Reconquering An Empire

(See Cover)

From Brazzaville, his capital in French Equatorial Africa, General Charles de Gaulle flew to Lebanon and Syria last week to congratulate his victorious troops. Resplendent in uniform, accompanied by his field general, Georges Catroux, Free Frenchman De Gaulle made a ceremonial entry into a Beirut decorated with many a Cross of Lorraine. In the street De

Gaulle stopped his motorcade, stepped out of his car and gravely saluted the Lebanese flag. At this gesture the Lebanese went wild, broke the police cordon surrounding the generals' car, flocked around De Gaulle cheering.

The gesture meant that De Gaulle had come, not to capture Lebanon and Syria, but to liberate them. In making it the General called attention to the peculiar strength and the peculiar weakness of his movement. Free France is an army of 40,000 men, an air force of 1,000 and a navy of 17 fighting ships--but Free France does not pretend to be a government. To General de Gaulle and his brave, fanatical followers Free France is the trustee of the French Republic, and one day, he hopes and believes, it will return France to the representatives of its people. Meanwhile his task is to fight to free Frenchmen and French subjects from Nazi and Vichy fascism.

To the U.S. last week General de Gaulle's Free France assumed a new importance. The dwindling prestige of Vichy, which had fought Frenchmen and Britons in Syria but refused to fight Japanese in Indo-China, had run out. Officially, the U.S. made it clear that it considered Vichyfrance a partner in, not a victim of, Japan's aggression. Unofficially, restaurants began calling Vichyssoise "De Gaulle soup." There was no question of U.S. "recognition" of Free France, since Free France is not a government, but General de Gaulle's chief civilian aide, tall, gaunt Rene Pleven, was urging aid under the Lend-Lease Act in order to convince Frenchmen in France that the U.S. is behind De Gaulle and his forces of liberation.

The U.S. hesitated with reasons. One reason was the value of a diplomatic listening post in France. Another was the chance that the Germans might overplay their hand, arouse Vichy to partial resistance. The best reason was the small bet the U.S. has placed on General Maxime Weygand to resist any Axis attack on Vichyfrench Africa. General Weygand hates the guts of General de Gaulle.

Nonetheless General de Gaulle is doing his part to hold Hitler in check. In Syria Free French and British forces stand guard over the northern approaches to Suez, which in turn guard one approach to Africa. And across two-thirds of the waist of Africa lies French Equatorial Africa, a vital link in one supply line to Egypt, a dagger pointed at Axis Libya, and a possible base for Anglo-U.S. operations along Africa's west coast.

The Battle of Africa, many strategists think, will be the critical phase of the Battle of the Atlantic. There are signs that it may begin soon, perhaps in October, when the weather is right. The three most likely offensives, which may be undertaken separately or simultaneously:

1) from Libya and possibly the Middle East and Turkey toward Egypt and Suez; 2) from Libya down through French Equatorial Africa, the Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola (by transport plane) toward British South Africa; 3) from Spain and Spanish Morocco across Weygand's Morocco and West Africa (by persuasion or force) toward Dakar. The road to Dakar has already been improved and Dakar is the strongest fortress on the Atlantic coast of Africa.

When this battle begins the U.S. cannot stand by. The U.S. must seize as many of the jumping-off places to South America as it can hold. Meanwhile the U.S. could do worse in preparing for the battle than to strengthen De Gaulle.

Fatal Fortnight. In the year since he began trying to build a Free French Empire out of what Germany left at Compiegne, General de Gaulle has won nearly two-fifths of the Empire--by mileage--to his cause. He succeeded where economics and geography and the accident of local leadership favored him. Where he failed, it was the fatal two weeks after the fall of France that caused his failure.

In France a handful of defeatist politicians surrendered to Germany in the belief that Britain was doomed. They assured Frenchmen everywhere that this was the case, and most Frenchmen believed them. General de Gaulle went to England to rally the French Empire to the cause of fighting on. A good many oldsters in charge of colonial administration, convinced that all was lost, refused to respond. Many younger leaders wanted to fight, but doubted Britain's and De Gaulle's will or ability to fight on. By the time they decided on resistance many had been replaced by Vichy men.

In French Equatorial Africa De Gaulle got results. He sent Rene Pleven there. Rene Pleven was a zealot for continuing the fight. After he had pointed out that Equatorial Africa depends for its livelihood on the British-controlled coastline, after he had told the inhabitants what would happen to their economy if they refused, one by one the five colonies (Cameroun, Chad, Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari) voted to put themselves under De Gaulle without reservations. Even so the old pro-Vichy governor at Brazzaville had to be wrapped in a blanket and deposited across the border in Belgian

Congo. That was last August. Soon other colonies followed: the five dots of French territory in India; in the Pacific, New Caledonia, Tahiti, the Gambier Islands, Tuamotu, the Marquesas and Austral Islands.

De Gaulle was not to blame for the failure at Dakar; news of his mission leaked out from a dinner in London, tipped the Germans off. But Dakar cost him prestige and French West Africa. In French Indo-China Governor General Georges Catroux took too long to make up his mind. By the time Catroux had decided to join De Gaulle, Vichy had replaced him with Admiral Jean Decoux, who last week handed the colony over to Japan (see p. 27). General Catroux hurried to London, tore three of the five stars from his sleeve and reported to De Gaulle (who wears only two stars). It was General Catroux who received De Gaulle's congratulations as the conqueror of Syria last week.

As it became clear that De Gaulle and Britain would see it through, one by one French officers came from far places to join his cause. Vice Admiral Emile Henry Muselier, who had been retired by Admiral Darlan, reached England soon after the armistice and was immediately made commander of the Naval Force. Others were slower in arriving. Colonel Martial Valin, now commander of the Air Force, was in Brazil when the armistice was signed. Vichy offered to let him name his own terms if he would stay there. Said Colonel Valin: "I am going to serve France where my conscience dictates," and sailed for England.

Brigadier General Ernest Petit, Chief of the Free French General Staff, was kept in Paraguay during France's part of

the war. On the collapse of France he cabled De Gaulle, stating his reasons in a letter to a staff officer: "When one has to choose between two duties, always take that one whose fulfillment is the most brutal and the most difficult. You can be quite sure that it is the right one." General Paul Louis Le Gentilhomme was sacked by Vichy for continuing the fight in Somaliland. Twelve-times-wounded Colonel Philibert Collet escaped from Syria to join De Gaulle last May.

Le General. The man who heads Free France is an inexperienced politician, a bad salesman; he was a figure of little personal prestige a year ago. Charles Andre Joseph Marie de Gaulle, whom the Free French now call simply Le General, has a too-tall (6 ft. 4 in.) body, big hips, a small head and the undynamic appearance frequently found in big men. But he has the unique advantage of being the one Frenchman who knew what was wrong with the French Army.

He was wounded three times in World War I, was captured and escaped five times, only to be recaptured each time. (Psychological note; De Gaulle's two chief lieutenants, Generals Petit and Catroux, were also notable escapists.) After the war De Gaulle became Professor of Military History at Saint Cyr, afterwards a student at the Staff College. Between 1932 and 1936 he was general secretary of the Superior Council of National Defense, from which vantage point he observed the conditions which led to his two prophetic books.

The first of these was Au Fil de l'Epee (translated as The Philosophy of Command), which advocated individual initiative on the part of commanders instead of the traditional French system of fighting according to plan. Vers l'Armee de Metier (The Army of the Future) went even further in breaking with French tradition.

The army of the future will move on caterpillar treads, De Gaulle wrote in 1934. The Maginot Line is limited in depth and leaves northern France exposed, he warned. The defensive psychology of the Maginot Line "will defeat France." As to the vaunted French morale, "neither bravery nor skill can any longer achieve anything except as functions of equipment." Marshal Henri Philippe Petain laughed off the book as "witticisms." General Weygand called it "evil." The Germans learned from it.

In January 1940, while France was trying to sit out the war, Colonel de Gaulle again raised his voice. From his tank brigade in Lorraine he sent a 17-page memorandum to General Gamelin, Premier Daladier and 20 others: "The Maginot Line, however reinforced, can be crossed. . . . The defender who limits himself to resisting in a fixed position with antiquated weapons is doomed." Nobody paid any attention to De Gaulle.

On the day after the Germans broke through at Sedan De Gaulle was made a general in command of a hastily assembled armored division. He held up the Germans for four days at Laon, fought fiercely at Abbeville (and it was there that his men first called him Le General). After that Premier Paul Reynaud made him Under Secretary of State for Defense. General de Gaulle helped to persuade Premier Reynaud to continue the war--against the arguments for armistice of Weygand, Petain and others--and he flew to London to tell Winston Churchill that France would see it through. Weygand refused to shake hands with him when he returned. When Reynaud lost heart and resigned in favor of Petain, De Gaulle flew to London for keeps. There is more than fiction to the legend told about him to Negroes in Cameroun:

De Gaulle was a corporal. He was dead. He had been dead for five years. In his grave he heard that a German corporal had taken Paris. He leaped from his grave shouting: "I am a general now and I'll show you something!"

Wearers of the Cross. In World War II De Gaulle was commander of the 507th Regiment of the Chars de Combat, drawn from the neighborhood of Metz in Lorraine. The two-barred Cross of Lorraine was a part of the badge. When General de Gaulle sought an emblem for Free France he chose the Cross of Lorraine, with the motto Honneur, Patrie. The former word is missing from Vichy-france's motto.

Said General de Gaulle in a broadcast to the U.S. last fortnight: "In the world's history the greatest deeds of the greatest peoples have been their struggles for freedom."

Free France knows it is struggling for France's freedom, and it is this knowledge that binds De Gaulle's men to his cause with fanatical loyalty. This loyalty has overcome De Gaulle's lack of personal magnetism; it has overcome his political inexperience. His supporters include Socialists, Monarchists and Republicans. He insists that he is not leading a political movement, that he is merely leading a military movement to restore France's freedom, that when that is accomplished he will render account to the chosen representatives of the French people.

It is no easy thing to be a Free Frenchman in 1941. As General Petit wrote, it is the most brutal, the most difficult choice. Most of the leaders have been condemned to death in absentia. Smaller fry who are caught get 15 years at hard labor. Most of the Free French have families living in France.

The men have almost all braved dangers to join De Gaulle. Many tales are told of their daring, of the sacrifice of the people behind them. Two fliers took an Italian Armistice Commission plane at Casablanca and flew it to Gibraltar. Two boys flew a German Colonel's plane from a field in Occupied France and landed it on a military airdrome in England. Another stole a transport plane from the Vichy airport and flew to London. A scientist who was reluctant to leave his wife and five children in France found a note in his pocket when he was halfway across the English Channel. It said what she had not told him before, for fear he might not go: that she was pregnant with her sixth child.

De Gaullists slip into France at every opportunity, and can rely so much on popular support that they knock on doors at random, announce simply: "I am here."

They get a night's lodging, a meal or whatever help they need and go on about the business of organizing sympathizers for an eventual uprising. Few are caught within the country; few Frenchmen want or would dare to turn a De Gaullist in, and thousands of people have cards marked with the Cross of Lorraine concealed somewhere against the coming of a De Gaullist agent. When the De Gaullists try to pass a German-corrupted customs official, some of them are caught. Some of them get out. Some reach Spain and are interned there. Later, if they are still alive, they are returned to France and hard labor.

In the field General de Gaulle has only 40,000 men, but in France he is building a greater army. It is still unarmed and unready, but if Vichy and Hitler begin to crumble, the Free French in France will have not merely a fifth column. They may have the nation.

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