Snubbed Again

FRANCE

Snubbed Again

On the Sunday before Dday, General Charles de Gaulle flew to England from North Africa. The touchy French leader could hardly fail to be touched by the reception committee which met him: Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Lieut. General "Beedle" Smith (busy chief of staff for busy General Dwight Eisenhower), other British and U.S. bigwigs.

On the rail trip from the airport to London, cigars and cigarets were lighted, conversation flowed smoothly. General Smith told General de Gaulle that the invasion of France had been set for that night but that a brief delay was necessary. Meanwhile, would General de Gaulle read the text of General Eisenhower's proposed D-day address to France, and suggest whatever changes he thought advisable? Then or later General de Gaulle gravely accepted a copy of the address.

The Rebuff. All Sunday night in London the French leader worked on the script, altering words here & there, inserting statements about the Algiers Government's responsibility for administering liberated France. On Monday he called at General Eisenhower's headquarters with a practically new draft. There he was flatly told that changes were impossible: recordings had been made, leaflets printed. The important thing for General de Gaulle to do now, he was told, was to draft a speech of his own to follow General Eisenhower's.

The long-frustrated, oft-snubbed French leader blew up, exclaimed: "I cannot follow Eisenhower!" Then he turned on his polished heel and strode off. Behind him he left turmoil. No one knew just what he meant: whether he would not "follow Eisenhower" on the air, or in principle, or both. The U.S. generals wanted to be tough. The British statesmen wanted to be tender; they asked that they be allowed to handle the situation.

They had to work fast; obviously the French must hear from De Gaulle on Dday. Winston Churchill's Cabinet thrashed the problem all afternoon & evening. At midnight word went to Algiers' Ambassador Pierre Vienot that General de Gaulle must speak over the radio, or Prime Minister Churchill would have to speak on the situation before Parliament.

The Riposte. Diplomat Vienot hurried to his chief's apartment in the Connaught Hotel. There he found Charles de Gaulle energetically pushing a pen at his desk. "You must speak to the French!" the Ambassador cried impetuously. "Who said I was not going to speak?" retorted the General. "I am in the middle of writing it now."

Thus the first crisis passed.

The next worry concerned the contents of Charles de Gaulle's speech. Americans and Britons desperately wanted to see it before it was broadcast, but, remembering the General's temper, they did not dare make the request.

With his speech known only to himself, General de Gaulle hurried to the BBC studio to make a recording. The manuscript was written in almost illegible longhand, with sentences running up & down the margins, holes torn in the paper by a scratchy pen. But the recording was made.

On D-day, Charles de Gaulle spoke to his countrymen, in his own manner and long after General Eisenhower had spoken (TIME, June 12). Nothing that he said displeased the Allied command outright; nothing that he said waived one iota of his Government's claim to exclusive sovereignty in France.

The Obstacles. Eden dined with De Gaulle. In Churchill's presence, Eisenhower shook hands (see cut). News came from Washington that President Roosevelt would be glad to see De Gaulle as an individual if not as the head of a state (see U.S. AT WAR). But, fundamentally, nothing had been solved. In particular, the question of Gaullist sovereignty in France had not been answered.

At a time when every distraction was bound to irritate the Allied command, nothing seemed to suit le grand Charlie,. He complained that they had presumed to print French invasion currency without consulting his government (the unchecked buying power of U.S. troops could play havoc with the French economy) He hit at the essence of Franklin Roosevelt's French policy: the taking over of interim power in France by the Allied military command. This plan, said De Gaulle, "is obviously not acceptable to us, and it might provoke in France incidents which must be avoided." With good reason, he said that failure to solve these and other problems in advance might bring serious complications. At week's end, London correspondents heard that De Gaulle had been forbidden to visit France at this stage of the invasion.

Clearly an agreement was long overdue. Clearly the U.S. bore most of the blame in French minds. Just as clearly, and as usual, Charles de Gaulle was being most difficult when he was right.

-The invasion notes bore the imprint of no government, no bank, no guarantee whatever. On their face, they invited forgery; captured German soldiers had notes exactly like the Allied ''currency." Cried a Frenchman in Britain when he saw one of the notes: "Hello. Supreme Headquarters is playing Monopoly!"

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