Lessons from the Bismarck

The long-standing controversy of sea power v. air power was settled once and for all by the Hood-Bismarck affair and by the battle for Crete. The answer was not that air power had proved indisputably superior to sea power. The answer was rather that the whole controversy was meaningless. Any sea power worthy of the name must work with air power; air power over the sea is in fact sea power. The lessons of the Hood-Bismarck chase and of Crete, therefore, were lessons in the balance of these two powers as they team up to fight an opposing balance of the two. Specific lessons:

> The first duties of air power used as a sea weapon are scouting, reconnaissance, keeping touch with the enemy. The Bismarck might never have been sunk had she not been stalked by U.S.-made Consolidated (PBY-5) Catalinas. These flying boats, which have a 104-ft. wing span and weigh 27,080 lb. but are called "sardine tins" by British pilots because of their compactness compared with the monstrous British-built Short Sunderlands, can cruise over 4,000 miles, and last week one of them set a British record by staying in the air for 24 hours.

> Planes need bases. The Catalinas could fly from the Bismarck to Gibraltar, to Iceland, to Britain, and under ideal weather conditions might be refueled at sea; but shorter-range aircraft over the open sea would be helpless but for aircraft carriers. Britain has eight carriers, Germany has perhaps two, Italy has none. However, airfields ashore are "fixed carriers," and they are better than mobile carriers because they are not bound by sea carriers' limitations, and on the continent of Europe the Axis controls most of the fixed carriers.

Therefore, as the Bismarck and Crete demonstrated, British sea-air power becomes progressively effective as it moves away from shore. Two aircraft carriers, the brand-new Victorious and the still unsunk Ark Royal, were able to cripple the most powerful battleship in the world just before it came within danger range of land air bases in France. Conversely, the British did not dare expose vulnerable aircraft carriers, which they call "floating blocks of flats," in the confined waters of the Aegean; and ships without planes consequently took an unmerciful beating.

> Torpedoes played a greater part than shellfire in crippling and sinking the Bismarck. At Taranto, at Matapan and in this conflict, the British have shown great skill in using the torpedo-carrying aircraft, which was invented by a U.S. naval officer in 1912, which has surprisingly not been adopted by the Germans in the Battle of the Atlantic.

To launch torpedoes the Fleet Air Arm used antique wire-stayed biplanes, which carrier pilots refer to as "string bags." These planes had to approach to within 500 yards of their targets at about 20 feet above the water. They were presumably covered by a plane-hung smoke screen.

> Naval architects were astonished by the way the Bismarck stood up under punishment. Bismarck's crew were convinced she was unsinkable, and they were almost right. She absorbed at least 20 16-in. shells from the Rodney, 15-in. shells from the Hood, and 14-in. shells from the Prince of Wales and King George V; three torpedoes launched from aircraft, two from destroyers, one from a battleship and three from cruisers; and about three hundred 8-in. shells, 4.7-in. shells and other small stuff. PArtly this wonderful shock-worthiness was due to her thick, modern alloy-steel armor, partly to an intricate system of cellular compartments, "blisters," "torpedo bulkheads" -- all contributing to her great 118-ft. beam and calculated to isolate and minimize each hole in her skin. But the crew's faith in her buoyancy was betrayed. The British rescued about 100 of them, but had to move off when submarines were reported nearby.

> Luck has contributed a spectacular share to the naval encounters of World War II. When the British knocked out the fire-control tower of the Admiral Graf Spee and when the Germans dropped a bomb smack down on the plane elevator shaft of the Illustrious, something more than skill was involved. Considering the fact that the average number of hits in sea battle at long range comes to little more than 2% of rounds fired, the hit on one of Hood's magazines from extreme range of nearly 13 miles was fantastically lucky. And the British had their share of solid luck when one of their torpedo planes crippled a propeller and the steering mechanism of the Bismarck.

> But the main lesson was the need for coordination of all the weapons of sea warfare. Near Crete neither side was properly coordinated: Britain, lacking aircraft, lost ships, and Germany, lacking ships, lost men. But in holing the Bismarck the British used almost uncanny coordination. And the Bismarck, without planes to scout and destroyers to screen, was helpless once she was caught. British coordination was almost too keen. In its determination to catch the fat prize, the Royal Navy took a long risk -- neglected convoys, deserted Gibraltar, sent out the Home Fleet, left Britain's normal supply lines and normal defenses almost naked of ships. Over 100 vessels were said to be involved in the hunt.

> When Napoleon planned the invasion of Britain, he dreamed of just such a stripping as this, and sent his fleet as a decoy to the West Indies to try to accomplish it; but then only Nelson and the Mediterranean squadron entered the chase. With the Bismarck gone, the Germans still have her sister, the Tirpitz. If the German Navy, knowing what certain death it would be, nevertheless sent the Tirpitz out on a similar sweep, it might be a tipoff for invasion.

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