Rubber: The Last Word

The fight over synthetic rubber was finished (TIME, Feb. 8). The issue--how many synthetic rubber plants Czar William Jeffers could build without using materials needed by the Army & Navy--was ancient history. The decision was already on the books: Economic Czar James F. Byrnes, as referee, had decided to let Jeffers build plants for 452,000 tons, 43.6% of the amount called for by the Baruch report.

But in Washington's tumult nobody had heard the gong. So last week, before a joint session of House Military and Naval Affairs subcommittees, blunt Bill Jeffers roared again that Army & Navy factory expediters were "loafers" who made off with materials he could have used better. An audience of top military men looked on in angry silence. Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson and Under Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal roared back at the Czar.

Fight v. Fact. The fight was Washington's most tragic waste of time and energy. The facts were clear, their meaning simple. Nobody had any business taking issue with them.

Fact 1. Synthetic-rubber plants, and the refineries which make high-octane gasoline for the Army's airplanes, both use heat and pressure processes which require boilers, hundreds of valves, condensers, pumps, gauges, instruments. Thus they conflict with each other--and with the Navy's escort vessel program, which requires much the same type of "component part."

Fact 2. The Army's gasoline program has been expanded and re-expanded as aircraft production increased. The Navy's escort vessel schedules, off to a slow start and interrupted by shifts in strategy, have been stepped up to cope with the U-boat. The Baruch rubber report, with its recommendation for 1,037,000 tons of capacity, was drawn up before anybody knew how many component parts would be needed elsewhere.

Fact 3. Manufacturers of valves and boilers have not been able to keep up with the demand. They are increasing their output: by year's end component parts will probably be no problem. But today, and probably until June, these parts constitute a bottleneck which only time can break.

Fact 4. One of the three conflicting programs must suffer: rubber, escort vessels, or high-octane gas. Jimmy Byrnes has decided--wisely, but after a long delay --that the last 585,000 tons of capacity in the Baruch rubber recommendations can best be spared for now.

Fight v. Order. The Army's Patterson learned how to be dogged as well as judicious while he was on the Federal bench. As Under Secretary of War, he does his job as he sees it, without fear of bruises or cuts. The Navy's Forrestal is as calm, soft-spoken and neat as any other onetime investment banker--but he also knows how to fight for what he thinks is right. And rubber's Jeffers, a tough customer who came up from section hand to railroad president, will take his coat off at the slightest provocation.

In this quarrel, Jeffers was on the losing side. But the fault was not his. He had clear marching orders: to carry out the Baruch program, down to the last valve and pressure gauge. Like any good soldier, he was ready to keep marching until he dropped--or until his chief gave him new orders.

In any well-organized army, soldiers who obey their marching orders stay out of trouble and win the fight. But in disorderly Washington, Jeffers got nothing but sore feet for his pains. He made a lot of enemies, convinced many an observer that his "bulling through" was simply bullheaded, got a dressing down this week from the House subcommittee. But Washington needs more men who will risk their hides to carry out their orders. It also needs policymakers--and organization--which will guarantee that the orders make sense.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.