Four Chiefs, One Peace

"Had Europe gone on toward a balance of power alignment, with Britain and France on one side and Germany and Italy on the other, the picture would have become dismally like that of Europe before the World War. If, on the other hand, these four powers can agree, they can run Europe. No country in the Old World can start and fight a war to which all of the signatories of the Four Power Treaty are really opposed."

With Chamberlain, Hitler, Daladier and Mussolini agreeing in Munich, making a four-power treaty and obviously eager to run Europe, the above comment was significant last week, although written in 1933 by able New York Timesman Edwin L. James apropos of the Pact made at Rome in June of that year by exactly the same Four Powers. Away back before the 1922 March on Rome, Editor Benito Mussolini used to tell his journalistic colleagues in Milan that Europe could find enduring peace only by coming under the responsible dominance of the great powers of the West.

On Jan. 30, 1933, when Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, one of his first moves was to order General Goering to go to Rome and there propose a militant lineup of Germany and Italy against Britain and France, "Fascism against Democracy." Il Duce at this time rebuffed the overture, urged instead a four-power agreement "for peace." Edouard Daladier, who was then Premier of France (as he is today), saw the opportunity and rushed to confer at Geneva with Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald. The snowy-haired Scot next dashed to Rome, some what as Neville Chamberlain was to dash to Berchtesgaden and to Godesberg five years later, and the idea for a Four-Power Pact was agreed upon.

Instantly the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania) and Poland raised a protesting outcry, and before the Pact could be signed it was amended to restrict action under the Pact to what could be agreed upon under League auspices at Geneva, not merely by the Big Four but by all parties nearly or remotely concerned.

These amendments killed the 1933 Pact, which was signed but not ratified by all the governments, and small European states, which had feared the Big Four, gave credit for its death largely to Dr. Eduard Benes.

"Oh, don't bother about Czechoslovakia!" was Il Duce's prophetic comment in 1933. "Czechoslovakia will fall to pieces within ten years by the natural development of Germany!"

Queen Mary & Lord Baldwin. At one of the most dangerous moments of the Czechoslovak crisis last week, when Britain and France were mobilizing for war and Adolf Hitler was adamant in repeating that the German Army would "march" unless Prague yielded to all his demands, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain addressed the Empire and the U.S. by radio, declared Fuehrer Hitler's demands "unreasonable." The next day, at a time of even greater tension he appealed to the Italian Premier to use his good offices with the Fuehrer.

At five minutes before noon on the fatal day, with German troops actually in motion toward the Czech border which they were to cross at 2 p.m., Il Duce in Rome rang up Chancellor Hitler at Berlin and they talked for 45 minutes. The Fuehrer had received that morning a second appeal for peace from President Roosevelt, an appeal to which the only reply was an anti-Roosevelt tirade delivered that same evening to an audience of 175,000 Germans by No. 3 Nazi Goebbels. The results of the Mussolini-Hitler conversation were flashed to London where they brought the high point of drama in a speech to the House of Commons made by the Prime Minister, while in the gallery Queen Mary wept with emotion and Earl Baldwin watched every move.

M.P.'s said afterward that the lengthy speech of Neville Chamberlain seemed to many of them to be trending toward a declaration of war, then suddenly the Prime Minister began to tell how he had sent a personal letter to Il Duce urging him to contact the Fuehrer. This Mussolini did. "In response," said Mr. Chamberlain, "Herr Hitler has agreed to postpone mobilization for twenty-four hours. Whatever views the honorable members have had about Signor Mussolini in the past, I believe every one will welcome his gesture of being willing to work with us for peace in Europe!"

Precisely at this moment, Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir John Simon handed the Prime Minister a message just received from the Fuehrer, and Neville Chamberlain, after reading it, went on with emotion in his voice:

"I have something further to tell the House. I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me to meet him in Munich tomorrow morning. He has also invited Signor Mussolini and Monsieur Daladier. Signor Mussolini has accepted and I have no doubt that Monsieur Daladier will also accept. The House will not need to ask me what my answer will be!"

This touched off such a tempest of applause by M.P.'s as the House of Commons has not heard for a generation. Labor and Liberal opposition leaders joined the crowd of M.P.'s who rushed up to shake Neville Chamberlain's hand and tell him how relieved they and their constituents were that now Britain would not be bombed. But Anthony Eden was seen to walk out, unsmiling, white-lipped.

Early next morning, no less than 14 of the 21 members of the British Cabinet spontaneously went to Heston Airport, jubilated in unprecedented fashion before news cameras (see cut) as they said good-by to Neville Chamberlain, wished him all success at Munich.

"Ein Ganzer Kerl!" Adolf Hitler, who makes it his crude habit to rub the noses of distinguished foreign guests as deeply as possible in Nazidom, characteristically staged the Munich conference at the very hub of the Nazi movement, the Fuehrerhaus (Leader's House).

Il Duce, as the ally of the Fuehrer, alone rated to be met at the frontier of Germany by the Chancellor. The Italian Premier is also the only one of the four chiefs who can speak English, German, French and Italian. Nobody needed to speak Czech. The Big Four, in accordance with the original concept of 1933, were about to constitute themselves the arbiters of Europe, excluding from their councils Czechoslovakia, the League and the Soviet Union. M. Daladier and Mr. Chamberlain, arriving separately by air, were met by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop.

Perhaps never before have statesmen of great powers negotiated so expeditiously. As fast as the Big Four agreed upon a basic point, their secretaries took this to an adjoining room, where it was dealt with by general staff officers and legal experts, ironing out all details.

"I am not going to quibble about a village!" was one of Adolf Hitler's cracks. Doodles by Benito Mussolini at the Conference consisted of scratching short parallel lines, making large capital letters at random. Premier Daladier said afterward that he had dissuaded the Fuehrer from certain demands touching Bratislava. Added the Frenchman: "If there had been any question threatening the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia, I would have resolutely refused to consider negotiating further." Herr Hitler said later that M. Daladier is "Ein ganzer Kerl," which Nazi aides translated as "a real he-man."

Amenities such as these among the Four Chiefs smoothed the way for their agreement to dictate to Czechoslovakia what they hoped would be a final settlement. Its terms at first struck correspondents in Munich as complete capitulation to Germany, but within 24 hours fuller information modified these conclusions.

What Hitler Gets. The final German demands, made at Godesberg, would have brought the Reich approximately 12,000 square miles of Czechoslovakia without a plebiscite, plus a possible 2,200 square miles by plebiscite, or a possible grand total of 14,200 square miles.

The Big Four last week decided that Germany is to get about 10,000 square miles without plebiscite, plus a possible 2,000 square miles by plebiscites, or a possible grand total of 12,000 square miles.

In many respects of detail, Munich was milder than Godesberg. On the question of time, which was actually the point on which war nearly broke out last week, Hitler had demanded 12,000 square miles by October 1. He got 300 square miles on October 1 (see p. 18) and is to get a total of 10,000 square miles progressively by October 10. Moreover, plebiscites will now be held under an international commission of five set up by the Big Four, consisting of one Czech, one Briton, one Frenchman, one German and one Italian--thus weighted 3 to 2 on the side of the democracies. Neutral observers predicted: "The Czechs now have a good chance to win most of the plebiscites," which are to be held by November 30. The Commission of Five is empowered to recommend "minor modifications in strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite." An annex to the pact of the Big Four decreed that Britain and France immediately join in "an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression." This was an historic reversal of British policy, for up to now Britain has not been directly pledged to anything on the Continent, except via her League obligations. This pledge binds her in black and white to Czechoslovakia even more definitely than her unwritten entente binds her to France.

The Big Four, instead of settling the Polish and Hungarian minority questions in Czechoslovakia at Munich, left these open for 90 days pending action by the three little countries themselves (see p. 18), and only later if necessary will the Big Four settle that hash. The Munich pact concludes: "When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for their part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia."

Significance. The triumph of Germany was enormous, but not without limits, which were set as firmly as limits can be set in the Europe of 1938. If the crisis proved anything with finality, it proved that modern communication and enlightenment of the peoples reduce the chances of an outbreak of war. For the first time in history, a major conflict had been settled by talking instead of shooting first. And, while all men of good will deplored the dismemberment of central Europe's one island of democracy and were saddened for the painful uprooting of the minorities which will leave the ceded territories, realists took heart from one fact. Unlike the rapes of Manchukuo and Ethiopia, the Czechoslovak rape had at least set a precedent, which might flower into a great influence for peace, for aggressors being persuaded to follow legal-diplomatic forms.

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