Bread & Cheese

London Fabians heard another speech from Home Secretary Herbert Morrison. In it the tousled, persistent Socialist hammered down another plank in a platform which, he thinks, will insure Britain a secure place in the postwar world. His views were not necessarily those of the Government; rather, they were indicative of a wide section of British thinking. He spotlighted the deepening concern of all Britons over postwar bread & cheese.

In his latest speech, as in earlier ones, Morrison advocated: 1) a floor under the wages of the world's workers, to be installed and enforced by international agreement; 2) full and responsible public management of Britain's postwar industry.

Wage Floor. The implications of a worldwide minimum wage are enormous. Its proposal by a member of an Empire Government, even in unofficial capacity, is arresting. Was he thinking of China? India? the Malay States? Or was he groping for some Archimedean machine to pull Britain, the U.S., Russia into line on a world trade basis? Morrison said only that his purpose was to eliminate "that worst of all forms of competition, which is based on the abject poverty and misery of the workers in socially backward countries."

Such a wage floor would mean that Britain would give up the sustenance it has drawn from the cheap labor of colonial enterprises for generations; that in a world of ever-increasing industrialization, Britain no longer wants to risk being undersold anywhere, even by its own Empire.

Britain's Problems. Economically, Britain is a factory. Under war controls its efficiency has improved enormously. Britain's problem is to slip into peace without sacrificing this wartime efficiency. Only so, if at all, can returning veterans avoid the dole; only so can at least some of $2,600 million of war-built, publicly owned factories be put into peacetime production; only so can the Beveridge plan become much more than dream security.

For Britain, production alone is not enough. Most of her output must be sold abroad in exchange for money to be translated into food, clothing and shelter. Pre-war Britain bought, from the Empire and the world at large, nearly twice the value of the things she sold. Prewar, this preposterous unbalance was righted by income from shipping, charges for handling money, dividends from foreign investments. Postwar, Britain's merchant ships may no longer dominate the lanes of commerce; foreign investments will have been exchanged for bombers and shells. The factory must produce, and exporters sell, nearly twice the 1938 volume.

Government Control. Informed Britons realize that their ultimate survival depends as much on a solution as on beating Hitler. They are united on the need, divided on how to achieve it. Advocates of private monopoly want to establish world cartels, fix prices by private agreement, guide the flow of goods, save private enterprise. It is an old, accustomed practice.

The argument of those who want the state to take over boils down to this: no factory can be efficient except under one management; no management except government will look after the interests of all the people; government must control, whether or not it actually owns the sources of production.

As laid down thus far, the mechanics of control are manifold. Already the consular and diplomatic service is being revised to place expert market analysts over the world. From them the national factory would learn continuously what the world wants to buy, in approximate quantities. Haphazard manufacture would be eliminated. Workers would be shifted as the need arises. Imports would be watched to see that not too much of the nation's payroll goes for luxuries. Manufacturers in financial straits would be helped by tax money when advisable.

Under such controls, industry would be expected to produce more goods at a lower unit cost, turn a practicable (and perhaps guaranteed) profit for its owners, expand Britain's world markets, produce the additional money needed to sustain life and, eventually, to raise the standard of life.

Whatever the actual nature of postwar controls may be, Britain is being conditioned to go to any length for economic security. If she cannot secure it through international agreement, she is prepared for internal streamlining which could become a formidable weapon in postwar competition. How stubbornly Britain will fight when peace cannot be bargained for, all Britain's history shows.

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