Showdown on the Far East

Telegrams poured into Secretary Hull's office: "Don't sell China down the river."

They hit the Secretary with the double force of an unintended insult. He had just told the Japanese once again, firmly, that the U.S. would not condone further aggression by them.

Cordell Hull had spent about eight hours in deadlock negotiations with Japanese Envoys Kurusu and Nomura, had held at least twelve conferences with the representatives of Britain, Australia, China, The Netherlands--the ABCD powers--when midway in last week's talks he gave the Japanese a written statement of the U.S. principles that must underlie a general settlement. They amounted to the general points on a free Pacific that he first set forth in 1937.

And midway of last week, things began to happen. It was plain that Japan's answer was being given, not in words in Washington, but in troop movements in the Far East. In Tokyo U.S. Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Togo were minding their diplomatic Ps & Qs, but Japanese troops were pouring into French Indo-China, threatening the Burma Road.

To clear up confusion at home, the U.S. for the first time gave out an "authoritative" recapitulation of the U.S.-Japanese diplomatic struggle. It was brutally frank. Its first point, by implication, accused Japan of stalling in Washington in order to prepare a new aggression. Main points:

P: Japan and the U.S. began their talks with the arrival of Ambassador Nomura last spring. In the middle of them, Japan invaded Indo-China. There is a deadly parallel with the current Kurusu talks and Japan's gestures toward Thailand.

P: The U.S. was concerned because of the Japanese parallel with Hitler's method of first encircling a country he intends to attack. With Japanese-mandated islands east and Japanese land bases west, the Philippines are in a horseshoe open only at the southern end.

P: The southern end must be kept open. A Japanese move into Thailand would be regarded as an attempt to dominate the entire South Pacific.

P: If the Japanese are bluffing, their bluff has been called. If they move, the U.S. will move.

This was a showdown. The U.S. and Japan were nearer war than at any moment of their history. In a speech that was like a cry of pain and rage--and also of disappointment--Japanese Tojo called on his people to purge Asia of British and American exploitation (see p. 27).

In Manila the air force was standing by; naval leaves were canceled. Leaves were canceled at Corregidor, the strong rock fortress guarding Manila Bay. Permanent blackout was ordered at the naval base at Cavite, at Olongapo, where the Navy has been mysteriously building. All British and U.S. forces in the Far East were put on the alert. In Manila naval messages jammed the radio, forced civil officials to use commercial cables. It was Manila's biggest war scare, and as the week went on, it grew.

Suddenly, the Japanese Cabinet instructed Kurusu and Nomura to continue the talks. At least talking postponed war. It was a strained Saburo Kurusu who carried the news to Cordell Hull that his task was to keep talking. At week's end there was still no written reply from the Japanese to the 'written U.S. statement of principles.

When Kurusu, leaving the State Department, was asked whether talks would go on, he said, ''They have never been broken off." When asked about Premier Tojo's speech, he said that the Premier had been misquoted.

If the U.S. could convince Japan that her desire to cut the Burma Road would be met by overwhelming force, the Japanese, who regard politics as "the art of the possible," might retreat. If not, an unconvinced Japan was likely to decide that the art of the possible called for the art of war.

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