De Valera's Dilemma

No victim jammed between two gunmen in a death car with pistols prodding his ribs ever felt more conscious of his position than did Eamon de Valera last week.

"Britain is to invade Eire through Ulster," blared the German radio incessantly, adding: "In such event, Berlin is determined to react in the same manner as in the case of Norway and Belgium." Britain, with approximately 300,000 troops massed in Ulster, was poised to march into Eire, but only after the first Irish shot had been fired at a German.

Military observers believed that Hitler could gain a cheaper victory by invading Eire than by a frontal attack on Britain itself. Idle at German bases were two new 35,000-ton battleships, two 26,000-ton battle cruisers, perhaps two pocket battleships, at least three heavy cruisers and five light cruisers in addition to destroyers and submarines. A surprise attack on Eire using this force as escort might easily succeed if British ships, scattered widely on many duties, were not available to engage it. Once in Irish ports, the Nazis would be difficult to dislodge.

Panicky emergency measures by the De Valera Government banned street and place signs visible from trains, cars or low-flying planes, dimmed already shaded street lights in Dublin, which Britain declared were being used by Nazi raiders as guiding beacons.

Eire's pet phrase: "Britain's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity," seemed about to backfire.

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