Jap in a Trap

General Hatazo Adachi was in a trap. Since General MacArthur's leapfrog landings along the New Guinea coast at Aitape and Hollandia last April 22, his Eighteenth Army had been hemmed between the sea to the north, Australians to the east, mountains to the south and Americans to the west. Adachi had seen his force dwindle from 60,000 to 45,000 (round numbers estimated at General MacArthur's headquarters), as a result of daily bombings and disease hastened by hunger.

There was no room for Adachi to maneuver in the 7-mile-wide corridor of swamp and jungle. But anything was better than death by stagnation. So he lashed out to the west, hoping to drive the Americans from Aitape, 21 miles away. What they hoped to gain beyond that, with Americans dug in 600 miles to the west of them, only Adachi and the sun-god knew.

On the first day, U.S. infantry veterans of Buna and Saidor held firm in the face of a flood of Japs. The second day, they were forced to give ground; by night the Japs had reached the main U.S. defensive positions on the Driniumor River. They had gained four to five miles; some of them forded the river.

Exercise in Futility. But the Japs had no air cover, no sea support; the Allies had plenty. The attack, dubbed by MacArthur "a hazardous movement of doubtful success," faltered. The enemy paused to regroup, but while he did so, American reinforcements arrived in time to wipe out the Japs on the west side of the Driniumor. Like their comrades on New Britain and Bougainville, who were also cut off, the Japs had no hope of victory or of rescue. Unlike their comrades on Saipan they could still hide out and make the miserable best of the jungle.

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