Hold the Line

In the battle against inflation, Franklin Roosevelt had talked a tough war and fought a weak one. By last week the enemy could no longer be stalled off with words. The President had to make his stand and fight--or retreat in disorder.

He chose to stand, and dug in. At week's end, he was holding firmly.

Only Way. The President issued a new order on price control. He explained:

"To hold the line we cannot tolerate further increases in prices affecting the cost of living or further increases in general wage or salary rates except where clearly necessary to correct substandard living conditions.

"No one straw may break a camel's back, but there is always a last straw. We cannot afford to take further chances in relaxing the line. We already have taken too many. . . .

"Some groups have been urging increased prices for farmers on the ground that wage earners have unduly profited. Other groups have been urging increased wages on the ground that farmers have unduly profited. Any continuance of this conflict will not only cause inflation, but will breed disunity at a time when unity is essential. . . .

"I am exerting every power I possess to preserve our stabilization program.

"I am sure the Congress will cooperate."

Battle Plan. With these words, Franklin Roosevelt conceded something every citizen had learned in the market place: for all its strong talk, the Administration had retreated and retreated again. In his executive order, he outlined a braver battle plan:

> The Administration will put dollars-&-cents price ceilings on the foodstuffs and goods that make up the average citizen's cost of living. Prices already out of line will be pushed back, if possible, to last September's levels. Only foods not yet at parity will be free to rise.

> Wage and salary increases will be limited to the terms of the Little Steel formula, which allows a 15% rise since the beginning of 1941. No other raises will be permitted except to "correct substandards of living" or to accompany legitimate promotions.

> As a check on pay rates, the War Manpower Commission was authorized to stop citizens from moving to higher-paid jobs, unless the change in employment would aid in the war.

Implementation. There was nothing startlingly new in this strategy. Franklin Roosevelt had laid down much the same plans before. Cynics noted the similarity of his three important pronouncements last year: his "seven-point program" of April, his Labor Day message to Congress, his "general stabilization order" last October.

But the important thing was that this time the Administration seemed to mean it. The President turned over ample price-control powers to Economic Czar James F. Byrnes. Within two days, action began all along the front:

> The War Labor Board instructed all its regional offices to make no exceptions to the Little Steel formula. The formula had been under attack by the A. F. of L., C.I.O. and John L. Lewis.

> Price Boss Prentiss Brown drew up ceilings for wheat, cotton, fresh fruit, seeds from which oil is pressed.

> The Administration mustered all its Congressional forces to hold tight against the farm bloc's Pace Bill, which would tack farm-labor costs to agricultural prices, or of the Bankhead Bill (already vetoed by the President, but still resur-rectible), which would raise parity prices by pretending that Government benefit payments are not really farm income.

> Food Administrator Chester C. Davis made a three-pronged attack on the price imbalances which have worsened the meat shortage. He lifted by 5-c- the feed-corn ceiling, which had practically paralyzed the market, in order to start corn moving to cattle growers again. He raised the floor price of hogs from $13.25 to $13.75 to guarantee hog growers a fair return. And for the benefit of packers and the public, he got ready to slap a $14.50 ceiling on live hogs, recently selling at $16.

Elements of Victory. All these actions were happily timed, for last week the inflationary forces which had pushed the U.S. to the brink were divided among themselves. Jimmy Byrnes had been shrewdly spreading the gospel that inflation benefits nobody--and his missionary work had finally brought results.

The farm bloc was convinced, for the moment at least, that higher farm prices would do farmers less good financially than they would John Lewis as an argument for higher wages. The Bankhead Bill was sent back to committee, to serve only as a club in case the Administration weakened to Lewis. The Pace Bill also languished in committee. Farm Lobbyist Ed O'Neal protested that he was "dumfounded" by the President's new price orders, but his bright old eyes twinkled.

No outcry came from the old-line labor leaders, either C.I.O.'s Phil Murray or A. F. of L.'s Bill Green. Only John Lewis stormed and raged.

Franklin Roosevelt now had the elements of victory at hand: a strong line, a divided opposition, a vast public support. He also had a final responsibility: to retreat no more.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.