HITLER: "Here I shall remain"

U.S. and British strategists today are deep in a guessing game. Was the Wehrmacht's retreat in Russia a rout or a planned withdrawal? Will Hitler make a stand on the Dnieper Line? (A Swedish daily quoted him: "Here I am and here I shall remain.") If this line falls, where will the Wehrmacht stand next?

The answers vitally affect the Allied strategy. They might supply a hint of Germany's plans. They might reveal grave strains and stresses within the Wehrmacht. They might indicate the Red Army's strength, its future victories, even Stalin's political demands. Yet, to get to the answers, one must cut through many layers of claims and counterclaims, of secrecy and propaganda. Hitler himself hinders clear answers, for he is an opportunist, a gambler, an intuitive strategist who does not plan far ahead.

Summer Retreat. After Hitler's third great offensive gamble in Russia failed last July, he pinned his hope to the Wehrmacht's line of July 5 (see map). But the Red Army counterattacked and one after another Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov toppled. Each loss set in motion the wheels of military necessity and fate. Kharkov's fall necessitated the retreat from the southern bulge. That in turn imperiled the German foothold on the Caucasus. The fall of Orel doomed Bryansk.

In August, the German command knew it faced a major defeat. Its problem then was to withdraw its men and materiel to the next defensible line, on the Dnieper. It has done so with great skill. According to Moscow's claims, Hitler's gamble in July cost the Wehrmacht more than 1,500.000 in dead and wounded, close to 10,000 tanks, nearly 6,000 planes. It cost heavily in space and in morale. But by a series of delaying actions the Wehrmacht was saved.

Hitler's Problems. With this battered army, Hitler can, and will, launch local attacks. But he cannot pit his 220 Nazi and satellite divisions against the Red Army's estimated 275 wellarmed, well-led divisions with any chance of success. Today, Russia's might and the Allied threat in the west make upon him two stern demands: i) He must establish a strong defense line somewhere on the Eastern Front, and 2) he must hoard his precious reserves of men and materiel.

Berlin has made it plain that the Wehrmacht hopes to hold on to the Dnieper Line (see map). In the two weeks which followed the loss of Smolensk, it has yielded only Kremenchug. At some points the front is still as much as 40 miles east of Hitler's defense wall. Yet the Russian pressure is immense. Early this week, most of the bastions of this line--Vitebsk, Mogilev, Gomel, Kiev, Melitopol--were in danger.

Winter Prospects. If the Dnieper Line does not crumble this week or next, it may crumble in the winter, when ice will bridge the river and the Pripet Marshes. The Wehrmacht v.ill then fall back upon its second line, running through the fortresses of Odessa, Zhitomir, Pinsk, Minsk and Riga. If this falls too, the German Army will still have a third line of defense, behind Russia's old frontier. But with each retreat, the Wehrmacht will be weaker, its defense lines less formidable.

With each retreat, also, the poison of defeat will spread. Especially vulnerable will be the Balkans, wrhere the heavy thud of approaching Russian sapogi (boots) might well set off explosive anti-German sentiment. The German command knows well the dangers implicit in these airline distances from the Eastern front: to the Ploesti oil fields, 530 miles; to the old Polish frontier, 95 miles; to Germany proper, 475 miles.

The Red Army has its woes too. Its supply lines are overextended, its highways blanketed with mud, its railroads torn up by the methodical Germans. Its rear is hungry and devastated. The winter, only two months away, presents a harsh problem in logistics. But in the fortnight of fighting weather remaining before the autumnal rains, the Wehrmacht will have to fight hard to hold the Dnieper Line.

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