Vindicating the Carrier

Last week two more powerful Essex-class carriers, the Bennington and the Shangri-La, were launched from East Coast shipyards. When they join the fleet, at least eleven of these 27,000-ton flattops will be in operation--barring possible sinkings.

Nine thousand miles away, in the western Pacific, the Navy was busy demonstrating that such carriers, plus smaller cruisers and merchantmen converted into carriers, could operate effectively against Japanese land-based aviation ... a thesis that was once fiercely debated (TIME, June 29, 1942).

Only five days after his task force had struck savagely at Truk Rear Admiral Marc Mitscher was hitting the Japs again: this time the Marianas Islands, 650 miles northwest of Truk, 1,400 miles south of Tokyo, were the targets.

Guam, Too. Douglas and Curtiss dive-bombers roared out of the predawn to smack the twin, 15-mile-long islands of Saipan and Tinian, while Grumman Hellcats provided cover and strafing. Later in the day a second strike was launched on schedule. A smaller delegation of Navy pilots bombed U.S.-owned Guam, 85 miles farther south, for the first time since the Japs seized it in December 1941.

Admiral Nimitz announced the results: one cargo ship sunk, others set afire or damaged; a total of 135 Jap planes destroyed against a loss of six U.S. planes.

But the manner of achievement was more startling than the figures. This time the surprise of the Kwajalein invasion and the Truk carrier blow was missing. The Japs detected Mitscher's force many hours away, sent wave after wave of planes against it. During the night, antiaircraft gunners aboard the carriers and their protective ships knocked down fourteen. Hellcats shot down five others which attacked the force during the morning. The fact that no U.S. ship was sunk (and none admitted to be damaged) provided the best vindication of the carrier's ability to meet land-based planes. Superior numbers of superior aircraft had upset the theorists.

Puzzling feature: if the Japs knew Mitscher's force was coming, why did they lose 87 planes on the ground? Possible explanation: when Japs become confused, or when something goes wrong with their plans, everything goes haywire. Sometimes in their stress they commit suicide because they can think of nothing else to do.

> In the southwest Pacific flyers under command of General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey were busy as beavers. During the week some 500 tons of bombs were dropped on Rabaul, finally made so untenable that no Jap fighters rose to intercept.

Having lost an astounding total of 793 planes at Rabaul since Dec. 17, the Japs apparently decided to lose no more there. Twice more during the week U.S. destroyers shelled Kavieng, which seems next on the list of untenables.

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