The Case

Very few people had any clear idea of the Polish Government, of its case or of the chances of a settlement which would not wreck all the promises of Teheran.

The Poles. The Polish Government has a wide reputation for being reactionary, antiSemitic, utterly unreasonable in its dealings with other powers. This impression is unfair. By comparison with its predecessors, the Polish Government to day is more liberal than any in Polish history. The majority of its members are by no means Fascist-minded, or even reactionary in the non-Fascist sense. By & large, its officials represent a combination of Polish conservative and liberal forces, stanchly combined to preserve a strong and independent Poland between Germany and Russia.

Two important facts qualify this picture of official Poland: 1) the Government still has to reckon with some feudal-minded, unbending figures who are totally unfitted to deal with Poland's plight; 2) the influence of some ultraconservative, violently anti-Russian leaders of the Polish Army is still strong, although they are not actually in the exiled government.

Official Poland's principal spokesman, exiled Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, is an affable, diffident and calm man with a shrewd mind. Last week in London he stood on Poland's official demand for the complete restoration of its borders as they were before Germany and Russia divided the country in 1939. He and other government Poles still look to the U.S. and its people to support the Polish position, even hope for some official U.S. declaration in Poland's favor. Mikolajczyk and his fellow Poles realize that Britain puts a premium on collaboration with Russia at almost any cost, is not likely to come out for the Poles.

"Sit Down and Talk." Yet there are signs that the Polish Government may not actually be so stubborn as its official statements indicated. Said Premier Mikolajczyk last week: "The question of the line is not so important. The greatest problem is to get security for the Polish population. We want no evacuations and we want no revenge taken on our leaders."

He and his Government noticeably did not demand a final showdown when the Red Army entered Old Poland. The Poles, if reasonably approached, may yet be willing to consider the Russian proposal that they surrender at least part of pre-war Eastern Poland, turn to German East Prussia and Silesia for recompense. Essentially, what the Polish Government cries out against is not so much the loss of part of Eastern Poland by postwar negotiation as the prospect that there will be no opportunity for negotiation at all.

Last week, when Mikolajczyk was asked to define "Polish rights," he answered: "A strong, free and independent Poland, with free, happy citizens." Joseph Stalin himself has declared that Russia wants a strong and independent Poland, and that Russia would welcome a Soviet-Polish alliance against the Germans. Says Miko lajczyk: "I want a strong and friendly Russia for the same reason." But the only signs of compromise had come from the Poles. Moscow held rigidly as ever to its demands, underscoring them again this week with the declaration that the "Curzon Line" (see map), well inside pre-1939 Poland, must be the basis of settlement.

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