Lessons from Defeat

That the British met disaster in Libya, and in the first stages of the battle for Egypt, was something for the U.S. to ponder prayerfully: the U.S. Army has yet to meet and beat the German Army in World War II. And, for British and U.S. military men alike, Libya and Matruh held many a lesson.

Brains still win, and the Germans had the best brains. A World War I subaltern in the Kaiser's Armies, who later became Hitler's personal thug, General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel has become one of the most competent soldiers of his time.

His tricks and tactics were not essentially new. An old-fashioned ambush broke the back of Britain's armored forces in Libya. Tobruk and Matruh fell to typical shock assaults by land and air. In the U.S. Civil War, Stonewall Jackson and William Tecumseh Sherman won battles and made great advances just as Rommel did--by forced marches and surprise attacks when, according to the rules, their armies should have been resting for the next round.

The best guns were German guns, particularly their 88-mm., all-purpose field pieces, which blew the British tank forces to shreds. These guns should have been no surprise; they are standard German equipment. But Rommel massed them in unprecedented numbers, towed some in conventional fashion, mounted others in self-propelled units. In last year's Libyan campaign, the British confounded Rommel with their lighter, but then effective, 25-pounders. He took the lesson to heart, this year outdid the British in their own anti-tank tactics.

The best tanks were the German Mark IVs. Short on speed, engine power and armor protection, these tanks confirmed a U.S. doctrine which the British accepted last year, but did not put into effect in time for Libya and Egypt: that, above all else, tanks must have superior fire power. The Mark IVs main guns were better than anything in most of the British tanks. The British had many U.S. medium tanks ("General Grants") which theoretically outgunned even the Mark IVs. But the Grants had a serious fault: their main guns' limited field of fire.

Air power was as vital as it has been elsewhere in World War II. The fact that the British had more planes in the air most of the time proved that the Nazis put their planes to better use than the British did.

The Luftwaffe laid the foundations for Rommel's victory by concentrating the right kinds of planes where they would do the most good: over the narrow Mediterranean area through which supplies flowed to Rommel by sea and air. If the British in turn had concentrated enough long-range fighters and bombers against Rommel's lifeline, he might have been beaten before he started. Instead, the British did what the Axis expected them to do. They tried, and failed, to hold the Mediterranean primarily with warships, and they concentrated their Mediterranean aircraft on the defense of Malta. Even now, properly used in the Mediterranean, as many bombers as the British sent over Bremen might make Alexandria and Suez secure.

The R.A.F. never went all out against Rommel's troops, tanks and artillery. This failure was the result of deliberate policy. The Air Staff in London long ago convinced itself that aircraft was not effective against troops, tanks and guns in actual zones of combat--and thus lacked planes adapted to such attacks. Instead, the R.A.F. concentrated its attacks on: 1) enemy planes; 2) airdromes and supply lines in Rommel's immediate rear. British pilots, many of them in U.S. planes, raised hob with such targets. But that was not enough. At the pinch Rommel still had enough tanks, guns and supplies. And he had the dive-bombers to crack Bir Hacheim, Tobruk and Matruh.

Too Much Air? Just as ground armies must be air-minded, so must air forces be ground-minded. In North Africa, as in every other theater of World War II, the Luftwaffe was ground-minded; the R.A.F. was rigidly air-minded. Rommel had absolute command of all German and Italian air units; Britain's Generals Ritchie and Auchinleck had none, except through their warming, thoroughly British and thoroughly inadequate personal contact with Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham.

Other basic faults in organization--well-known to many & many a Briton--hamper the British Army. One of the gravest is in Britain's armored divisions, whose auxiliary units of infantry and artillery are merely "attached" to the main forces and may be detached at any time. In the German and U.S. Armies, armored divisions are firmly welded units, with tanks, artillery, infantry and even aviation permanently under the same command. The British Army's tenacious hold upon its ancient & honorable distinctions goes deep into British character; but it is no help at beating the Germans.

Forever England? The most important fact about the British in World War II cannot be found in communiques, nor in battle reports, nor in the graves of Malaya, Burma and Africa. It is a military fact, but it is also a human and very British fact. The real, the lasting strength of Britons is in Britain--in the bombed slums of London, the neatly piled rubble of Coventry, the countrysides where U.S. soldiers are now breathing the air of England. On the record of World War II, the one great British success has been in the defense of Britain. It is easy to say--as many people said last week--that the British lack the offensive spirit. It is fairer and more realistic to say that 20th-century Britons fight best when home is the stake.

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