Monday, Jul. 19, 1943

"There is No France"

When General Henri HonoreGiraud, his white uniform crinkled, stepped out of the giant C-54 transport at Washington's Bolling Field last week, his squinting eyes focused on a shimmering collection of silver stars and gold braid. Generals and admirals were there in profusion to greet him on his arrival from North Africa--but nary a striped pants diplomat or even a State Department functionary on routine protocol.

Thus did the White House heavily underscore its attempt to make the Giraud visit appear as just a military mission. For two days before the tall, scraggly-mustached general arrived, White House Secretary Steve Early had distributed handouts which said, in effect: Not a word of politics will be discussed; this is strictly military.

Two days later, when General Giraud met the U.S. press--in the Conference Room of the Army's Pentagon Building--an Army colonel abruptly informed reporters that only questions on military topics would be permitted.

Franklin Roosevelt told his press conference that there was no news about the visit; he and the general had had a little talk at lunch, but it was all about military problems.

Coincidence. Thus went the White House campaign to strip the visit of all political significance. But at the same time, the U. S. press blossomed with inspired stories (quoting "high officials," "unimpeachable sources") attacking the motives and personality of General de Gaulle. Pet reporters of the State Department and the White House were called in and given confidential tips.

These stories were in exact key with the anti-De Gaulle stories that had poured forth for months from North Africa. The drive became so hot and so obvious that Columnist Walter Lippmann cried: It is time "to stop the official propaganda campaign for Giraud and against De Gaulle."

>Wrote Harold Callender, a New York Times State Department reporter: "In the opinion of high American officials General de Gaulle is less interested in helping to win the war than in advancing his personal political fortunes. ... As to the reports that he has made a deep impression on the French youth in North Africa, the comment here is that the reason is that he personifies the Fascistic impulses that were working among many French youths before the war. ..."

>Admiral William D. Leahy's favorite newsman, the Washington Star's Constantine Brown, reported: High Washington circles had known for a long time that General de Gaulle "wished to create a powerful political machine by which he would hoist himself as the unchallenged ruler of France."

>The 100% New Deal Chicago Sun revived a six months' old anecdote, retold it as a choice bit of gossip. Said the Sun's Inside Washington column: When President Roosevelt was in Casablanca, General de Gaulle remarked that the French people regarded him as the spirit of Joan of Arc. Later, he let drop the comment that the French people thought of him as the reincarnation of Napoleon. To which Franklin Roosevelt jabbed: "General, I think you should make up your mind."

>The United Press fell for the story that the U.S. Government was in possession of information concerning a "secret document": an alleged, Fascist-sounding oath by which De Gaullists swear eternal allegiance to their chief. The enlistment oath, printed in London last April, contained no such clause.

>Said the New York World-Telegram, in an editorial syndicated to the 18 other Scripps-Howard papers: "De Gaullists have stooped to anti-American propaganda of a kind dear to the heart of Hitler. . . . If this keeps up, the United States must curtail its plan to arm 400,000 French forces. . . ."

These stories were more than complaints about De Gaulle's intransigent character, which have been heard before. The new charge of anti-Americanism was added; and last week the British suspended the Fighting French weekly in London for its anti-American tone. (Actually the weekly's tone seemed to have been one of opposition to American interference in French affairs.)

New Line? As the aftermath of North African expediency, the U.S. foreign policy toward France was now out in the open, a policy charted in the White House. And though on the surface it appeared to favor General Giraud over General de Gaulle actually it favored neither of them.

At a White House dinner for General Giraud on the night of the invasion of Sicily (at which, among nonmilitary guests, was Secretary of State Cordell Hull), Franklin Roosevelt raised his glass in a toast to a liberated France, adding: "It is a very great symbol that General Giraud is here tonight. . . ." Yet it seemed to Frenchmen--both Giraudists and Gaullists alike--that the tanned five-star general, who has no stomach for politics, was a virtual prisoner in the U.S., his words censored, his movements circumscribed, his visits outside Washington mysterious.

Earlier that day, at his press conference, Franklin Roosevelt had made a statement which outraged Giraudists and Gaullists everywhere, and which certainly would have shocked the 42,000,000 people of France, especially those risking their lives in the underground, if they had heard it. In reply to a question on the possible recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation (of which Generals Giraud and De Gaulle are co-chairmen), the President said: there is, at the present time, no France, except for the five percent outside France. He would have a hard time erasing that sentence from Frenchmen's minds.

From sources as unimpeachable as those which fostered the anti-De Gaulle stories had come many definite reports that Franklin Roosevelt had won over Winston Churchill to the sacking of General de Gaulle. Only Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden prevented Britain's agreement. Twice, it was said on high authority, Franklin Roosevelt had cabled Winston Churchill, actually suggesting the arrest of General de Gaulle. Churchill refused, but only at Eden's insistence, it was said.

People sought a reason. Why is the President so set against De Gaulle? Why all the inspired anti-De Gaulle stories? No matter how unlovable a personality, De Gaulle is still, to most living Frenchmen, the symbol of French resistance. What is the President's case against him?

The President's case against De Gaulle--which would equally apply to the French Committee--appears to be this: he is convinced that the solution of European problems will be much easier if its basic lines are established by the three big powers--the United States, Great Britain and Russia. The President wants to assure all European powers, great & small, full independence and freedom. But he believes that they need not all be consulted; their voices would complicate a solution or even make it impossible.

He believes that European cooperation cannot be obtained by spontaneous agreement of all parties (due to the new growth of nationalism, the holdover of old jealousies, etc.). Therefore he thinks the shape and pattern of European cooperation should be imposed on them by the Big Three powers.

For that reason Mr. Roosevelt would prefer to have France absent when those solutions are worked out--in short, not only no De Gaulle, but no Giraud; in effect, as he himself had said: no France.

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