Lifeline Cut

(See Cover)

Of all the Admirals who have made war on the modern seas, none was ever in the fix of Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, by title Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet; by specific function: Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

When Japanese bombers whipped over the frowning fastness of Diamond Head last Sunday morning the book of traditional U.S. naval strategy in the Pacific was torn to shreds. When the Japanese bombs had ceased to fall in the defense-crammed area around Pearl Harbor the book was out of print. Japanese tactics, which some called suicide war and others, less hopeful, the typical spring-legged assault of the determined underdog, called for revolutionary strategy.

Blue-eyed, broad-shouldered Admiral Kimmel had been struck with war's most effective weapon: surprise. His whole mission had been vitally changed. He needed to re-establish the lifeline between the U.S. mainland and Admiral Thomas C. ("Tommy'') Hart's Asiatic Fleet along the line Honolulu-Midway-Wake-Guam-Manila. But for the moment his mission was mainly defensive. It was almost as thoroughly defensive as the mission of Lieut. General Walter C. Short, commander of Honolulu's Army defenses, who also fell victim to surprise, but who could probably blame it on the extraordinary inadequacy of U.S. Naval reconnaissance of the Pacific. Gifted with a preponderance of tonnage and fire power, protected by more and better aircraft, the U.S. Navy has thought in terms of assault.

Spear & Shaft. The spearpoint of U.S. Naval effort in the Pacific is the Asiatic Fleet based on Manila. The shaft of the spear is the line between the Philippines and Honolulu. The fist that wields the spear is Admiral Kimmel's fleet, based among the naval shops and the complicated waterways of Pearl Harbor. As long as the Navy could maintain this base, the spear could strike where it was aimed in the Far East. So strategists, thinking of the shaft in terms of the supply it must carry, called it the lifeline of the Pacific.

The lifeline ran through perilous territory. At Guam it passed through the heart of the Japanese Mandated Islands, fortified and fitted with plane-and-light-craft bases beyond the eyes of prying U.S. agents. Through its length the lifeline was vulnerable, as Navy men well knew, to harassing attacks from Japan.

But the lifeline's anchor, Pearl Harbor, an indispensable adjunct to any fleet operation in the Pacific and the only major base west of the mainland, looked safe from all-out attack even by suicide units. From the Navy's bases on Ford Island, in Pearl Harbor yard, and at Kaneohe Bay, on Oahu's windward side, Navy patrol planes ranged ceaselessly out to sea. Their great circles of reconnaissance lapped each other, lapped the circle of Navy patrols from Alaska's Dutch Harbor. Except for the Japanese spies that teemed in Honolulu, the Navy felt safe in its base.

How that carefully planned reconnaissance system failed, few civilians could tell when the blow was struck. But the important thing thereafter was that the lifeline had been cut between Pearl Harbor and Manila. It was even possible that its anchor had lost a great part of its effectiveness as a supply-repair base and reserve fortress for the fleet in the Pacific. And if that were true, the loss would be greater than the loss in warships, immeasurably greater in its implications than the wreckage of planes at Hickam Field.

Punch & Reel. The enemy had struck its first blow. Only ten months ago Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel was jumped over 46 flag officers to take the senior job afloat in the U.S. Navy. It was a strange commentary on the memories of civilians and Navymen alike that after Port Arthur* this blow should have come as a surprise. Long before Hitler, the Japanese Navy had shown what the swift thrust, before declaration of war, could do.

Like a boxer who is slammed before he can get off his stool, the Pacific Fleet had first to get itself up. From that time until the day when it can report its first victories over the Japanese, its role is primarily defensive. Its first victories may or may not come quickly. But until it can drive the Japanese out of the waters between Honolulu and the mainland, until it can recover the lifeline islands and secure them from further attack, it cannot exert its full force against the Japanese.

If Pearl Harbor got past this week's raids with little damage done to shops, drydocks and fuel storage, the Fleet can still function in force, minus only the striking power of ships and aircraft lost to bombs and torpedoes. But if Pearl Harbor is grievously damaged, the Fleet, or large units of it, may be forced to pull back to the Pacific Coast.

Force. Even if it suffered the worst loss yet rumored in the Battle of Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy is still far superior to the Japanese Navy in striking force. Latest available data show that it then had 346 warships, the Japanese 262. Their classes:

. . U. S. . . Japan
Battleships . . 17. . 12
Carriers . . 7 . . 8
Cruisers . . 37 . . 46
Destroyers . . 172 . . 125
Submarines . . 113 . . 71

In aircraft the U.S. also had a substantial edge: 8,000 by conservative estimate, to 3,600 for Japan (both Army and Navy).

The actualities of production also favor the U.S. The U.S. can outbuild Japan time & time again in aircraft or ships. But the drain of supplies to other allied countries cuts down this margin.

On the side of the U.S. Navy is a well-trained personnel with high morale spurred to desperation by the most humiliating setback in U.S. history.

Against these advantages Japan balances a Navy with a high tradition, adept leadership, proved last week. Carrying the initiative with them, armed with secrecy, flaming with the success of their surprise attack, the Japanese have a broad ocean to hide in between blows.

Target & Tactics. Japan hit Pearl Harbor in order to reduce the striking power of the U.S. Fleet beyond Manila. Japan wants the rich (oil, tin, rubber, etc.) Netherlands East Indies. But the path to the South China Sea is watched by many policemen. Headed southward, Japan will have to pass Manila, with its complement of bombers. She must risk a full-out attack on the Philippine defenses or bypass them.

Japan's bases near the Philippines are open to the kind of amphibious warfare--land, sea and air attack--that the U.S. Navy has long discussed. Flanking her southward march on the right is Hong Kong, a better-equipped base than the Philippines' Cavite. Ahead of her lie Singapore, the stout secondary bases at Surabaya, Darwin and Amboina. This week Japan was pecking at some of these places, but she had not yet apparently risked an all-out attack on any. And before she could hope to grab and hold the Indies, she must reduce Singapore.

Japan had taken on a crowd. With astounding success the little man had clipped the big fellow at Pearl Harbor, kicked the shins of a lot of other little fellows like Guam and Wake, stomped toward the rest of the crowd with impassioned, fiery eyes. But the fighters who had been hit were getting up; the rest were waiting with knives out. Japan was going to be busy, perhaps for a long time, certainly in a lot of places. To "Hubby" Kimmel and the Navy, as to 130,000,000 plain U.S. citizens, only one finish was conceivable.

* Where in 1904 the Japanese assaulted the Russian fleet while their Ambassador danced at the Tsar's ball in St. Petersburg.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so reader's discretion is required.