Travels of a Treaty

Into a green metal safe at the Department of State, a safe so flimsy that a good burglar could have opened it with his bare hands, was dropped one evening last week a very ordinary looking document which in all probability will govern the size of the U. S. Navy for the next five years. It was of foolscap size, with text printed in two parallel columns. It lacked red ribbons, red seals, great inky signatures, for it was only a copy, albeit an official and certified copy, of the naval compact agreed upon in London by the U. S., Britain and Japan.

Under Pillow. William Beck, secretary to Secretary of State Stimson, had brought the treaty back from London aboard the Leviathan, which also carried the U. S. delegation from the Conference. On the homeward voyage Statesman Stimson got the notion that his secretary was sleeping with the precious pact under his pillow. At misty morn Mr. Beck did not tarry for New York's official but lukewarm reception to the returning delegates. Instead, clutching his leather portfolio doubly tight lest he drop it into the grey-green-greasy water and spoil the treaty, he transferred to a special revenue cutter, dashed up the harbor to the Battery, dashed uptown in a taxi to the Pennsylvania Station, dashed to Washington on the first train out, dashed to the State Department to deposit the treaty in figurative safety.

To the White House. Next day the treaty was taken out of the green safe by Statesman Stimson, carried to the White House, put into the fat but firm hands of President Hoover (see p. 13). With satisfaction the President scanned the document he had waited for so long and so anxiously. For 24 hours it lay on his broad desk. To his stenographer he dictated an 83-word, one-sentence message: "I transmit herewith a treaty . . . to the ratification of which I ask the advice and consent of the Senate."

To the Senate. Next morning the rear Senate doors swung open for Maurice C. Latta, White House messenger, who bowed and repeated in a loud voice the formula: "A message from the President of the United States!" A Senate clerk took the treaty from Messenger Latta, marched it up to Vice President Curtis' rostrum where it lay unrecognized and unwelcomed for an hour until Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, moved to refer it to his committee. There it was carefully tucked away in a file to await hearings. Its travels were temporarily over.

Beside the treaty, the Senate also received back its minority leader, Arkansas' Senator Joseph Taylor Robinson, a London delegate. The chamber recessed to allow members to file by their colleague on the rostrum, wring his brawny hand, give him a word of welcome.

"Friendly." Declared Senator Borah, after promising to commence committee hearings this week: "I feel friendly to the treaty but I don't want to commit myself to it until I've given it careful study."

Suspicious Eye. Not so friendly to the treaty was Maine's Senator Frederick Hale, chairman of the Naval Affairs Com mittee. A Big-Navy man, Senator Hale called his committee together to make an independent inquiry into its effects upon the Navy. The Hale hearings have no official standing, are for the patent pur pose of drumming up treaty opposition, if any, by staging a publicity sideshow. As Witness No. 1, Senator Hale summoned Secretary of the Navy Charles Francis Adams, a London delegate, to explain and elucidate. Later would be called Admirals William Veazie Pratt and Hilary P. Jones, naval advisors to the U. S. delegation, to see if they would say critical things about the treaty's effect on the Navy.

6-in. v. 8-in. Guns. Senator Hale se cured from the Navy wooden models of 6-in. guns and 8-in. guns as used on cruisers, set them up in his office to outline his objections to the treaty. Carefully he explained that a 6-in. gun would fire a 105-lb. shell 10 miles; an 8-in. gun a 260-lb. shell 18 miles. What seemed to displease him most was that, whereas under the 1929 naval plan 23 cruisers of 10,000 tons each, armed with 8-in. guns, would have been constructed, under the treaty this force would be cut to 18 such craft, with some 143,000 surplus cruiser tonnage going into smaller vessels carrying 6-in. guns.

Senator Hale well knew there was a split in expert naval opinion as to the relative value of these two types of cruisers. Senator Robinson anticipated this division of naval thought last week when he declared: "This is a question, I believe, which will never be settled to the satisfaction of everyone. The treaty recognizes the larger cruiser as more consistent with our needs in that we build 18 to 15 for the British. Some of the experts do not regard those figures as satisfactory. The treaty is as near parity as could be devised."

Loud Speaker; Secrets. Silent but alert throughout the London negotiations has been the Navy League of the U. S., well-organized Big-Navy propaganda agency. Founded 25 years ago, this civilian organization headed by William Howard Gardiner of Manhattan favors "limitation by agreement," repudiates "reduction by example." It protests any cut in naval personnel, supports every building program that comes along, spreads naval information far and near. Last week the Navy League lifted a voice of warning against any hasty ratification of the London treaty. That President Gardiner thought he had something ominous up his mufti sleeve was suggested when he said:

"It is impossible to appreciate this present step and its probable consequences unless there is sufficient understanding of the conditions that led up to it. These cannot be adequately known to the Senate committees concerned if the Senate fails to call on the State and Navy Departments for every bit of the records, however secret, as to who first suggested the Washington conference [in 1921],what preparation was made for it, what really happened at it and why and what were its real results. . . . Similar information should be secured as to all the circumstances known to the American Government . . . in connection with the London Naval Conference of 1930."

Pratt for Hughes. Meanwhile the Navy announced that Admiral Pratt, now Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet (highest rank afloat), would succeed Admiral Charles Frederick Hughes next October as Chief of Naval Operations (highest rank ashore). Admiral Pratt will thus be placed in a position to execute the terms of the London agreement which he helped to make. Admiral Pratt is viewed with alarm by Big-Navy men. He assented at the Conference to the transfer of part of U. S. cruiser tonnage from large ships to small. He is a "6-in. gun man" whereas Admiral Hughes was an "8-in. gun man." By the State Department and President Hoover he is regarded as that rare thing, an admiral capable of sharing the civilian viewpoint, a technician unbiassed by his technique.

Faster, More Formidable. With the treaty yet to be ratified, the Navy began last week to refine its original plans for the three 10,000-ton cruisers, construction of which President Hoover held up last autumn. Crack draftsman were put to work on new designs which would produce faster, more formidable battle craft. Building on these vessels will start in navy yards within two months, first step in the $600,000,000 six-year "parity program."

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