Consternation Piece

Last week the public witnessed, and U.S. strategists suffered, an extraordinary outbreak of what Washington calls local-itis. Symptoms of this disease appeared in Alaska and the Aleutians (see p. 26), but the most virulent manifestations occurred in the Southwest Pacific area commanded by General Douglas Mac-Arthur. In conjunction with subordinate commanders and Australian politicians, he waged a public campaign, through the press, to compel a major and immediate change in U.S. strategy. ^ General MacArthur said from Australia: "The range of our air force over surrounding waters marks the stretch of no man's sea which is the measure of our safety. If we lose the air, naval forces cannot save us. ... The Allied naval forces can be counted upon to play their own magnificent part, but the battle of the Western Pacific will be won or lost by the proper application of the ground-air team."

> General Sir Thomas Blarney, Australian commander of Allied ground forces in the Southwest Pacific, gave point to Mac-Arthur's generalizations by remarking of the Japanese enemy: "He is now building up really big forces in this area. He has now 200,000 men and a proportionate number of airplanes. ... He is now attempting to obtain control of the air preparatory to taking the initiative." -- Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, while acknowledging increased Japanese air activity, said: "You must remember that an attack on Australia must be accompanied by a tremendous sea force, and there is no indication of any such concentration. The only way the Japanese can get to Australia is by ship."

> A spokesman for General MacArthur tried to answer Secretary Knox. He said that Japan held a big naval combat fleet in the Truk area, within three days' steaming of Australia. Since it was common knowledge that this concentration had been based on Truk since approximately 1936, and since Mr. Knox's statement obviously referred to a putative concentration of troopships for an immediate invasion, the Army spokesman's comment was the week's sourest note.

>The week's most sensible and concrete points were made by MacArthur's air commander, Lieut. General George C. Kenney, just back in Australia from Washington. General Kenney made a point about supply lines: "When we shoot down a plane, the Jap replaces it in a few days. When he shoots down one of ours, the replacement has to come a long way and it takes time." He also made the point that U.S. and Australian airmen are now greatly outnumbered: "We are forced to shoot down four or five to one to keep the score straight. That's a pretty heavy burden on the boys. I'd like to tell them they could shoot down one for one and still be all, right."

> Australia's Minister for External (Foreign) Affairs, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, who had just arrived in Washington from Australia, translated this disparity in ominous terms: "This week Port Moresby experienced its 106th air raid when 100 Japanese planes attacked the garrison. . . . The heaviest attack yet made on Rabaul by [Allied] forces of the Southwest Pacific Area has consisted of 37 aircraft."

> Finally Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson said: "The needs of the Southwest Pacific are being kept constantly in mind and there will be a constantly increasing flow of military supplies, particularly aircraft, to that theater."

The net result of this consternation piece was that: 1) Americans at large believed that an invasion of Australia soon was possible; 2) Australians believed that a rapid and immediate increase of air power in the Southwest Pacific was probable. Actually, one of the assumptions underlying American war strategy is that invasion of Australia is unlikely. One effect of this strategy, with its first emphasis on Europe, is that anything beyond very gradual increase in Pacific air power is now impossible.

What the Japs Want. The situation in the Southwest Pacific had not suddenly changed in any important respect last week, except that the Japanese haa begun to cash in on four to six months' gradual preparations along their 6,000-mile defensive arc. For some time they had been building airstrips, until now there were 65 between Timor and Munda. For some time they had been moving troops to a maze of forward garrisons, until there were seven to ten divisions in line. Some of these were good troops: one division had fought several months in China against the Communist Chu Teh, another had fought through Burma, another through Malaya. For some time a pool of perhaps 250-300 aircraft had been gradually building up at Rabaul, a reserve pool and a Zero assembly plant at Kavieng. Wewak on New Guinea had been developed into an advance base, now that the Lae-Salamaua area of eastern New Guinea was so clearly dominated by Allied power.

Last week these preparations bore fruit. Four times within a week the Japanese undertook a raid with nearly 100 planes: against shipping in the Solomons (TIME, April 19), in Oro Bay and Milne Bay on New Guinea, and against the docks and ground installations at Port Moresby. Allied forces claimed they had shot down 121 planes in these four raids, but the raiders too did some damage. Allied planes also sank two ships out of a convoy of nine which probably succeeded in putting supplies ashore at Wewak.

All this did not presage an imminent invasion of Australia. On political grounds, such an invasion would not fit into the Japanese pattern of conquest: Australia is a white man's land, and if Japan moves forward again, it is more likely to be in the direction of India, where Asiatics might be persuaded that they want Asia for themselves. Militarily it would call for tremendous expenditures, at a time when Japan must dig in on a long periphery. Raids and smaller invasions along the Allied supply line to Australia would cost less and avail almost as much. Even Australians are not inclined to take invasion seriously.

Australians do believe that the Japanese want Milne Bay and Port Moresby very much, and that they will try to take them, no matter what the cost. Their capture would clear the Allies out of New Guinea, deny Torres Strait to Allied shipping, give the Japanese forward bases from which to bomb northern Australia, and forge the final links in a chain of defensive holes in the ground that would stretch from the Solomons to the Aleutians.

Port Moresby must be held, Australians feel. Therefore control of the air must be held. But complaining to the press will not bring bombers on the wing.

What the Japs Have. A popular error in thinking about the Pacific war is to consider it only in terms of immediate Jap threats to any given point. The Japs think in larger terms. They have gradually solidified their defense lines from Rangoon to the Gilbert Islands, from the Philippines to the Marshalls, from the China coast to the Aleutians. Implicit in these moves is a strategy first of conquest, then of defense, finally of negotiation. The more the Japs can get and hold, the less may be taken away from them at the peace table--especially if the enemies of Japan are by then weary of war and of attack against one defense line after another. Thus the Jap wants Milne Bay and Port Moresby, so that, among other things, the people just outside the barricades may be kept continuously in a defensive frame of mind.

With a spider web of bases throughout the conquered zone, the Japs hope to be ultimately impregnable, except to attack at incredible cost. The building of this web does not, of course, preclude the possibility that the spider may strike at one or more points around the fringes of the web, in order to prevent his enemy from cutting any of its strings. Such strokes, though apparently offensive, would fit into the defensive pattern.

Fundamentally, it is a realization of these things which impels MacArthur and the men around him to plead for men, planes, ships to attack the Japs now. The high commands in Washington are also aware of the Japanese purposes, and of the danger. The great gamble of this war, to which America and Britain are now committed, is that the danger in Europe can be faced and removed first, and that there will then be time and the military strength to turn in full might upon the Japanese.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.