Turning Point?

This week Allied air command had sober reason to think they could force the Luftwaffe into a decisive battle with only one result: elimination of Germany's air defenses. They had some reason to think that at least part of that task was already accomplished. Germany's airmen could still fight well--but not every day.

In the overall sense the great air attacks now being launched from England are only the prelude to the unopposed destruction of German war potential and the land invasion that will finally destroy Nazi power. But in the immediate sense, the air campaign is itself a sizeable war, which has inflicted critical damage on the enemy's cities and armed forces.

Double Blade. The Allied air weapon was cutting as a two-edged sword. Air officers welcomed the chance either to dismantle Germany's war industry at trifling cost, or, better still, to whittle down the tiring Luftwaffe squadrons in the process.

Last summer, after frantic efforts, the Nazis had lifted their fighter-plane production to an estimated 1,200 ships a month. Then the Allies opened their methodical campaign against aircraft factories, assembly plants, repair depots. Last week Allied authorities reckoned that the Germans were getting only 25% of the new fighters expected by March.

But it was no guess that the Luftwaffe had lost 301 fighters in two daylight air battles over Berlin last week, and it was no guess that when the U.S. bombers came back in force for a third attack within four days, the Luftwaffe planes did not come up to oppose them.

For a precedent, military historians looked back to the classic battles of landbound days, and wondered if this might be the stage when the weaker side had committed its reserves and was failing. Then the stronger would strike the knockout blow. He would send in his cavalry, ripping through the flagging line, then pour infantry through the breach while his horsemen drove on, carving a decision in the enemy's disorganized rear areas.

The days to come would tell whether the parallel would hold good for the U.S. Eighth Air Force's "heavy cavalry."* But as the most powerful air offensive in history rolled through its third week, the Luftwaffe was behaving exactly like a fighter who finds the going too rugged, knows instinctively that he must break off or risk exhaustion and knockout.

Air Attrition. Early in the week 800 U.S. bombers and nearly 1,000 fighters had fought a terrific battle to, from and over Berlin; 176 enemy fighters were downed, but the German was still impressive, capable. The U.S. losses were the biggest yet: 68 heavy bombers and eleven fighters.

Two days later a slightly smaller attacking force slugged its way in through a thinning overcast and plastered the key Erkner ball-bearing works at Berlin. The air combat was still large scale: 38 bombers and 15 fighters were lost, 125 Nazi planes shot down.

Peace & Quiet. But again next day a similar bombing force went out, and this time the Eighth cashed in on its recuperative powers. Flying above a heavy overcast the U.S. ships sorted out their Berlin targets with secret instruments, got off their bombs.

They flew home in peaceful wonderment. Along the entire 1,200-mile route there was nothing to worry about but flak barrages. Only seven Fortresses and one fighter were lost. American gunners claimed no enemy ships: they had seen none to shoot at.

Even conservative observers wondered whether the week might not have brought an historic turning point of World War II. No Allied airman was so brash as to say the Luftwaffe was not strong enough to go up to fight. Weather, weariness and disorganization from the earlier battles-- any or all of these might have influenced the Nazi fighter command's decision.

But if the Germans could not defend Berlin, then what could they defend? And if Berlin was no longer worth defending, then what center of German pride and might did not face the same fate?

A spokesman for Lieut. General Carl ("Tooey") Spaatz, U.S. strategic bombing chief, reported that "all the losses we have suffered in the first four assaults on Berlin were replaced in a matter of hours. . . . Replacements are now automatic from the huge reserves built up in Britain to sustain the air drive."

Swift Repetition. No German spokesman could make such a boast. The Luftwaffe is not yet entirely committed to inaction; it is still believed to have some 1,100 planes assigned to defend North and West Germany.

But at week's end it was still on the ground. U.S. heavy bombers attacked the railroad yards and repair shops at Muenster in Western Germany and lost not a single aircraft. Four night sweeps by R.A.F. heavy bombers met little or no opposition.

The searing assault went on, determinedly capitalizing on the destructive effects of heavy blows struck with swift repetition. Now is the time to hit hard, and never stop hitting.

* Major General James H. Doolittle. commander of the Eighth, was nominated this week by President Roosevelt for promotion to Lieutenant General.

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