The Game & The Trap

The Allied planes over Italy, Sardinia, Sicily and Pantelleria last week were probably harbingers of invasion. But the tempo and concentration of the attacks were achievements in themselves. Unfolding in the Mediterranean was a carefully devised, fiercely executed pattern of strategic bombing.

During the Battle of Tunisia, such bombing had been aimed primarily at the enemy's air-&-water routes. Now it was aimed at the enemy's supply and operational bases, at the enemy air force, and at the enemy's morale. And the weight of the attacks was increasing on a cumulative scale which multiplied the effects of each mission.

The Game. In March, Allied aircraft based in western Africa dropped something over 3,000,000 lb. of bombs; in April, more than 7,000,000 lb.; in May, more than 11,000,000 lb. In two months, the weight had thus more than tripled, and it was still on the rise in June. Furthermore, the concentration had increased.

By May's end, the weight dropped on Sicily had increased 15 times; that on Sardinia, 20 times. The total (5,500 tons on all targets in May) was still 1,000 tons less than the weight the Luftwaffe dropped on Malta in the one month of April last year, but reconnaissance reports testified to the damaging effects on the ports, shipping, railways, air defenses, munitions dumps, oil stores of southern Italy and the islands. Photographs of Pantelleria's single airdrome, for instance, showed black smoke from oil fires, white bursts on the landing field near the entrance to underground hangars (see cut).

This wrecking process had two objectives: 1) to put a long-term strain on Italy's resources; 2) to hamper the enemy's efforts to amass sufficient reserves of food, munitions and transport for the defense of the islands which cannot long subsist on their own resources.

The Trap. The Luftwaffe and the satellite Italian air force are in a bad way. The Luftwaffe did not attempt to ward off Allied attacks on Italian ports until May 19, when the Germans lost 29 planes. On one day in late May, 91 Axis planes were destroyed on the ground, 27 in the air. Fifty-eight out of 59 were wrecked on one field alone. Monthly tabulations of Allied and Axis losses speak for themselves:

February: Allies 102 planes; Axis 167 March 109 285 April 198 649 May 108 337*

The Axis is trying to conserve its remaining air forces. The Luftwaffe's Field Marshal Albert Kesselring sends his fighters in only when he expects local superiority over a particular target, seldom has the superiority even then. For these tactics, Kesselring must have mobility. But his forces can be only as mobile as his gas and oil supplies. The more his dumps are bombed, the more immobile he becomes.

When he lies low, the Italian bases he is supposed to protect are open to heavier & heavier bombing. The Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean is in a closing trap.

*May losses do not include planes destroyed on the ground.

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