1 ,009 Ukrainian Days

For the Russians this was a day of hope and rejoicing. For the Germans it was cruel. After their 850-mile advance from the Prut to the Volga, they were back at the end of 1,009 days at the river where they started.

The road back had been very grueling. The last long lap in the Ukraine had not been a successful retirement but a major defeat, like Stalingrad.

The Germans had had every reason to think that they could take their time in retiring. They probably expected to hold the Russians on the River Bug until well into May. For the Ukraine, like a ship divided into many compartments, is divided by rivers running north and south, each of which forms a defense line: Behind the Dnieper lies the Bug, behind the Bug lies the Dniester, behind the Dniester lies the Prut.

But the Russian flood had leaped one barrier after another, leaped them so fast that before any compartment had been fully flooded, the next had already been breached. How different this was from successful retreat was shown by the results:

P: The German Sixth Army (reconstituted since Stalingrad) chewed up on the Dnieper.

P: The Eighth Infantry and First Tank Armies wiped up between the Bug and the Dniester.

P: I Retreat of 75 German divisions into Poland and Rumania, with their strength mostly cut from 12,000 men in a division to 7,000 or 8,000.

P: Capture of enough undamaged tanks (many of them still loaded on railway cars) to outfit five divisions.

P: I Capture at Proskurov of 4,300 loaded German trucks.

Even discounting some of these Russian claims, the booty captured by the Reds was obviously enormous. Booty and prisoners are the evidence that a drive has not merely captured territory but played havoc with the enemy's army. With 'sev eral compartments of the Ukraine still only partly flooded, the possibility of more booty and prisoners was still promising.

Barrier Breaching. In Bessarabia last week the air was thick with the aroma of apple blossoms and Marshal Ivan Konev was there to enjoy it. Even more he could enjoy the knowledge that his was the major credit for breaking through one compartment after another of the Ger man defenses.

To do this in mid-spring when the Ukraine is knee-deep in mud was a mili tary masterpiece. Marshal Malinovsky, commanding the part of the front directly adjoining the Black Sea, had probably done as well as could be expected, since his way lay across the broad estuaries of the big rivers. Marshal Zhukov, at the northern end of the Ukrainian front, had done very well by breaking through with heavy concentrations of guns and tanks into Bucovina. But Konev, in the center, had pushed farthest. He had already crossed the Bug and the Dniester. This week his army held a 50-mile front along the sandy Prut river, nowhere wider than 300 yards.

As much as a man could be, Konev was responsible for this miracle of a great offensive at mud-time. He produced it by turning to foot, man, and tank-power, by keeping his men on grueling marches few other armies could survive. His officers scoff: "The Fritzies are lost without their trucks; they want to ride--whether forward or backward."

Konev used his tanks both to fight and to transport. His favorite tank is the adaptable T-34, with its broad treads, high belly clearance, a reinforced axle. Its German counterpart, Mark V, or Panther, often bogs down in the mud and breaks its axle. The Red tanks carry Tommy gun crews, equipment and fuel barrels strapped to the side. They also tow caravans of mud sledges, loaded high with food and ammunition.

Where possible, Konev uses Studebaker trucks, for whose six wheels, four gears and sturdiness Red officers profess high regard. Artillery is hauled by tractors, men, and small, shaggy Siberian ponies, which need amazingly little food and rest. U.S. jeeps do the rest, because the Russians have found them marvelous mud buggies.

Whither Next? Said a German military commentator last week: "The Russians . . . have advanced more & more, exhausting themselves more & more, until they stand now in dead space. . . . More cannot be said . . . because [it] would reveal prematurely the great German strategy."

This far-fetched description of the situation in the Ukraine told very little about what has happened or what will happen next. The advance may have exhausted the Russians, but not nearly so much as retreat exhausted the Germans. It was evident that the Russian conquests of General Mud could be only partly accounted for by superior technique. In part it was certainly traceable to the simple fact that the Russians had the morale of the winning side. While the Germans wearily struggled with the mud in retreat, the Russians went at their backbreaking, grimy effort with the enthusiasm of men who knew that they were conquering.

By all the rules of the game, the Russian advance ought soon to bog down. The spring floods should halt them--just as mud should long ago have halted them. The irony is that the early spring, which produced mud weeks before the usual time, has produced gradual thaws so that the usual spring floods may not occur at all. At least, the Germans cannot count on them.

If the Russian advance halts soon, as it ought to, the reason is more likely to be the necessity of establishing supply lines across the battered Ukraine so that the Red armies can push on again. This may take time, but meanwhile the Germans have another worry. They reported last week that a Red Army of 1,000,000 men stands ready in White Russia to drive across Poland.

With the German Army weakening, slowly but surely, the Russians know well that the secret of success is to give a weary enemy no rest.

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