Troubled Tokyo

Wrinkled were the brows of Japan last week. To a nation which figured it had learned all about the modern world from having lived in it only 73 years, the world suddenly presented a puzzling aspect. Japan had suffered her worst diplomatic defeat in years, a flat refusal by The Netherlands Indies to recognize Japanese "rights" to abnormal amounts of tin and rubber. The U.S. was suddenly on the aggressive in the Pacific (see p. 37) and two western powers with which Japan had in the past year sealed solemn pacts of friendship and neutrality--Russia and Germany--were suddenly at each other's throats.

Just before the blowoff, from Berlin came a dreamy interview with General Tomoyuki Yamashita, head of the Japanese military mission to the Axis, giving his impressions of Hitler.

"I felt that in the mind of Hitler there was much of spiritual matters, transcending material plans. When I met the Fuehrer he said that since boyhood he had been attracted by Japan. He read carefully reports of Japan's victory over Russia when he was only 17 years old and was impressed by Japan's astonishing strength.

"The same thing can be said of Mussolini.

"Hitler emphasized that in the coming age the interests of Japan and Germany would be identical as the two have common spiritual foundations. His attitude towards Japan is based on spiritual considerations. Hitler and Mussolini are united not from any consideration of interest but from thorough spiritual understanding."

In Tokyo, Ko Ishii, spokesman for Japan's Information Bureau, was explaining Japan's importance another way. "It is almost certain that the U.S. will enter the European war on the British side . . . Japan as a partner in the Tripartite Pact remains dominant on the other side of the Pacific and is playing an important role as a strong deterrent. . .

"As things stand," said Mr. Ishii darkly, "The U.S. will think twice ... or thrice."

With storm warnings of the Russo-German rift, rumors of a change in Japanese policy, perhaps even a Cabinet reshuffle, grew louder each day. The Tokyo newspaper Nichi Nichi insisted the rumors were all "British propaganda." Others printed them as true.

Said the big daily Yomiuri soberly: "It cannot be denied that with the change in the international situation Japan's diplomatic policy will also have to be changed. . . . Whatever the change in diplomacy may be, it must be pervaded by a spirit of independence and autonomy, and follow the way of the Emperor. Diplomacy that depends on others is the diplomacy of a doomed country. In Japan this tendency is especially notable."

When the Russo-German war actually came, doomed country or not, Japan was forced to face the fact that her ambiguous diplomacy had put her on an ambiguous spot. By the Tripartite Pact she was bound to go to Germany's assistance, if Germany were attacked. By the neutrality agreement with Moscow, she must remain neutral if Russia were attacked. So if she remained neutral, Germany was the aggressor--an ugly thing for a nation to admit about its friend in public.

At the week's beginning the dilemma was deep. The Cabinet met, disbanded, met again, finally half-promised to issue "a statement manifesting Japan's firm attitude." The statement, according to the official news agency, would stress two things: Japan's devotion to peace, her determination to continue with her oft-sidetracked New Order in East Asia.

The worst part of it all was that Japan was not quite sure who would win the Russo-German fight. What should a nation do in such an embarrassing situation?

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