Monday, Apr. 06, 1936

Britain to Belgium

Many a Belgian family living near the German frontier crammed its movable possessions hastily into suitcases, took the first train and fled when Adolf Hitler ruptured the Treaty of Versailles by sending German soldiers goose-stepping into the Rhineland (TIME, March 16). Last week a few of the boldest of such Belgians had gone back to their homes. They felt excited as they looked across the frontier and saw German soldiers standing guard for the first time since the Rhineland was demilitarized 17 years ago. What small Belgium wanted to know was whether Great Britain could be counted on in case of German onslaught.

In London a procedure for dealing firmly with Germany's violation had just made its appearance in the form of a British White Paper (TIME, March 30). Returning from London to Brussels Premier Paul van Zeeland rose in the Belgian Chamber. "For the first time in history the British Government has defined in advance the course it would take in a given emergency," he cried. ''This unprecedented step was due to the fact that Belgium has so clearly given [Germany] no excuse for breaking the Locarno Treaty."

Nod or Shake? In London last week His Majesty's Government suddenly seemed to lose interest in the White Paper which it had taken the lead in negotiating. This lightning change occurred after Adolf Hitler sent to London by his special Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop last week a six-page reply to the White Paper, the gist of which was that Germany rejected its terms in toto and that the Great Powers must mark time until the Realmleader should send them his proposals for what is to be done about Germany's rupture of treaties. Ambassador von Ribbentrop explained that Der Fuhrer was so busy winning a German election (see p. 25) that his proposals would not be ready for at least another week.

By the terms of the White Paper Germany was not to erect fortifications in the Rhineland. Last week news that Adolf Hitler had ordered the most intensive German efforts to build fortifications in the Rhineland as fast as possible made the interest of His Majesty's Government in the British White Paper diminish even further. To find out exactly where the British stood a French delegate to the League Council in London, famed trial Lawyer Joseph Paul-Boncour, visited Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, then flew to Paris. Said he: "The only answer I received was a movement of the head--neither positive nor negative."

Brazenly the Turkish Government announced that if Germany was not punished for remilitarizing the Rhineland in violation of treaties, Turkey would proceed to similar violations and remilitarize the Dardanelles with heaviest fortifications.

Briton against Briton? With the Rhineland crisis thus tangled some European wiseacres believed a story that Ambassador von Ribbentrop had banged his fist on Mr. Anthony Eden's desk and uttered threats. The most painstaking and detached analysis of the situation was by seasoned Vladimir Poliakoff, the "Augur"' of the New York Times, who wrote: "Behind the smoke screen of the Franco-German tussle over the Rhineland... an internal political crisis is slowly maturing in London. No less is in the balance than the choice of a successor to Stanley Baldwin as leader of the Conservative Party and as Prime Minister."

Recalling the fact that some months ago Chancellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain-- and the then Foreign Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare were major rivals to succeed Squire Baldwin, "Augur" made the direct charge that Mr. Chamberlain and not British public opinion was chiefly responsible for knifing the Hoare-Laval deal which might have made peace between Italy and Ethiopia (TIME, Dec. 30). In the case of the present White Paper, upon which Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Eden jointly lavished their best efforts, "Augur" charged that this was last week in course of being knifed by Sir Samuel Hoare & friends as a blow at the Chancellor's chances of becoming Prime Minister. Concluded "Augur": "Mr. Baldwin seems to have lost his grip on the situation entirely. Unless he becomes active soon and stages a comeback the outcry against him in the ranks of the party and among the public generally may become overwhelming."

Britain's Signature. In the House of Commons a dog-tired-looking Anthony Eden finally rose to speak. He had spent the week-end in the country with Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin. On his return to London he had participated in folding up the Council of the League of Nations which had met in London to deal with the Rhineland crisis. The Council had voted Germany guilty of violating the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact but had done nothing toward punishing these violations. As their final decision at London last week, the Geneva statesmen adjourned indefinitely to meet again in Geneva.

Just before facing the House of Commons, Mr. Eden conferred for an hour and a half at the British Foreign Office with Ambassador von Ribbentrop, who had just breakfasted at No. 10 Downing Street with the Prime Minister. Such hospitality at such a moment undercut any sign of British firmness against Germany which listeners might think they heard in the opening of Foreign Secretary's speech to the House of Commons. "I want, in all bluntness, to make this plain to the House: I am not prepared to be the first Foreign Secretary to go back on the British signature! . . . Many people may think the territory of France and Germany should be treated on exactly equal terms. Those, however, are not the terms of the Versailles and Locarno treaties to which Britain is bound by her signature.

"We are not arbiters!" declared the Foreign Secretary. "We are guarantors of a treaty. We have certain commitments and they are very definite. . . . The demilitarized [Rhineland] zone embodied in the Versailles Treaty was for time without limit. It was an enduring undertaking."

From that point on, however, Mr. Eden's speech trailed off into saying that the White Paper sent to Adolf Hitler contained only "proposals, and they have never been an ultimatum. ... I freely admit it is not impossible to find faults with the White Paper. I could find a few myself."

Leaving Adolf Hitler to find the rest, Anthony Eden and Stanley Baldwin ended the speech in an affecting little British tableau, the Prime Minister putting a fatherly arm around the slim Foreign Secretary's shoulder and clapping him on the back with repeated little pats while the Conservative Party raised cheer on cheer.

"Definitely Not." No vote of confidence was asked by His Majesty's Government, but the conclusion of the debate contained its only clear-cut utterances:

His Majesty's Loyal Opposition, replying officially to Mr. Eden's speech in the person of the last Labor Cabinet's Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Hugh Dalton: "Great Britain should tell the German people in friendship and frankness that their political and economic equality is recognized. But that does not mean that we recognize the right of any nation to an overbearing, brutal predominance. Germany should be told that if she returns to the League she will have no need for overpowering armaments because she will be collectively guaranteed as to the inviolability of all her frontiers.

"If Germany refuses, other countries must organize peace without her and Britain must make it clear that Germany is to have no free hand to attack Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria or Russia. If Britain speaks plainly in Europe there can be no war."

Winston Churchill: "The German people cannot be blamed for enjoying Hitler's victories. Where will it be next? Austria or Memel? What other disputed areas has Hitler already in view?

"You must invite Germany to state her grievances, lay them on the Council board and let us have them out, but don't let us have them out as if we are a rabble fleeing before forces we cannot resist!"

His Majesty's Government, in the person of the Chancellor of the Exchequer: "It does not follow because particular proposals [the White Paper] here are rejected by Germany that the negotiations have failed. . . . On the contrary, we are going to have further proposals, and we have to consider what is in them. The fact that we have to establish or continue contact between the general staffs of Britain, France and Belgium does not involve us in any obligation to undertake, in company with France, expulsion of German troops from the Rhineland. Most definitely not!"

If Britain's "Most Definitely Not!" was disheartening to harassed Belgians, it was nonetheless of little solace to Germans this week when it appeared that Anglo-Franco-Belgian conversations would take place over the vehement protests of Ambassador von Ribbentrop.

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