The Plans Are Laid

Washington this week was the center of the Allied world. In the map-paneled rooms of strategic war councils such men as Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell, British Commander in Chief in India, U.S. Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, Britain's Chief of the Imperial General Staff General Sir Alan Francis Brooke and many others were working out details of Allied strategy for months ahead. In their hands lay the disposition of armies awaiting action all over the world.

Dominant in the Washington world was bullnecked, beaming Winston Churchill. He was there with a purpose beyond that of conferences with his allies. In Casablanca he and Franklin Roosevelt had planned actions now under way. In Washington they reached decisions which will not mature for months--months in which Allied unity may be given a severe trial. Already, as the two men conferred, voices were raised in the U.S. against their war planning, which gave priority to the theater in Europe (see col. 3). To still these criticisms, to convince the U.S. people of the wisdom of Allied strategy, Churchill spoke to the U.S. Congress. It was obvious that he could not reveal details, but his speech showed in general outline what Allied leaders foresaw.

The Simple Truth. The Allies long ago made a strategic choice: beat Hitler first, then crush Japan. To the critics of this decision Churchill opposed a "simple truth": while "the defeat of Japan would not mean the defeat of Germany, the defeat of Germany would infallibly mean the ruin of Japan."

This was the basis of Allied strategy, and with it went a British promise. The Prime Minister said: "I am here to tell you that we will wage that war [against Japan] side by side with you . . . while there is breath in our bodies and while blood flows through our veins." The proof of British sincerity lay in the record of Britain's losses in the Far East--"the largest military disaster in British history. All this," added Churchill, "has to be retrieved."

With Europe holding its priority rating, how would the Far Eastern war be waged? For the moment, said Churchill, the U.S. would remain mainly responsible for prosecuting the war against Japan, "and indeed the major part of the U.S. forces is now deployed on the Pacific front." But he indicated offensive actions:

> In Burma (see p. 33): "A notable part of the war against Japan must, of course, be played by the large armies and by the air and naval forces now marshaled by Great Britain on the eastern frontiers of India. In this quarter there lies one of the means of bringing aid to hard-pressed and long-tormented China."

> By air (see p. 34): "It is all agreed between us that we should at the earliest possible moment . . . bring our joint air power to bear upon the military targets in the homeland of Japan."

This would be the Allied strategy in the Far East. What of the European theater?

War on the Sea. In the offensive against Europe, Churchill still rates "the U-boat danger as the greatest we have to face." But he predicted confidently: "It will be not only met and contained, but overcome."

War in the Air. As Churchill spoke to Congress, the air offensive against Germany was in full swing (see col. 3). On the effectiveness of this campaign a major Allied hope was based. Said he: "It is our settled policy . . . to make it impossible for Germany to carry on any form of war industry on a large or concentrated scale, either in Germany, in Italy or in the enemy-occupied countries. Wherever these centers exist or are developed, they will be destroyed and the munitions populations will be dispersed. . . . And this process will continue ceaselessly with ever-increasing weight and intensity until the German and Italian peoples abandon or destroy the monstrous tyrannies which they have incubated and reared in their midst.

"Surveying the whole aspect of the air war, we cannot doubt that it is a major factor in the process of victory."

War on the Land. In North Africa, Allied troops waiting for their next campaign (see p. 30) heard the Prime Minister's forecast: "The African war is over. . . . Other operations . . . will follow in due course."

The Gravest Danger. Only the highest Allied leaders knew what operations are in prospect in the next phase of World War II. Churchill spoke of them with the confidence of a man who knows of plans well laid. But he recognized clearly one latent, mortal danger to these plans--the basic strategy of the enemy's defense against them. Said he:

"There is one grave danger which will go along with us until the end. That danger is the undue prolongation of the war. It is in the dragging out of war at enormous expense till the democracies are tired or bored or split that the main hopes of Germany and Japan must now reside. We must destroy this hope as we have destroyed so many others."

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