Design by Lanza

A clear study of the continent as an invasion objective has come from a remarkable but little-known U.S. Army figure: 65-year-old Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, retired. At his home in Manchester, N.H., Colonel Lanza reads the newspapers, tunes in foreign broadcasts with a short-wave receiver, studies maps, applies the background knowledge acquired during 44 years as an army officer. Results: articles which at times have made General Staff officers gasp and wonder where Colonel Lanza was getting his "secret" information.

Conrad Lanza was born (in New York) of a titled Italian family, according to Army friends. He looked the part in his early army years. Tall, slender, boasting both a mustache and a Vandyke beard, he had been commissioned a lieutenant when he was 20, was a captain at 25. At that time, in 1903, most captains were nearer 40. Lanza played the piano "beautifully," spoke five languages (including French, German, Italian), made a brilliant record as a staff officer, was decorated for his work as an artillery staffer in France during World War I.

In the June issue of the Field Artillery Journal, Colonel Lanza published a piece called Routes into Europe: A Study in Terrain. He did not attempt to predict the time or the places, of invasion, but he did show where it would be easiest, hardest and nearest to the eventual objective--Berlin. Some of his points:

> The coast between Oslo and Knstiansand is a promising place to strike in Norway. Good beaches, space for maneuver, highways and railways leading into the interior are available. But the sea route from Britain is difficult, exposed to air attack for 500 miles. In any event, a movement against southern Norway should be supported by simultaneous, diverting actions against the western and northern coast. Probable opposition: six to 14 German divisions.

> Conquest of Norway would be an essential preliminary to landings which would have a much more direct effect on the enemy: in Denmark, and perhaps then on the Baltic coast of Germany, at a point within 100 miles of Berlin itself. Strongly defended Copenhagen would have to be taken before substantial forces could be landed on the Baltic coasts. But Germany could concentrate perhaps 40 divisions, would have the advantage in the early defense of the narrow Baltic approaches. "Until the German divisions in Germany are drawn off elsewhere [by other invasions or the Russian campaign], an invasion of Denmark does not look prom ising. This time may not be so far off."

> The coast of northwest Germany and The Netherlands coast east of Texel offer a 200-mile route to Berlin. They are heavily defended, fortified for miles back of the beaches, served by railways and roads over which the Germans could quickly concentrate more than 50 divisions. "An invasion here does not seem advisable unless coupled with invasions at other points." One necessary point: Denmark.

> Landings in the Low Countries (Belgium, The Netherlands) south of Texel would have some advantages. The 100-mile sea route from Britain is short enough for rapid reinforcement of the initial landing parties ; the area can be given thorough air cover. The defenses are strong, and the Allied advance would eventually bring the invaders up against Germany's West Wall.

> Invasion points in northern France are some 500 miles from Berlin, but are within easy sea and air distance of Britain. In the end, invasion here and in Brittany ("considered by many as most promising") would require millions of troops, on a front extending, as in World War I, from the English Channel to Switzerland.

> Fifty divisions, including reserves, could man a front stretching 250 miles from a point south of the Garonne River to the French Mediterranean coast. Success south of the Garonne would "isolate the Axis from Spain ... and open the possibility of Spain joining the United Nations."

> Best invasion points on France's Mediterranean coast are west of Toulon, offering excellent lines of advance up the Rhone Valley. Simultaneous landings at Sete and near Narbonne, west of Marseille, would make sense if that port is to be attacked. Forces invading southern France presumably would meet others coming in from the Atlantic.

> Even though the Allies have Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, an advance toward Germany from western Italy would be very difficult and costly, because of the natural barriers of mountains and rivers. Italy's Adriatic, coast would be better, but could be difficult unless southern Italy and the Yugoslavian coast had first been reduced.

> Crete, Kythera, Scarpanto, Rhodes and other German-held islands in or near the Aegean should be reduced before the Allies invade Greece. Once they were taken, the best way to win Greece would be to attack the northern port of Salonika and work southward, instead of trying to seize Athens first. Given firm bases in Greece, the best route (950 miles) to Berlin would be through the Vardar Valley.

Colonel Lanza's overall conclusion: "In view of the enemy's strength, an invasion involving but a few divisions is not promising. Best chance of success appears to be in employing very large forces, at as many different areas as possible, and as nearly simultaneously as practicable. It will be a great and difficult task."

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