Monday, Sep. 21, 1942
By Their Words ...
From Winston Churchill's speech last week and Franklin Roosevelt's speech a few days earlier (TIME, Sept. 14) the world received a little insight into Allied military thinking, a glimpse of the official point of view on Allied strength in 1942-43:
The Second Front in Europe is still a future front. Winston Churchill remarked only that he had convinced the Russians of "our loyal and sincere resolve." A pillar of Allied strategy is still the conviction that "the Russians will hold out" (Mr. Roosevelt's fateful words) until the U.S. and Britain can move against Hitler. The possibility that Russia may by then be reduced to a limited defense, with its corollary that if the Allied armies strike later they will have to be strong enough to meet the main might of the Wehrmacht, was not hinted at either by Roosevelt or Churchill.
The Air Front over Europe is still a secondary front. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt suggested the idea that bombing might destroy the German war-production machine, or that Allied air strength should be concentrated in Europe at the expense of other theaters. News that U.S. air commanders in Britain were begging for "at least 300" heavy bombers indicated how few the U.S. yet had in Europe. Mr. Roosevelt reflected the orthodox Army view when he said: "The power of Germany must be broken on the battlefields of Europe."
The Middle East will be defended from Egypt to Persia. Winston Churchill also left the impression that North Africa may soon be the scene of an Allied counteroffensive ("I might say more"); that British troops may soon join the Red Army in battle against the Germans south of the Caucasus.
The Pacific is still defensive area. ("The Japanese . . . will undoubtedly strike hard again" -- Roosevelt.) Neither Franklin Roosevelt nor Winston Churchill mentioned the possibility of a Japanese attack upon Russian Siberia; their speeches reflected more concern about a Japanese drive through India toward a juncture with the Germans in the Middle East.
Silent Indicative? The many omissions in the Roosevelt-Churchill speeches did not bar the possibility of second frontlets: in Norway, in Africa, at all points along the coast of German Europe where the Allies may repeat and expand their experiment at Dieppe ("an indispensable preliminary to full-scale operations"--Churchill). In full view of Luftwaffe cameras, British ports were abustle with preparations, with the unceasing influx of U.S. troops. From somewhere in the area of silence, Winston Churchill patiently expected to hear loud noises, and to hear them soon.
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