Defense & Offensive

To decide how to defend the Burma Road, one of Democracy's two vital lifelines (see p. 18), one of the world's greatest men, one of Britain's greatest generals and one of the U.S.'s greatest hopefuls met for three days last week. In Chungking Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek received Britain's Indian Commander, General Sir Archibald Percival Wavell, and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Army Air Corps, Major General George H. Brett. They met to devise the ABCs of Allied land and air strategy.

The three strategists had three tough problems to solve. Should Britain risk her Indian defenses to bolster Burma? Should the U.S. rush in more air power besides the 100 "volunteer" pilots of the International Tigers (who last week helped shoot down nine Japanese planes over Rangoon)? Should China mount an offensive into Indo-China, or rush troops into Burma, or even to Malaya? The conferees announced the creation of a Military Council, the first working body for joint action in the war. But their strategic decisions necessarily remained a military secret.

The greatest compliment the Chungking conference could be given--since it recognized the threat of joint Allied action in southeast Asia--was paid by the Japanese. They started a new offensive in central China, aimed at much-aimed-at Changsha. The Jap, despite the only proven use of gas in World War II, had already failed three times to take Changsha. This time he may not be so anxious to get that provincial capital as to get Chiang's mind off cooperation.

Chiang's idea of cooperation in this case was to smack a counterattack at the Japanese. The Chinese claimed they had driven one of three Japanese columns back ten miles.

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