Model for Victory

Perhaps Lieut. General Omar Bradley's victory on the Cotentin peninsula last week was something more than the breaking of a stalemate. It may have been the opening break to the bigger battle that was in Ike Eisenhower's blueprint for destruction of the German in the west. Or, as war against the German goes in the west, it may have been only a breakout, destined to be stopped by a new line of resistance.

Whichever it was, by this week the American generals had plenty of cause for satisfaction. Their troops had broken out of the Normandy peninsula on the west, fought a smart, bold battle.

This week, still on the advance, they had smashed into Avranches (see map) cutting the German's best road across lower Normandy. They had already ripped through to the sea at Brehal and at Granville in a series of well-executed sweeps that enveloped pockets of stunned German tankmen and infantrymen. They had collected more than 10,000 prisoners; more thousands were streaming in from some of the German's best divisions. There was a good chance the reeling Germans could not stop short of the hills below Avranches (their retreat was so speedy in the last 20 miles to Avranches that they had almost no time to employ their specialty: mine sowing).

Pressures. The Americans had done more than break out of the bocage country by mere weight and superior fire power. They had fashioned a planes-plus-tanks-plus-infantry weapon to fit that hedge-rowed terrain. In the clear, they had employed their tanks in large force for the first time in France.

They had knocked the Germans off balance with a solid armored punch, had chewed up the best part of six divisions and had at least two others backtracking. Best of all, they were on the move, and they moved with dash and boldness, with a murderous air support that made hash of German units on the roads.

The British and Canadians were moving, too, in an offensive from the center of the line south of Caumont. The pressure was on. If it could be kept on, General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery could pick his time to drive against the east end of the line, below Caen. There the enemy still had his heaviest defenses.

The immediate strategy of the Norman campaign still pointed southeast from Caen. Beyond it was tank country. There Monty could employ bolder tactics, for which his fast-stepping Sherman and Cromwell tanks were designed.

Preparation for Armor. The American offensive opened with one of the greatest aerial preparations in history. The bomb carpet was laid mostly on the Saint Lo-Periers road and beyond it in an area 2,000 yards wide and 9,000 yards in depth. Nearly everything in the bomber's book went into it--from 500-pounders carried by heavies to 23-lb. fragmentations scattered by mediums and fighters--a saturation of about ten bombs to an acre.

Even two miles back from the carpet U.S. troops were rocked by concussion. There were U.S. casualties--many of them--from U.S. bombs that fell short of the targets. But the bombardment broke the crust of the enemy's defenses.

By Tank and By Foot. The breakout by the armored forces was swift, decisive. U.S. tankmen swept out into the open fields from the woods that tankers hate.

Infantrymen clambered aboard tanks and half-tracks. When the tanks reached spots of resistance the footsloggers took over and the tanks waited until the way was cleared.

At other spots, the tanks raced ahead at 30 miles an hour, leaving pockets to be mopped up. When the tankmen ran into hard trouble they popped out of their flower-garlanded iron battlewagons and became Tommy-gunners. Some tanks got well beyond their fuel supplies, but the whole movement never lost momentum. Their sweep beyond Coutances (their first main objective) to Avranches was at even swifter tempo.

The Germans--fearful of the British on the east--brought no large numbers of reserves from that sector. Instead they pulled out of the narrow pocket in which Omar Bradley tried to trap them against the sea above Coutances and Brehal. But they were badly mauled. There alone they lost more than 100 battered and burned-out tanks, more than 1,000 other vehicles.

Berlin said that at least 2,000 U.S. tanks were used in the break (officially the U.S. said 600). Two points were certain: 1) there were many more tanks back at Cherbourg and on the beaches for the bigger battle; 2) U.S. tankmen knew how to make them move. U.S. tails were well up.

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