Monday, Jul. 07, 1941

Against Both Sides

Now we find ourselves promising aid to Stalin and his militant Communist conspiracy against the whole democratic ideals of the world. . . . We know also Hitler's hideous record of brutality. . . . But I am talking of Stalin at this moment . . .

if we go further and join the war and we win, then we have won for Stalin the grip of Communism on Russia, and more opportunity for it to extend in the world.

. . . It makes the whole argument of our joining the war to bring the four freedoms to mankind a Gargantuan jest. . . .

With these words the ex-President of the U.S. this week typified his share in the emotional confusion of most U.S. citizens who looked upon a war in which they wished both sides would lose--but not too soon. It was a troubling experience for those who rejoiced when Nazis smacked into Russia, out of hatred of Communism --but who worried to see how hard they smacked; and for those who could see the logic of U.S. aid to Russia, since Russia was the weaker of two well-hated dictatorships--but gagged at the thought of a Russian victory.

Franklin Roosevelt did little to resolve this emotional dilemma for his fellow citizens--even for Herbert Hoover. In the same speech the ex-President paid an astonishing if ambiguous tribute to his successor.

Inveighing against warmongers, he suddenly interjected: "Let me say at once that President Roosevelt has held steadfast to his promise not to send 'our Army, Navy, or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside America except in case of attack.' " Such remarks, added to the President's apparent lack of urgency about the defense program, the impression that visitors have lately received in talking to him, have bolstered rumors that have made both interventionists and isolationists ask: Does the President mean to keep the U.S. out of war no matter what happens to Britain? Does the President mean to let Britain go after all? His declaration of aid for Russia did not support this view. But the theory that he would revert to a new, super-New Deal isolationism if he came to believe Britain's cause hopeless has seeped underground in Washington for a long time. It flourished among New Dealers even during periods when the President, being assailed as a warmonger, was damning isolationism. They chattered that: 1) the President decided after Dunkirk that Britain could not win; 2) if Britain falls, the U.S. will painlessly acquire most of the British Empire, will be strong enough -- with its defense program finished and the rest of the world exhausted -- to defend it.

During every long Presidential silence such talk flourishes and last week the U.S. was in the middle of such a silence. A likely explanation for it was that the President was waiting for the military situation in Russia to grow clearer, for U.S. public opinion to crystallize. A still likelier explanation was that he badly needed the rest he was taking. But at any event last week Franklin Roosevelt left it to others to tell the public what to do about a war which no one should win.

One, Pundit Mark Sullivan, declared that promised U.S. aid to Russia was a mistake because it would make aid to Britain mo're difficult.

Another, Secretary of the Navy Knox, wanted to use the crisis to help Britain in the biggest way possible. Said he: the time had come to use the U.S. Navy to clear the Atlantic of the German menace.

"Now is the time to strike. . . . While his [Hitler's] back is turned we must answer his obvious contempt with a smashing blow that can and will change the entire world. . . ." And Herbert Hoover urged the U.S. to concentrate on hoping for a stalemate, adding rather pessimistically that the U.S. could live in a dictator-ridden world if Hitler won: "It would not be pleasant but it can be done." As the week wore on it looked as if the U.S. might be quickly helped out of its emotional confusion--not by the advice of its leaders, but by a speedy Hitler victory.

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