In the Afterglow

Four weeks after Teheran, the first exuberance was soberly shaking down. In his report to the world, President Roosevelt confirmed what London and Moscow were already saying: the general agreement on broad principles still left thorny, potentially disruptive differences to be settled.

Voice from Moscow.

The fortnightly War and the Working Class, semi-official organ of external Soviet policy, answered some questions about Russia's post-Teheran position:

1) For the Soviet Union's money, the question of the Baltic States is closed. Historically, and by their own choice--in the Russian view--Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are parts of the Soviet Union. Dissent elsewhere, intrigues by Baltic emigres, "Polish imperialists" and propaganda by Hitler will not alter this stand.

2) Poland, a "neighbor" of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia, may join in the Czecho-Russian agreement. But to do so Poland must have the right foreign policy (i.e., one friendly to the U.S.S.R.).

3) The Czecho-Russian treaty points the way to a "general security system" (as desired by the U.S.). But the U.S.S.R. will have no truck with "artificial and lifeless unifications, such as federations, etc."

4) Suspicions that Russia has territorial aims, such as outlets on the Persian Gulf or the Adriatic, are inventions of Hitler; Russia demands full respect of its own territorial integrity, will fully respect the sovereignty and integrity of all other nations.

Voices in Washington.

In Washington there was no such clarity. The U.S. State Department was still on the record with its cold comment on the Czecho-Russian treaty; the unofficial explanation was still that the agreement did not fit the U.S. concept of "overall security." London sources took a precisely opposite view, held with the Russians that the treaty neither contradicted the principles of Teheran nor alarmed the British. One possible explanation: once again Mr. Roosevelt, speaking warmly of the Russians and all their recent works, knew more about actual U.S. policy than the State Department's functionaries did. A corollary explanation may be that the Russians, willing enough to enter an overall system along U.S. lines, are determined first to see that their immediate sphere in Eastern and Central Europe is arranged to their own needs and liking. Doubts will remain, questions will persist until Mr. Roosevelt and the State Department give the world a precise, understandable statement of exactly what "overall security" means.

Voice in London.

Last month South Africa's Jan Christiaan Smuts bespoke a deep-seated British fear that: 1) Russia will be "the colossus of Europe"; 2) Russia and the U.S. between them may well outweigh Britain in the postwar world; 3) Britain herself will be impoverished and endangered by victory (TIME, Dec. 13).

Last week a respected British voice rose in dissent. The London Economist robustly argued that:

1) Russia will indeed be mighty, but will also be internally weakened by war;

2) Britons have exaggerated the probable depth and duration of their own postwar poverty, underestimated their powers of recovery;

3) in any event, the promise of Big Three unity is brighter than all the dark spots.

This argument had a quality in common with other recent British expressions: it reflected a feeling that Britain must make the best of the new Europe and the new world, find hope and safety in unity with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Said the Economist: "Russia's power is growing and will be very great. . . . They have in a variety of ways shown their anxiety to maintain close relations with Britain and the U.S.--by abolition of the Comintern . . . delay [of] the signing of the Russo-Czech pact until the wider settlement at Teheran. . . . In their relations with some of their smaller neighbors they have shown moderation. . . . Europe can be led by Britain and Russia, but not divided between them, or bestridden by them."

The Economist noticeably did not include the U.S. among the "leaders" of Europe. Still troubling the British was the old fear that the U.S. people would again become indifferent to Europe's problems.

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