Surrounded by ABCD

When French Indo-China last week became Japanese Indo-China (see p. 21) the strategic map of southeastern Asia was redrawn. Japan had gained another stronghold on the South China Sea.

Its possession did not mean that Japan would move next week or next month on Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. But in southern Indo-China Japan now has airfields within difficult but practicable bombing range of Singapore, part of the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines (see map). Bombing in the reverse direction is, of course, equally possible.

But more important than Japan's new air position is her new sea position. From Saigon and Cam-ranh Bay (an excellent fleet anchorage which can be made in time into a naval base) the Japanese now can more easily cut the British sea route from Singapore to Hong Kong. Moreover, they have a central position from which to intercept fleet movements between Manila and Singapore. With Japanese bases in Indo-China, Hainan, Formosa and the mandated islands to the east of the Philippines, Manila is now almost encircled by Japanese outposts.

Conversely, the Japanese have deliberately put themselves in a spot encircled by hostile possessions. The ABCD powers --American, British, Chinese, Dutch--surround Indo-China. The Japanese line of supply is now a 2,000-mile sea route from Cam-ranh Bay to Nagasaki, and U.S. planes, submarines and surface vessels operating from Manila could make it an uncomfortable route. To reach Indo-China the Japanese have to pass through one of two channels--the 150-mile channel between Formosa and the mainland or the 235-mile channel between Formosa and Luzon--where patrols can keep a good lookout.

Strategically Japan had taken herself some more rope. Sooner or later somebody was likely to get hanged.

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