Submersible Squabbles

For five weeks diplomats and statesmen have been making amiable sounds at the London Naval Conference. Last week, compliments over, the Admirals were heard.* Not one spoke directly. At a conference whose avowed purpose is world peace and the reduction of naval armaments, Admirals have had to take back seats, but the Admirals spoke to the Statesmen, and the Statesmen, Admiralty-primed, brought forward the technical demands, the technical objections of their various navies. The real battles of the conference began.

Submarines. Ever since 1898 when U. S. inventor John P. Holland followed the research of countless other experimenters and built the first practicable modern submarine, submarines and submarine-warfare have been an important international problem. Last week U. S. Secretary of State Henry Lewis Stimson, representing the country which owns the greatest fleet of effective submarines in commission (76), the country most opposed to their use, led the conference's half-hearted attempt to abolish them. Said he:

"The argument that the submarine is a purely defensive weapon seems to us difficult to reconcile with the offensive use which has been made of it at great distances from its home ports. The contention that it is a less costly weapon which affords a maximum of strategic value for a minimum of outlay must be considered in the light of the knowledge that the submarine is three or four times as costly, ton for ton, as the largest type of surface craft and approximately twice as costly as the largest ships of war. . . .

"The essential objection to the submarine is that it is a weapon particularly susceptible to abuse; that it is susceptible of use against merchant ships in a way that violates alike the laws of war and the dictates of humanity. . . .

"We cannot but feel that for this conference . . .to sanction an instrument of war, the abuses of which were directly responsible for calling the western world into the greatest European war of history, would be a contradiction of the purposes for which we have met."

Eager to second him was Albert Victor Alexander, longtime Baptist lay preacher and British First Lord of the Admiralty. Going over all the usual reasons for the abolition of submarines: humanity, their use as offensive weapons, cost, he added yet another:

"I imagine almost all of us have been in a submarine," said he in his best Baptist-meeting voice, "We admire its ingenuity and its wonderful technique but we are bound to observe that the lack of space, involving long periods of being unable to stand upright, with vitiated atmosphere very often when submerged, are hardly in keeping with the improved conditions for industrial workers which we now all of us consistently urge at Geneva.

. . . Think for a brief moment of the toll of submarine disasters even since the War.

"Gentlemen, seamen are not cowards. But is it not true to say that every time there is a submarine disaster the public conscience is shocked at our own flesh and blood being required by national policy . . . to face death in conditions in which they have no more chance than a rat in a trap? And there is not a power here today . . . which has not experienced such disasters."

Against this attack up stepped droop-shouldered Georges Leygues, French Minister of Marine, and delivered through his ponderous buffalo-horn mustachios what the N. Y. World's London correspondent, John L. Balderston, called "the finest piece of advocacy the 'viper of the seas' has ever called forth."

"Compared with other ships," said Minister Leygues, speaking rapidly, crisply, "what are the distinctive features of the submarine. To the gun and torpedo joined together, it adds submersion. The latter discovery is never more surprising nor in itself more unlawful than was, at the time of its first appearance, the steamship as opposed to the sailing vessel.

"It has been maintained." . . . with a quick birdlike glance at Secretary Stimson, "that the submarine could only be used against the merchant ship. Comparison between naval tonnages of warships destroyed during the War period bring forward the following figures:

"As far as the French were concerned, the loss by submarines was . . . three-quarters of the total losses [of warships] suffered. As concerns the British Navy, 191,090 tons; that is, one-third of the British losses.

"What warships the submarine does not destroy it will immobilize, or, should they leave their bases, it wears them out. . . . The submarine works by surprise. It lies in wait for the enemy, but was ambush ever excluded from warfare? It hides under water, but does not the surface ship sometimes try to hide behind a screen of smoke? . . . The submarine, therefore, is a warship like all others. . . . Must it disappear because it disturbs the habits and honored traditions of surface ships?

"The French government is of the opinion that unrestricted submarine war against seafaring trade should be outlawed. . . . France accepts the principle laid down in Articles 1 and 2 of the Root resolution."

Root Resolution. Important was this last sentence. Before last week's session began, it was well understood that Britain and the U. S. would attempt the abolition of submarines, that France, Italy, Japan would oppose it. But here was a genuine concession. The Root Resolution to limit the use of submarines in wartime, was framed in Washington in 1921. Never ratified by France, the substance of its first two articles provides that:

1) A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized.

2) A merchant vessel cannot be sunk until the crew and passengers have first been placed in safety.

Since it is more than difficult to provide for the passengers and crew of even a fair-sized merchantman inside a submarine, commerce raiding according to the Root Formula is virtually impossible. Pessimists pointed out last week that while France is accepting principles, she is still keeping her submarines, that she has not accepted Article 3 of the Root formula which provides that any submarine commander who violated the law shall, if caught, be tried for piracy "before the civil or military authorities of any power within the jurisdiction of which he may be found."

Rodney. While Mediterranean delegates talked submarine last week, a minor flurry in British-U. S. naval circles was caused by the British battleship Rodney, largest, most powerful dreadnaught in the world, possibly the largest battleship that will ever be built. Naval experts have agreed that the way to achieve battleship parity between Britain and the U. S. is for Britain to scrap five battleships, the U. S., three. This still leaves Britain the advantage of the 33,900-ton Rodney. U. S. naval officers blandly suggested that this country be allowed to scrap a fourth battleship, build a duplicate Rodney to take its place. This brought instant protest from Senator Borah in Washington, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

"I can see no justification in our building, or claiming the right to build one battleship. Scrap the Rodney. That will settle the proposition."

Most Britons would sooner scrap King George's right eye than the battleship Rodney. In the House of Commons anxious Tories demanded if there was any truth in this startling rumor.

"NO SIR!" said First Lord of the Admiralty Alexander.

French Demands. Toward the week's end a final flurry shook the conference.

Before assembled naval delegates, crisp businesslike Prime Minister Andre Tardieu demanded for France a total of 725.000 tons by 1937 in order to give her absolute parity with Italy in the Mediterranean, and to offset the 144,000 tons allowed Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. This program, if built, would give France not only the largest submarine fleet in the world, but a total naval ratio of 3-3-2 with Britain and the U. S. Observers were aghast, saw the possibility that instead of reducing armaments, Britain and the U. S. might have to indulge in a billion dollars worth of naval ship building. Admirals and statesmen conferred, President Hoover hurried north from Florida (see p. 13). At the last minute Prime Minister Tardieu dropped a hint. If Britain) and the U. S. would sign a security pact, guaranteeing not to supply food or munitions to any aggressor nation in a war with France, the French Government would cut its demands 20%.

Retribution was swift on Prime Minister Tardieu for nearly wrecking the conference. Returning to Paris for the weekend he was stricken with acute laryngitis, lost his government on a vote of no confidence (see p. 23).

*Chief among U. S. Admirals at the conference were Rear Admiral Hilary Pollard Jones (retired), Admiral William Veazie Pratt. Cultured, intelligent, Admiral Pratt ferried President Wilson to France in 1918. He was an expert adviser at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. Statesmen like him for his willingness to accept less from treaty makers than his more cautious brothers in arms.

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