New Sea, New Management

In the Pearl Harbor office of Admiral Nimitz hangs a great wall map of the Pacific Ocean. Last week a new name was pasted on the map: the Philippine Sea. That new name meant that a new management had moved into the area--1,500,000 square miles, bounded by the southern islands of Japan, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, Carolines, Marianas and Bonins.

The keys to the eastern reaches of the Philippine Sea were being seized by U.S. hands: Saipan, now taken; Guam, in process of liberation; Tinian under invasion. From these points, U.S. land-based bombers could bring the whole sea under their bombsights. The sea's western reaches were in the range of B245 and 6-295, operating from China; its southern reaches could be covered from the Biak-Noemfoor area off New Guinea. These ranges fanned out and overlapped. The islands studding these waters held Jap garrisons for whom death was certain: U.S. forces were coming to get them.

Admiral Ernest J. King, fresh from a survey of the Navy's latest acquisition, Saipan, pointed out at week's end that the southern Marianas are roughly 1,500 sea miles from Japan, China and the Philippines. For Tokyo's benefit he added that "1,500 miles is considered a fair operational radius for the fleet. That is an opportunity of which we will take full advantage."

The Blue Lagoon. With air bases for the Army's heavy bombers already being readied for use, the U.S. command's greatest need was a fleet anchorage in the western Pacific, fronting on the Philippine Sea. Saipan and Guam could serve only as staging points for a fleet; what was wanted was a landlocked basin such as Pearl Harbor, a blue lagoon like Kwajalein, Eniwetok or Majuro. A fine harbor could be had at Palau, a poorer one at Yap; a lagoon could be secured at one of several atolls in the western Carolines--far beyond the bypassed enemy strongholds of Truk and Ponape.

There was another need before the final drive on Japan was begun: the ground forces had to have room to stretch themselves. General Douglas MacArthur, in the Southwest Pacific, was in the best position for such a move, and inching closer to the takeoff point. From westernmost New Guinea to Halmahera was an easy distance (200 miles) by the new U.S. Pacific standards; from Halmahera it is another short hop (400 miles) to Mindanao in the Philippines.

What would be the next stop on the road to Tokyo? Planning in Pearl Harbor, Admiral Chester Nimitz had a score of possibilities. Planning in Tokyo, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada had no possibilities at all. He had to wait for the blow, counter it if he could. Up to now his countering average was zero. His only asset was the fanatical willingness of garrison troops to die; their numbers and resources would increase as U.S. forces drove closer to his homeland. Saipan was but a sample of the Japs' determination to carry with them to death as many Americans as possible.

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