Dulling of the Thorns

Every citizen of the Allied world was elated when he heard of the U.S. Navy's attack on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands (see map). But he wanted to know more about its why and its how.

Why? There was one hint as to a possible reason for the attack. Three days before it. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. in a press conference at his office in the Hawaiian Islands, said: "We have every expectation of holding these islands." He may possibly have thought then that the Japanese were assembling transports and supply vessels in the Marshalls and Gilberts for an invasion of the Hawaiian group: if so, the task force he sent was designed to break up such preparations.

But, the Cincpac's statement was more likely a smoke screen to cover the coming attack. The raid may have been the first operation in the series of assaults which will be the sine qua non of U.S. victory in the Pacific: reduction, base by prickly base, of the fortified Japanese islands which interdict the U.S. supply lines to the Far East. That process will not begin with any conviction until the Allies enjoy clear naval supremacy in the Pacific. But raids like last week's may prove very useful as preliminary softeners. If Japanese aircraft and submarine bases in the Marshalls have been pretty well destroyed, the U.S. can carry out other operations in the area with much greater freedom--opening the way for re-establishment of direct U.S. communication lines to the Far East.

How? The Navy communiques announcing the raid made it clear that not only aircraft carriers, but also battleships participated in the attack. Although described as a "surprise raid," the surprise was evidently not entirely complete because some defending planes were able to take to the air--two U.S. ships received minor damage from near bomb hits and eleven U.S. planes were lost.

But if the results ("many enemy fleet auxiliaries were sunk, beached or otherwise damaged . . . many enemy airplanes were destroyed . . . installations on shore were hit hard. . . .") were not as spectacular as at Pearl Harbor, the technique of attack was more so. This was not just a carrier hit-&-run. Here, besides hitting the defender from the air, the attacker closed with his surface ships and shelled the enemy. And he did it without losing any ships, unlike the Japanese in similar attacks on Wake.

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