After Honduras, What?

It has been a great week for India. President Roosevelt included us in the list of United Nations, after Honduras. Is it constitutionally correct to describe India as a United Nation? What is a nation? The Axis says a nation is the product of blood and soil and a roaring Fuehrer. The Democrats of Britain say a nation is made of a stable pound, good public schools and a lot of people making a lot of dollars between making a lot of whoopee. Is India a nation by any of these tests? No sir.

--the Hindustan Times.

Ever since India turned down Britain's offer of post-war independence, the U.S. press has cracked down on India's political leaders. A rash of cartoons has shown Gandhi as a loony bag of bones bent on balking the Japanese by lying flat in his breechclout. Solemn editorials have smeared the Indians. Typical was that of the Washington Post: "The responsibility for the failure must be placed squarely at the doors of the All-India Congress party. Its leaders are men deficient in statesmanship . . . petty, confused in mind."

Timeless Treasure. The West finds it difficult to understand how Indians, at a moment when Japan is at their gates, can occupy themselves with opposition to Britain. The West cannot be expected to have a clear mental picture of the dirt-poor, uneducated majority of India's 389,000,000 people. If it did, the West might realize that most of them think they have very little to lose to Japan, and little knowledge of Japan to begin with. To fight, they would need a strong incentive.

Many Indian leaders feel that immediate independence would be the strongest possible incentive. Said Jawaharlal Nehru last week: "The people of England feel that this is their war and they have a job to do, but this is lacking in the people of India. They don't know their job and don't wish to fight under the British Raj."

The war is only part of it. The West, absorbed in its own battles, cannot feel the reality of India's long battle for independence. Twentieth-Century, liberally educated Indians are apt to think: "Let bygones be bygones as far as Britain and India are concerned. Where do we go from here?" But below their liberal speculations they are also apt to feel a bitterness against Britain which even common danger cannot fully assuage. Even the most liberally educated Indian watches Britain's moves toward India with ultrasensitivity.

Treasure Seekers. In the stifling-hot Indian town of Wardha last week, the top men of the Congress party had their heads together. The West first, heard that both Gandhi and Nehru were demanding that Britain "get out of India" immediately. But as the Congress leaders amplified their thoughts, it appeared that this was a faulty impression:

Nehru had indeed joined Gandhi in demanding that Britain "get out" politically; that India be given independence at once. But Gandhi wrote that the British military forces "may need to remain in India to prevent a Japanese occupation. That prevention is common cause between them and us. It may be necessary also for the sake of China." Thus Gandhi had retreated far from his stand for nonviolent nonresistance only. But he also made it clear that he still believes in nonviolence as the best defensive technique for most of India's millions, whose only weapons are sticks & stones.

Both Gandhi and Nehru declared that a free India would immediately ally herself with the United Nations.

Gandhi threatened that, if Britain still denied India her independence, he would start a movement "that will be felt by the whole world." This he did not describe. But he added: "It may not interfere with the movement of British troops, but it is sure to engage British attention." Gandhi also ordered his followers, in the event of disturbance, to protect Britons even at risk of their own lives. From all this it could be concluded that Gandhi did not intend to hamper Britain's war effort by calling strikes, but might stage some vast, symbolic demonstration aimed at shaming Britain. Rumor had it that he would call on hordes of Indians to approach Britons individually, saying: "Please leave India and go to England, which is your home."

India's sensitiveness has not been lessened by Sir Stafford Cripps's recent negotiations. During the weeks since the negotiations, the reasons for their breakdown have become increasingly clear. In the main they were:

Defense by Whom? While agreement was general that military operations in India's defense should remain under a British Commander in Chief, the Congress party wanted the Defense Member of the Viceroy's Executive Council (analogous to the U.S. Secretary of War) to be an Indian. Britain agreed to this, but proposed to take away his function as a link between the Government and the C.-in-C., giving it to the C.-in-C. himself. This would have left the Indian Defense Member holding a bag of relatively unmilitary responsibilities such as public relations, demobilization, post-war reconstruction, petroleum, canteens, stationery and printing.

Government by Whom? The Congress wanted immediate "recognition of India's freedom and right to self-determination." Wrote Congress President Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad to Sir Stafford Cripps: "The Committee do not think that there is any inherent difficulty in the way of constitutional changes during the war. . . . Certain important changes [can be made]. The rest can be left to future arrangements and adjustments. I might remind you that the British Prime Minister actually proposed a union of France and England on the fall of France. No greater or more fundamental change could be imagined, and this was suggested at a period of grave crisis and peril. War accelerates changes."

Short of independence, the Congress wanted a "National Government," with the Viceroy's Council composed of Indians with full powers as Cabinet members, under the Viceroy as constitutional head.

Britain, instead, offered post-war independence, did not remove the Viceroy's power of veto over his Council.

Politics by All. Congress undoubtedly had secret fears that Britain's offer of post-war separation to provinces which voted to secede might lead to Hindu-Moslem strife. The Moslem League objected to Britain's principle that such voting would be by existing provinces (whose boundaries are not according to Moslem majorities). Rumor claimed that some Congress members, instead of wanting more war responsibility, wanted to avoid such headaches. Undoubtedly they wanted to avoid the headaches of such partial responsibility as Britain offered.

Britain's Objections. Britain did not think that the Defense Member's main jobs could suddenly be shifted out of British hands without dangerous dislocations. As Sir Stafford Cripps put it: "This would mean an unscrambling of eggs scrambled many years ago." Britain did not think that immediate independence or a National Government could be granted without grave danger to India, either through vast confusion or possibly even civil war.

The ironic deadlock remains. Britain's objections cannot be soundly judged unless India's suggestions are tried. If Britain's objections proved valid, it would then be too late for India. But there can be no paper solution to the India problem. Mohandas Gandhi has renewed his demands for Indian independence at a time when the United Nations' cause can scarcely afford to ignore one of the"Orient's greatest leaders.

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