Until the Zero Hour

Adolf Hitler cannot control the angry voltage of his own nerves ; but he is masterful in trying the nerves of others. Last week he had the whole world guessing and jittering.

Words by the guttural thousands blared one day out of the German radio. It was the eighth anniversary of Adolf Hitler's coming to power. All day the air waves chorused Hitler's name. There were programs from the hospital room where the wounded Corporal Hitler decided to enter politics, from the beer hall where Hitler built his Party, from the prison cell into which Hitler was thrown when the first march failed, from the window in the old Chancellery where Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor of the Reich. The day's climax was a speech by Hitler himself in Berlin's Sportpalast.

Despite "strictest secrecy," 20,000 people had crowded into the Sportpalast by 4:30 p.m. For blocks outside storm troopers stood every few feet, and in the hall they sat in all the aisle seats. The occasion was all pomp. Above the stage a gigantic golden eagle sparkled against a red backdrop garnished with swastikas.

To music of war, helmeted storm troopers carrying swastika banners marched in and stood below the huge eagle. Finally Adolf Hitler came in -- small, jerky, smiling, waving his salute. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels introduced him.

As usual, he began historically and ended hysterically. The history was long-winded and occasionally either ambiguous or ignorant: in speaking of World War I, he referred to "the President Roosevelt of that period." The hysterics were incoherent -- but in their very incoherence lay the subtlety of the speech. Every phrase infected British and U. S. minds with great contempt, but also with suspense and, in some quarters, anxiety.

There were passages shot only at Britain: "On land the number of our divisions has been mightily increased. . . . Equipment has been improved and our enemies shall see how it was improved. On the seas the U-boat war will begin in the spring. And the Air Force will also put in an appearance, and all the armed forces together will force a decision one way or another." There was a specific warning to the U. S. "Whoever imagines he can aid England must, in all circumstances, know one thing: Every ship, whether with or without escort, that comes before our torpedo tubes will be torpedoed."

He attacked joint British-U. S. hopes: "They say Italy will fall away. . . . They have viewed German-Italian relations ac cording to their own standards. When one democracy helps another it demands some thing -- military bases or something that it then retains. ... Il Duce and I are neither Jews nor opportunists. When we shake hands it is the handshake of men of honor. .

Silence. Almost more nerve-tightening than what Hitler said was what he did not say. He said nothing about relations with France, nothing about Bizerte in Tunisia (see map, p. 23), which General Charles de Gaulle says Hitler wants to take to support Libya. He mentioned neither Russia nor Japan. He said nothing about Gibraltar. His only reference to timing was in connection with U-boats. He did not say a word about Ireland, a likely spot for preliminary landings in the invasion of Britain. Invasion remained the one paramount question mark in this war.

Lullablitz. The dead calm in night bombings of Britain which began fortnight ago continued last week, until British nerves strained for bombs. The Daily Express called the pause a "Lullablitz." Weather was not good, but it was not bad enough to keep the R. A. F. grounded ; they struck at invasion ports in bomber squadrons protected by huge fighter escorts, and met scanty resistance. First the British thought perhaps the Germans paused because their oil supply was low; then they wondered whether the Nazis had taken a really sizable force to the Balkans and Sicily; then they suspected planes were being sent home for changes and improvements; perhaps invasion air fields were being expanded. Last week they finally concluded that preparations were being made for a terrible assault by air --24 hours a day, days on end -- before invasion.

Diversion Before Invasion? Three major scares of World War II have been followed by major campaigns. Last February and March Scandinavia had an attack of terror; in April Norway was invaded. Last January and April the Lowlands had their panics; in May they were overrun. In April and May there was apprehension about Benito Mussolini's entering the war; in June he did.

Since then there have been three major reconnaissances of nerves. Adolf Hitler has learned by these (accomplished by troop movements, bombings, concentrations of barges, etc.) that the Balkans and Ireland would be comparative pushovers, that Britain would be nothing of the sort.

The only visible German action last week apparently had nothing to do with a stroke at Ireland or invasion of Britain. It hinted, in fact, at a southerly diversion before invasion. Roads to the south of Berlin were jammed with military materiel, moving south. German air tactics appeared in Greece and Libya (see p. 22). German airplanes based on Sicily continued active attacks on Malta and Crete. The British, now familiar with the Hitler reconnaissance pattern, could only suspect that a southern campaign would be a sure indication of an imminent attempt at invasion.

U. S. military men indicated last week that they now believed an attempted invasion of Britain might be no further than 60 days away. U. S. Chief of Staff General George Catlett Marshall and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who publicly doubted whether the British could successfully resist without U. S. assistance, both guessed April or May. General Marshall thought that by then Germany would be ready with 1,200 squadrons of bombers and fighters, would be able to keep 18,000 planes in action at once, with 18,000 more in reserve, and would have more than 42.000 pilots to fly them -- odds of about four to one against Britain in numbers alone. Secretary Knox expressed the opinion that in the meantime the Germans are developing new types (including a stratosphere bomber) and revising old ones.

Germans in the street took the attitude that the invasion would be an unhappy necessity. They protested that the gallant British were foolish not to seek a fair peace now; that the Germans hated to have to subdue the islands. Germans who claimed to have inside information passed word to foreign correspondents that the attempt would come early in March --a good reason for doubting that it would come just then. But it was taken for granted in Berlin that to win the war, the invasion must be attempted -- and must succeed -- by June. As to technique, one well-pleased German remarked last week: "We'll take England by employing the same method we used in taking Eben Emael"--the key Belgian fort, which was subdued by treachery, flame, bombs, parachutists, gliders, above all, by surprise.

Vichy's guess was the week's most interesting. It was based in part on Herr Hitler's reply to the Petain plan of French-German collaboration (see p. 28). Hitler was said to have demanded that France turn over Mediterranean ports to the Axis --suggesting a major campaign in that theatre. The French thought that after their own position had been clarified, the invasion would be attempted, perhaps late in February. Vichy guessers put forward a specific plan the Nazis might use: unassailable walls of mines guarding two broad, trans-Channel lanes, into which the German invasion fleet would be launched.

Ready Any Time. The British had had scares before. They knew that until the zero hour, the war of nerves would ebb & flow with the tides, cloud up and clear up with the weather. They were ready for anything any time, and each week made them more so. With perhaps 500,000 men in Africa and elsewhere abroad, they had 2,000,000 regulars at home with half a million under training as second line. Of 1,700,000 Home Guards, over half were already first-class supporting troops. Last June they were just a bunch of game wardens, armed with hunting guns and museum irons. But by last week they were better equipped than World War I soldiers, and were organized, throughout Britain, on efficient military lines. Behind the first defenses, the whole country was so tightly mobilized that children were already organized into experienced fire-fighting groups, and the hiring of a second footman in a large household became a matter for Parliamentary debate on wasting man power.

As to German air power, London experts thought General Marshall exaggerated the danger. Aeroplane's Peter Masefield doubted whether the Nazis could muster more than 19,000 planes for operations at one time. He further pointed out that the Nazi air strength is widely dispersed: Air Fleet One in eastern Germany, Air Fleet Two under Marshal Albert Kesselring operating in northern France and the Lowlands, Air Fleet Three under Marshal Hugo Sperrle, operating in western France from bases between Brest and the Spanish frontier, Air Fleet Five, under General Hans Jurgen Stumpff, operating in bases from The Netherlands all the way to Petsamo in Finland, two other air fleets based on Vienna and Rumania, and an independent unit in Italy.

Writer Masefield thought that as of last week the Nazis could spring no more than 6,800 planes from the fleets now facing Britain. But the Germans would doubtless concentrate other air fleets before launching invasion; the Masefield figures suggested only that invasion is not im mediately imminent, may be preceded by a campaign in the South, probably will not come before March at the earliest.

Britons scare hard. Last week they could think of nothing they wanted quite so much as invasion -- in June, in March, this week, any day now.

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