Monday, Nov. 15, 1943
Aftermath and Beginning
The one overpowering fact about the Moscow Conference was still the fact of agreement. Precisely what was said, done, promised or put off was still the guarded secret of the homeward-bound U.S. and British delegations and of their Russian colleagues. London and Washington did not forget that the Moscow meeting was only a preliminary to the promised meeting of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. But in every world capital the declarations had been weighed. A consensus of interpretation developed:
Postponement must have been a large word in Moscow; practically none of the difficult, specific and all-important mechanics for applying the adopted principles had been announced or, apparently, worked out. But in some instances "postponement" must have been the essence of tacit agreement--for example, on the question of Russia's border provinces.
Sovereign Responsibility. The U.S., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and China had accepted, in principle, their responsibility for setting up and backing some kind of international organization after the war. The responsibility would be all the heavier, the task all the harder because the Big Four had pledged themselves to preserve the "sovereign equality" of all member nations, large or small. If that term was to have real meaning, the job could not be done with a big stick. In effect the big nations, including the U.S., would have to underwrite the security and dignity of the little nations.
Consultation. The U.S. Government had taken a historically important step toward international cooperation by agreeing to consult with the Allies "with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations." Consultation could mean anything or nothing; if the promise of Moscow was to be fulfilled, it would have to mean everything. Last week the U.S. Senate affirmed the U.S. agreement to consult (see p. 18).
Two Wars. Cautious escape clauses in the declarations emphasized the fact that Russia is not at war with Japan. That suits the Western Allies now; they have planned their strategy to beat Germany first, and want Russia to exert her full strength in the West. But the question of Russia's Pacific policy will become a matter of red-hot concern in the U.S. when Germany falls; every day that brings Hitler's doom nearer also brings the Pacific question more to the fore.
This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.