Explanations re Finland

The failure of the Allies to prevent Finland's fall was one sentimental reason that the Daladier Government fell sympathetically last week (see p. 20). In Great Britain, too, the Finnish post-mortem continued, but with a difference. On the strength of it the Chamberlain Government was described as "riding a bull market." Far from condemning what Britain had done and left undone for brave little Finland, from an unexpected source, the Labor benches in the House of Commons, M. P. Josiah Wedgwood rejoiced: "If it were not for the greatest piece of luck this country has yet had in the war we should have sent 200,000 men to Finland, and they would all have been captured."

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Chamberlain, notwithstanding the demurrer of one secretive Scots Member, squared away to reveal exactly what assistance Britain had and had not sent the Finns--and why.

"I agree there is some disadvantage in giving the list," smiled Mr. Chamberlain, "but nevertheless, when charges are being bandied ... I think the advantages do outweigh the disadvantages. Here is the list: Airplanes promised, 152; actually sent, 101. Guns of all kinds promised, 223; sent, 114. Shells promised, 297,200; sent, 185,000. Vickers guns promised, 100; all sent. Marine mines promised, 500; sent, 400. Hand grenades promised, 50.000; all sent. Aircraft bombs promised, 20,500; sent, 15,700. Signal equipment promised, 1,300; sent, 800. Anti-tank rifles promised, 200; all sent. Respirators promised, 60,000; all sent. Greatcoats promised, 100,000; all sent. Battle dress promised, 100,000; all sent. Anti-tank mines promised, 20,000; sent, 10,000. Ambulances promised, 48; all sent.

"The list also included many other items, such as medical stores, tents, equipment, sandbags, steel helmets, etc., and large quantities of small arms ammunition."

100,000 Ready. The Prime Minister next revealed that as late as last January, Finnish Field Marshal Baron Mannerheim secretly advised the Allies that Finland "did not then require men, as his resources in man power were sufficient, in his opinion, to last until the thaw came. He did, however, say he would be very glad to have some 30,000 men in the month of May, but stipulated that they should be trained soldiers."

The Allies, according to Mr. Chamberlain, took immediate steps in secret to raise an expeditionary force of 100,000, "heavily armed and equipped," this being the largest force which British and French experts figured could be transported across Norway and Sweden in time to reach Finland in early May. As soon as Germany got wind of this, the Nazis began to threaten the Norwegians, Swedes and Finns, said Mr. Chamberlain. The Allies asked the Finns to decide by March 5 if they wanted the expeditionary force. The Finns asked if 50,000 troops could be sent to arrive by April. "Yes," replied the Allies, but the Finns kept postponing their decision from day to day.

"In the end," said the Prime Minister, "the date which they [the Finns] fixed as a final one on which they would give their decision passed without any decision being given. On the next day we heard that peace terms had been accepted. . . . We could not possibly have forced our help on the Finnish Government. ... It is not for us to criticize the Finns. A people that have put up such a fight as they have must be immune from all criticism."

"From Hitler Down." Scathingly Mr. Chamberlain then criticized another people who for a fortnight had been trying to spot the eight-ball in front of him on the Finnish matter. "I need hardly remind the members of the floods of German rhetoric which has been poured out on Finland since 1918, when Germany took some small part in freeing Finland from Bolshevization. Every German leader from Hitler down exhausted himself in declaring how Germany once saved Finland from the Red menace, and how she would never fail again to support her if she were menaced.

"When Finland once more was threatened, when once more she had put her tiny forces into the field to resist the huge hordes that came against her, Germany publicly professed her neutrality, but behind the scenes made every effort to prevent others from saving Finland and from performing the task which she had always declared should be her own.

"Responsibility for this affair stands fairly and squarely upon the shoulders of Germany."

For the U. S. The average Briton was more than willing to underwrite Neville Chamberlain's conclusion. The House interrupted and cheered the Prime Minister for a full minute when he fervently cried: "Any suggestion that the Allies--this country and France--in any way failed in their obligations to do their utmost to assist Finland in her need is one that cannot for one moment be maintained." And largely for U. S. consumption, he added: "Least of all should such a suggestion come from individuals in countries far away from the seat of war."

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