REPORT

A year ago, alarmed by widespread and contradictory criticism of U.S. combat planes and its effect on morale, OWI made a survey, published a report. Its warning: no plane can be found good, bad or indifferent until it has met its final test--battle. Its "verdict: although U.S. air power had been caught short of many necessaries (e.g., radio detectors, a system of bases), the U.S. combat .planes that had jought up to the time of the report had already been proven superior to the enemy's, on average. This week TIME updates OWI's report.

One morning last week the cloud cover over northwest Germany thundered. Over the port of Emden a "pathfinder" squadron of Fortresses eased down from the overcast, planted incendiaries. Flames burst from Emden's factories, clocks, submarine repair shops.

More bombers dropped out of the overcast, ghosted through long streamers of cloud below. Their job was easier: the target area could be plainly seen. They made short bombing runs, unloaded while Thunderbolt fighters took on the German pursuit in short, angry dogfights. Then the bombers crawled back into the clouds and headed for home.

In the development of U.S. combat aircraft, Emden had made history. There, for the first time U.S. four-motored bombers showed they were capable of something more than their deadly accurate high-altitude bombing. Without stop in production the big fellows had been made more versatile, could carry heavier bombloads at lower altitudes for the area-bombing for which British bombers are famed.

Now, when the weather is too low for precision bombing the American Fortresses can ride "in the soup" to their targets, unload bigger bombloads because they have achieved a quality which airmen call "interchangeability"--i.e., they can take light loads to high altitudes over long ranges, or they can cut down their fuel load and have bomb-rack room to load up with explosives. At Emden the Fortress load averaged around four tons each. Extra bomb racks had done the trick, without sacrifice of the Forts' defensive power.

Range for Escorts. There was more history at Emden. Never in the European theater had fighters traveled so far (350 miles) to meet German defenders. Never had bombers had such protection over a German homeland target. Even the superb Spitfire has a fighting radius less than a third as great.

Thus the Allies were beginning to cash in not only on a pursuit aircraft that was untried a year ago, but on a U.S. theory of design: long range for fighters. In support of ground troops this quality had been proven dramatically only a fortnight before. Without the range built into U.S. single-seaters Lieut. General Mark Clark's Fifth Army, which got fighter cover on the beach at Salerno, would have had a tough go of it. Without it, the probability is that the landing would have been made farther south with less decisive effect.

Fighter cover is now recognized as indispensable to the landing of troops. Now that the Allies are on the offensive, Salerno and Emden meant that future amphibious operations could make longer leaps and, as Douglas MacArthur said, "Permit the application of offensive power in swift massive strokes."

In the year capped by Salerno and Emden, the Army Air Forces, just finishing off a phenomenal growth of 3,500% in two years (and now bigger than the U.S. Navy), had written a book of tactics, proved new aircraft, broadened the functions of older types. So had the U.S. naval air arm, but on a scale proportionate to its smaller size, its more limited function as a supporting weapon of the fleet.

Precision Bombing. For Army airmen, biggest thing of the year was the final, definite proof of its bombing doctrines. Disregarding the skepticism of British airmen, Major General Ira Eaker of the Eighth Air Force (TIME, Aug. 30) had finally shown that his Fortresses and Liberators could consistently hit pinpoint targets from' altitudes above 20,000, thus be relatively safe from anti-aircraft defenses. His airmen had also shown that with their .50-caliber guns they were more than a match for German fighters. By bombing and gunnery they had become the biggest threat to Germany's vital fighter protection.

Single-Seat Versatility. In single-seater fighter aircraft, the U.S. emerged as the owner of the most dazzling display of any combatant. Working on the aeronautical axiom that "there is no substitute for soup," U.S. designers got their super-powered (2,000 h.p. and above) craft off the production lines and into action. The result was something more than they expected when design was begun, generally three or four years ago.

Beyond higher speeds, longer ranges and better altitude performance, the new fighters also demonstrated an unexpected versatility as light bombers. Meanwhile, designers of models with less power slicked and dressed their products, vastly improved performance, found that their craft, too, had more versatility than they had ever believed possible.

"The Numbers Racket." In this demonstration in combat, the Army Air Forces was quick to see a chance to cut down the complexity of its aircraft equipment, which runs into scores of types with overlapping tactical functions. This airmen call "the numbers racket."

A.A.F., which had to get planes from the U.S. Navy when it took up dive-bombing, discontinued the dive-bomber type, even washed out a converted fighter which had been equipped with diving brakes to make an excellent single-seater dive-bomber.

From now on, the A.A.F. will do its dive-bombing with fighters, contends it can do just as accurate a job in support of troops or against water targets as the Navy can with its two-seated, slower aircraft specifically designed for the job.

But the Navy will stick to the dive-bomber, which has unquestionably been its most potent air weapon. Its contention: the dive-bomber can dive steeply, even vertically against a target, thus has tremendous accuracy; the fighter bomber has to go in at a shallower angle, thus must allow for a looping trajectory in the fall of the bomb. The pilot must also drop his bomb and pull out at higher altitudes to keep from hitting the ground, or water, or risk pulling his plane apart in a violent recovery. The next twelve months should show which service is right.

The Principle of Numbers. To avoid "the numbers racket" Army Air Forces made other production changes, discontinued some models, stepped up the building of others, threw new and still secret models into the production works. To do this while keeping production growing, in bulk, called for the continued production of types which had been outmoded by newer models.

The older types that were continued stiU had their effective uses. But more important than the fact that they were still better than enemy equipment was another consideration which airmen have tentatively labeled "the principle of numbers." This is the principle that the sheer weight of numbers in aircraft gives the holder an advantage over the enemy even if his aircraft are inferior.

Many airmen now think that this, more than real fighting class, explains the high view which many young fighter pilots (and the U.S. public) originally had for the Japanese Zero: it was almost always on hand in overwhelming strength.

One famed Army pilot told his superiors after a fighting tour that "if you have got a hundred AT-6s [advanced trainers] you are a hell of a lot better off than if you have only twelve P-38s [Lightnings]. . . . We found that when we got into the low numbers we took a beating." Many another fighter pilot reported that when his flight had as much as a two-plane superiority. over the enemy his advantage was disproportionately big.

When war is over and air tacticians begin to write, many airmen think the principle may be reduced to a pseudomathemati-cal proposition. ". . . Something," said one, "to the effect that the power of a fighter formation increases as the square or cube of the planes added."

The principle of numbers also applies to bombers, especially in Europe, where their ability to defend themselves and knock down fighters increases out of all proportion as the numoers are increased. So it is that in the U.S.'s huge aircraft production (nearly 8,000 in September) airmen see something more than aircraft of superior quality. They also see numbers as decisive, an outlook that may bind the U.S. to more extensive postwar production of aircraft and a larger peacetime air force than most U.S. citizens now expect.

The Pursuit of Power. Yet the quest for more power in combat aircraft goes on. The new superbombers which General Henry Harley ("Hap") Arnold seriously promised would make "the Fortresses of today . . . the medium bombers of tomorrow" will see service before this war is over. New fighters, which should be better than anything now flying in combat, are now flying in test before production.

Service airmen and civilian designers are well aware that the Germans are probably up to similar developments in engines, new fuels, new aircraft designs. But they are sure that the Germans cannot go as far, as fast, as either U.S. or British industry. Furthermore, they take a nationalistic pride in predicting that the U.S., if it has not done so already, will outstrip the British. For proof they point to the aircraft the U.S. now has in service, little more than two years after U.S. industry got the money and the green light for war-building:

HEAVY BOMBERS

Flying Fortress (Boeing B-17). One of the truly great aircraft of World War II, newly refitted for interchangeability, the B-iy is fast, has superior altitude performance and a defensive gunpower unequaled in any foreign plane. Its accomplishments against German pursuit are legend. They are even more spectacular against the more brittle Jap air force. Example: in one series of 228 sorties in the Pacific, Fortresses met 754 Jap aircraft, destroyed 76, lost only one.

Liberator (Consolidated B-24). Newer than the eight-year-old Fortress, the 6-24 has the same characteristics. Possibly a shade less rugged under enemy gunfire than the Fortress, the 6-24 is slightly faster, has more range, recently had its fighting potency increased by addition of a nose turret. Its fighting and bombing performance in Europe has paralleled the Fortresses' work and it has been pulled out for special long-range work, notably the raid from North Africa on the Ploesti oilfield refineries. In the Pacific, in 161 sorties over a given period, 6-243 met 564 Jap aircraft, shot down 104-three Liberators were lost.

The New Bombers. Nothing may be said about the new bombers (which, will make mediums of the 6-17 and 6-24) except that they have vastly more firepower, range bomb capacity, speed and altitude performance.

FIGHTERS

Airacobra (Bell P-39). Never a favorite with U.S. flyers the P-3Q is the darling of the Russian air force which uses it impartially for ground-strafing and for low-altitude righting of Germany's best pursuits. Production is now being cut back and the Airacobra (except for Russian needs) will be succeeded by a new Bell fighter.

Warhawk (Curtiss P-40). One of the most heavily criticized of U. S. fighters, the rugged null (of the earlier Tomahawk and Kittyhawk series) were the backbone of U.S. defense in the early days of the war, drew many a slam because critics blamed them for results stemming from inexperienced tactics, lack of radar and other cause? outside the aircraft's ability. From Feb. i, 1942 to June 30, 1943, P-405 in all theaters, including Northwest Africa, destroyed 560 enemy craft, damaged 128, while losing 204. Yet the P-4O, of which more than 10,000 have been built, has been surpassed by newei U.S. fighters, is finally being discontinued.

Lightning (Lockheed P-38). This twin-tailed twin-engined single-seater, most unorthodox of all fighters in World War II, has proven a sensation. One of the fastest of pursuits at high altitudes, it can also lug bombs on low-altitude missions, fight its way out when bombs are dropped. Long-ranged and heavily armed, it can do almost anything a medium bomber can do, is one of the world's best and most versatile aircraft.

Mustang (North American P-51). Widely publicized by the British as the most nearly perfect aircraft aerodynamically, the PSI is one of the world's fastest fighters, has recently acquired outstanding high-altitude performance. It is a long-range pursuit aircraft, nimble and heavily armed, and one of the best in the U.S.'s superior assortment of first-line fighters.

The foregoing are powered with liquid-cooled (Rolls-Royce and Allison) engines of substantially less than 2,000 h.p. Makers of the air-cooled engines (Wright and Pratt & Whitney) which drive U.S. bombers and transports, also produce fighter engines. Except for the new Grumman Hellcat, whose Pratt & Whitney engine is still secret as to power, the following types are driven by air-cooled Pratt & Whitney 2,000s:

Thunderbolt (Republic P-47). First fought in the European Theater only a few months ago on a large scale, the turbosupercharged P47 is a hard-hitting, high-altitude specialist. Heavy as the familiar Ford trimotor, it has been used almost exclusively as a long-range bomber escort (as at Emden). Bombers run into comparatively little trouble when P-475 are escorting. The P-475 themselves, against German fighters, knocked down 5.8 German aircraft to every P47 that was lost in one recent month. Its overall ratio, from a fairly unimpressive start is 3.2 to i.

The P47 is the only Army super-powered single-engined fighter yet in service. The Navy has two:

Corsair (Vought F4U). Familiar to aircraft spotters because of its upswept wings, the Corsair was built and is used as a carrier fighter but it is also a era ~k land-based aircraft, so used in the main by the Marines. About as fast as anything in the air, it has great high-altitude performance, is also (because of its high horsepower) versatile enough to carry heavy bombs, torpedoes, or a belly tank.

Hellcat (Grumman F6F). The Hellcat, newest Navy fighter, is also a big super-powered pursuit aircraft. Amazingly "honest"--i.e., untricky--it is ideally adapted to carrier work. Yet it is in the 400-m.p.h. class, has a dazzling rate of climb, is probably the most nimble big fighter in U.S. service. Like other U.S. fighters it can carry bombs, a torpedo, or a belly tank.

The Hellcat superseded the:

Wildcat (Grumman F4F), to which Under Secretary Forrestal of the Navy referred when he said "In my opinion Grumman saved Guadalcanal." Powered by a 1,200-h.p. engine, the Wildcat is still regarded as better than anything the Jap has, is still being manufactured.

DIVE-BOMBERS

Dauntless (Douglas SBD). This is the Navy's one dive-bomber in wide service up to now. Outdated by later design as of Pearl Harbor, it was still all the Navy had, was still better than anything the enemy could show. Result: a spectacular record of destruction of enemy craft at Midway, the Coral Sea and in all the actions in the South Pacific.

HeSldiver (Curtiss SB2C). A later, and on paper a better plane than the Dauntless, the Helldiver has been a bitter production disappointment. Due to go into production about the time of Pearl Harbor it had so many "bugs" that it has only recently been put in service, has not yet seen action.

MEDIUM BOMBERS

Marauder (Martin B-26). One of the fastest of mediums, the B-26 has been denounced as tricky and unreliable. Actually it is a crack performer in the hands of an experienced pilot, has had an especially good record in the European Theater, where fields are good, runways long and smooth. But because it is expensive to make, to maintain, and because manufacturing space is needed for a new type, its production is being reduced and it will work only in theaters to which it is specifically adapted.

Mitchell (North American B-25). Production of the Mitchell will be increased to take up the slack left by Marauder reduction. Famed for the Tokyo raid, the Mitchell has proved a rugged, speedy, well-defended and reliable air craft. It now becomes the U.S.'s chief reliance for medium bombers, a class which in time may be superseded entirely by the more versatile fighter bombers like the Lockheed Lightning.

ATTACK BOMBERS

Boston (Douglas A-20). Long used by the British both as low-level attack bomber and as night fighter (Havoc), the twin-engined A-2O is fast, heavily armed, rugged, typically versatile and a heavy favorite with pilots and-crew. It is also in use in the U.S. Army Air Forces.

Invader (North American A-36). Dive-bombing version of the Mustang, recently discontinued in the Army Air Forces concentration on fighter-bombing.

TORPEDO PLANES

Avenger (Grumman TBF), the world's best, and the Navy's chief reliance since it superseded the Douglas Devastator (TBD) beginning with the battle of Midway. Fast and wellarmed, the big Avenger has plenty of interchangeability, can carry bombs, a huge gas tank, or a torpedo in its bomb bay. Airmen like to tell how an Avenger pilot landed on a carrier, opened up his bomb-bay doors and deposited four hitchhiking sailormen on the deck before he and his crew of two climbed down.

Avenger will shortly have a running-mate, a Vought-designed Torpedo-plane made by Consolidated Vultee. Already in production, it shows promise of even better performance, but airmen are withholding final judgment until the new craft, called Seawolf, gets its test in battle.

TRANSPORTS

Flying the supply lines of the world, the U.S. has its best transports. Besides the old reliable Douglas DC-3 (military versions: C-47 and C-53) and other converted airline models it has three new ones. One is the twin-engined Curtiss Commando (C-46), specifically built for the job and already proven as a rugged, speedy carrier of big loads. The second, with which airmen are even better pleased, is Douglas' Skymaster (C-54), a four-engined modification of the DC-4. The third is the (EUR-87), a cargo modification of the 6-24. It is probably the fastest of the transports, is particularly well-adapted to-the transocean lugging of heavy, concentrated, equipment.

Backing up these types the U.S. has many others in service, including Consolidated and Martin flying boats and a shoal of assorted models which were on hand and could be used. It has many another model on the way, to which airline operators with an eye to postwar aviation look with fond eyes.

Only one of these yet publicized is Lockheed's Constellation, which promises to be one of the speediest and most economical transports ever built. It is now in production. Behind it are others which will be bigger and should be better.

So, in spite of production changes, "the numbers racket" goes on, kept alive by the persistent reaching of designers for better aircraft. U.S. citizens may take comfort from the fact. "The numbers racket" is already winning the war. When war is over and the world is opened to air commerce, it may win the peace.

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