Not Enough

His spectacles far down on his nose, pug-faced Under Secretary of War Robert Porter Patterson sat before the Senate Defense Investigating Committee. The Under Secretary was reporting what the War Department had done in national defense during the last twelve months--the score of the first period in a deadly serious game.

Mr. Patterson's report sounded like a tremendous accomplishment. To a nation loath to drop its peacetime preoccupations with permanent-wave machines and shiny new automobiles for the grim business of arming for war, it was a tremendous accomplishment. But it was not enough. No one knew that better than Under Secretary Patterson. Said he:

"I doubt that more than 15% of America's productive endeavor is devoted to defense work."

Like other Army men, Bob Patterson dated the U.S.'s big defense effort from June 1940, when the fall of France showed a bemused world the awful might of Nazi arms. Until then the U.S. had made piddling increases in its standing army. While the Germans hacked their way toward Paris, Congress authorized an Army strength of 280,000 (from 227,000) made possible the organization of the Army's first armored division. Congress also set its sights (too low) on a program of training 7,000 military pilots a year. Two months more, passed before Congress got around to calling the National Guard to arms, three before the Selective Service Act was passed. Today the Army has close to 1,500,000 soldiers, is working toward producing pilots at the rate of 12,000 a year (by November), has its eyes on an output (by February 1942) of 30,000 a year. Two armored divisions are in the field, two more are in training, four more are to come.

> The pinch caught the U.S. with virtually no munitions industry except a few Army arsenals. ("We were proud of our lack of militarism," said Bob Patterson.) As of last week the Army Ordnance Department had built or under way 21 plants for powder, TNT, etc., was already getting some production.

> When France fell, the aircraft industry was at work on a program for 5,500 military planes. By last April it had orders for 40,000. Ahead lie orders for 34,000 more (including planes for Britain).

> An Army of 1,500,000, on paper in June 1940, is adequately housed today. Cost, including hospitals: $872,000,000. Said Bob Patterson, anticipating criticism of this tremendous cost: "Had time (which we could not spare) been consumed in more complete planning and more exact contracting, we would have saved money."

> U.S. soldiers in autumn 1940 were clothed in anything available--National Guard stores, leftovers from World War I. Today they have proper uniforms. Cost: $672,348,997.

> For fiscal 1940 the Army spent $95,680 a day for soldiers' food; 1941's daily grocery bill: $403,746.

> Of gas masks, which many a skeptical civilian thinks soldiers will never need, the Army has aplenty. Not overlooking the possibility that gas may still be used in war, it has about half the supply of "offensive chemical agents" it needs.

> For fiscal 1942, now begun, the War Department has $4,600,000,000 to spend for new materials and construction, has asked for $4,750,000,000 more. When the present buying program is completed, the War Department will have critical equipment* for a force of 3,000,000 men.

The Army today is still short of 105-mm. howitzers, is just beginning to get its first medium tanks, will not have adequate ammunition supplies until December 1942. But its worst worry is whether it will be able to keep itself intact, against Congressional unwillingness to keep draftees, National Guard and Reserve officers in service beyond one year.

* Requiring more than a year to manufacture.

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