From Old Lines

For 23 months and 13 days, the Navy had been conserving and rebuilding its strength, shattered at Pearl Harbor.* Despite the pleas of General MacArthur, and the demands of the Solomons campaign, the Navy had built up most of its strength in and for the Central Pacific.

Finally the Navy was ready. Conservative Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, blazed a challenge: "Henceforth we propose to give the Jap no rest anywhere." Last week's move signaled the opening of operations.

It came at a time when the Jap was digging in everywhere, the Allies cautiously moving forward. U.S. warships, ignoring the threat from Jap-held Rabaul, less than 200 miles distant, steamed boldly off the northern tip of Bougainville, and for 45 minutes poured shells into Jap air bases on Buka Island. Reinforced U.S. troops fought grimly in the jungles of Bougainville, wrenching advances of several hundred yards in the Empress Augusta Bay area while engineers rushed construction of airstrips. Australian troops, using Matilda tanks smuggled in secretly at night, increased pressure against the Japanese in the Finschhaven sector of New Guinea.

The Jap, short of planes, possibly even of trained jungle fighters, was grievously hurt. He could not adequately protect both the New Ireland-New Guinea area and the Central Pacific islands with what he had in sight. One battle zone or the other would have to remain weak, or reinforcements would have to be rushed from distant zones. Chungking reports indicated that the Japanese might be doing just this: fleet concentrations were said to be moving south off Fukien Province, and heavy troop movements were taking place from Manchukuo and North China.

* The Solomons and New Guinea campaigns in their early stages were never considered part of a major strategic offensive. They were defensive than offensive, conceived to protect the vital sea lanes to Australia.

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