One Night at Gela

Early this month Staff Sergeant Jack Foisie returned to the U.S. from the Mediterranean area to report on the home front for the Stars & Stripes. Last week Reporter Foisie turned up in San Francisco, made news himself by letting a big service cat out of the bag.

Said the Sergeant: In the Sicilian campaign last July U.S. guns shot down some 20 U.S. transport planes by mistake.

No longer could the War Department keep its secret from the public. At first War Secretary Stimson gruffly refused to comment. ("I can't ask for a report on what every soldier says when he comes back. ) But before the day ended the old Secretary's bluff was called and the Army and Navy jointly acknowledged that Sergeant Foisie was more than right. On the night of July 10-11 U.S. airborne troops had "received antiaircraft fire from enemy ground forces and from friendly naval and ground forces with losses of 23 aircraft [C-47s] and 410 personnel."

What Happened? The story of one of the wars most tragic blunders was well-known to newsmen--and to the enemy. On the night before the blunder 220 planes took off from North Africa. Faulty navigation and general inexperience dropped all except one battalion of the parachutists in the wrong spots. But that battalion captured its objective and held it against counterattack. On that mission eight planes were lost (none to friendly antiaircraft fire).

Next night the Sicilian campaign commander, Lieut. General George S. Patton, called for reinforcing troops from the 82nd Airborne Division to land within his own lines. Up went 170 planes, each bearing 18 paratroopers. They swung low over the water near Gela.

Navy gunners in the harbor were still panting after a German bombing raid. Someone heard the roar of American engines, mistook them for more Germans. An excited ship captain shouted: "Those friendly planes are bombing me!" A gun roared. Hundreds joined the chorus. Helpless planes began tumbling out of the sky.

On land the 1st Division, which had been warned that U.S. planes were expected, mostly held its fire. But antiaircraft gunners (as well as soldiers with rifles) of the 45th--which had not been warned--joined in the firing. More U. S. planes fell to pieces or burst into flames. Many blood-soaked parachutists tried to jump; some made it.

How many of the 170 planes were damaged the War Department would not say, but some estimates placed the figure as high as 50%. Neither would anyone say whether airborne British troops (also used in Sicily) fared better than the 82nd.

Despite such tragic losses, the effort was not wholly in vain. The airborne troops who escaped their comrades' fire helped to speed up the Sicilian campaign.

Why it Happened. In every big battle, soldiers are killed by their own men (example: Stonewall Jackson at Chancellorsville). Such losses in varying percentages, must be reckoned in the cost of war (though military men are reluctant to admit the public to the reckoning). In Sicily the abnormally high losses obviously were the result in large part of command. Commanders had delayed in notifying ships and soldiers that friendly aircraft were expected. Once the misdirected fire had been begun, trigger-happy gunners became so infected they continued shooting even after their officers had shouted: "Cease firing.

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