Victory and Responsibility

In the secrecy of their voting booths the American people last week brought about a sweep for an opposition party the like of which the country had not seen since the depression-ridden days of 1930. It was interesting but idle to speculate on what might have happened had the elections been held this week, after the sweeping, magnificently planned assault on Africa. But the democratic process had once more been observed, the people had judged, and the Republican Party became almost co-equal in power with the Democrats.

In a light vote, but one that had an almost uniform pattern of expression, Republicans, by winning 44 seats, came within an inch of controlling the House (222 to 209, with four minor-party representatives) ; grabbed off nine seats in the Senate; and moved governors into the big and potent States of New York, California and Michigan. Although the Democrats still controlled Congress, States which will now be governed by Republicans have a population of 76 million and an easy majority in the electoral college. Down to defeat went such stalwart New Dealers as Oklahoma's Josh Lee and New Jersey's William H. Smathers, such New Deal sympathizers as Nebraska's venerable George Norris. The New Deal, on shaky ground since 1938, had now clearly fallen from its crest; if the conservative elements of the Democratic Party were eliminated, it would virtually become a minority party.

Surprise. As in the wartime election of 1918, when Democrats made pre-election claims of gains only to lose the House, the election confounded most politicos and analysts. Perhaps the most surprised was Dr. George H. Gallup, whose American Institute of Public Opinion had predicted that Democrats would, at the very least, lose just one House seat and that they might even gain 19. Dr. Gallup blamed it on the low turnout of voters: he had counted on 30,000,000, but only 26,000,000 went to the polls, All signs had pointed to apathy; but it was the Democrats who were the most apathetic. Most important: they lost the independent vote which had once been their strength.

Nor could the nation's press take claim for much astute reporting. It, too, completely failed to gauge the breadth of Republican sentiment. One reporter who had sensed the trend was the St. Louis Post-Dispatch's able, amiable Irving Dilliard, who, in the New Republic on Sept. 7 set down a multitude of reasons for possible big Republican gains. Some of them: dissatisfaction with the military, failure to come to grips with inflation, politics as usual, "feather bed" regulations for labor, bungling censorship, Congress' descending reputation.

Another who sniffed the winds of revolt was Franklin Roosevelt. After his secret trip through the country, there was a quickening of action in Washington. By speaking of "Washington" as if it did not include him, he seemed to be trying to dissociate himself from the election. But the subsequent invasion of Africa confounded those critics who like to impute political motives to Franklin Roosevelt's conduct of the war.

Parallel. Three months after the fateful 1918 elections, Woodrow Wilson, having recovered from his first bitterness, gave his considered explanation of the result: "To be perfectly plain, there was not in the minds of the country sufficient evidence that we had supported some of the great things they were interested in any better than the other fellow." The 1942 parallel was striking.

Partnership Party. The Axis could take no comfort from the election, and made only the feeblest attempts to do so. As concerned the war, the mandate was clear: the Republican Party was now a full-fledged partner. No longer could the Republican minority in Congress sit by as grandstand critic, make its protests for the record, leave policy up to the New Deal, take none of the responsibilities and wait to capitalize on the mistakes. Henceforth, if the war went badly, the G.O.P. would share the blame.

Ahead, for the G.O.P. lay a forked road. If it followed a path back to old G.O.P. isolationism and reaction; if, in Congress, its members combined with conservative Democrats to form a haggling opposition, the path would lead to disaster. But its leaders called for cooperation. House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin Jr., glad at last to retire from the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee, asked for a joint Democratic-Republican House and Senate Committee on the conduct of the war. A similar proposal came from Michigan's Senator Vandenberg.

The resurgent opposition extended its hand; it was up to the Democrats to clasp it. If both work together, 1942's election--which Charles A. Lindbergh and like had feared might never be held--could go down in history as one of the most beneficial.

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