught off balance.

The crisis was well illustrated by what had happened in the tiny town of Rosemont, near Minneapolis. There, in the expanding days of 1942, the 21,000-acre Gopher Ordnance Works--a typical example of the cornfield-to-factory projects which sprang up all over the U.S.--was built to manufacture powder. Then, for almost two years, the plant stood idle; and finally, last February, workmen began to dismantle its machinery.

Last week the Gopher Ordnance Works was in rush-rush production, making nitric acid for much-needed gunpowder.

The sudden activity at Gopher was multiplied at countless other war plants. There were several reasons for this. Principal one was that the U.S. war machine was chewing up its equipment faster than it was being produced. Instances:

P: On the bomb-pocked roads of Europe, the trucks which moved in radiator-to-buckboard line were wearing out at a rate so fantastic that the actual number is still a military secret. In the northwest sector alone, 5,000 new tires were needed daily.

P: In one month of fighting, artillery units hurled $156 million worth of shells at the Germans. At Aachen, in two weeks of bombardment, 300,000 rounds of 105-mm. shells were expended.

P: General Eisenhower, pointing out that Aachen might have been taken sooner, said: "Today we are firing ammunition which we would not have used until next February or March if we had been content with a slower advance."

P: In the first month of the Leyte invasion, General MacArthur's forces pumped out as much ammunition as they had in 16 previous months of operation.

Bombs v. Shells. There was a second reason for the crisis: a miscalculation by the war planners. As in previous wars, the needs of the artillery had been vastly underestimated. Meanwhile, airmen, aircraft and airborne bombs had top priority. The airmen were not only asked to knock out German industry. They were also used as a swift, mobile artillery for the infantry. Thus, in the arsenals, artillery ammunition was cut back. But now the commanders restored artillerymen to their historic role of blasting the way for the infantry. At home, this meant a sudden shift back to production of artillery ammunition.

Third reason for the crisis was the still-present manpower shortage. Looked at nationally, this did not seem terribly urgent: war plants were but 200,000 workers short. But the men were needed in critical spots. Accordingly, Government and Army & Navy men scurried about urging war workers to stay on their jobs, exhorting those who had left, on the crest of the September optimism, to return.

No one was yet crying wolf; no one was anxious to magnify the problem. No one was afraid that it could not be solved. But last week the Army was flying 400-lb. shells to the front on the Rhine.

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