La Conference Coolidge

An atmosphere tense with Anglo-U. S. suspicion and discord characterized the sessions at Geneva last week of the Naval Limitations Parley (TIME, June 27), nicknamed by the Swiss "La Conference Coolidge." Nothing of a constructive nature was accomplished; but the proposals put forward by the U. S., Britain and Japan were of utmost importance; and the verbal fireworks which followed agreeably enlivened last week the annual Geneva Flower Festival.

U. S. Proposal. Chief Delegate Hugh Simpson Gibson, U. S. Ambassador to Belgium, proposed:

1) Extension of the Washington Conference 5-5-3 ratio, now limiting only capital ships, to limit also cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

2) Application of this ratio in such a way that the combined total of cruiser plus destroyer tonnage would not exceed 550,000 for the U. S., 550,000 for Britain and 330,000 for Japan.

Apart from this limitation of the total of cruisers plus destroyers, the limitations of each class to be:

CRUISERS

U. S. and Britain,

each 250,000 to 300,000 tons

Japan 150,000 to 180,000 tons

DESTROYERS

U. S. and Britain,

each 200,000 to 250,000 tons

Japan 120,000 to 150,000 tons

SUBMARINES

U. S. and Britain,

each 60,000 to 90,000 tons

Japan 36,000 to 54,000 tons

3) Any excess in tonnage above the combined totals to be immediately scrapped.

The reason for this harping upon combined totals is that the U. S. has a relatively superfluous number of destroyers, while Britain has, in U. S. eyes, a like superfluity of cruisers. By lumping the two, and by limiting combined or global tonnage the U. S. would be relieved of the necessity of building up to Britain's cruiser strength, would save money, yet keep global parity.

British Proposals. Chief Delegate William Clive Bridgeman, First Lord of the British Admiralty, proposed:

1) Not only extension of the Washington agreements from capital ships to cruisers, destroyers and submarines; but revision of these agreements as they now stand and limit capital ships.

This revision to compel the signatory nations to keep their capital ships for 26 years--instead of scrapping them at the end of 20 years and building improved ships, as at present.

Similar clauses to fix the "replacement age" of cruisers at 24 years, destroyers 20 years, submarines 15 years.*

2) Further revision of the Washington agreements to fix the maximum permissible tonnage of future ships of any class at 30,000, whereas capital ships may now be built up to 35,000 tons./-

Similar revision to reduce the maximum future battleship gun bore from 16 to 13.5 inches.

3) Limitation of the individual tonnage of cruisers to 7,500 each, destroyers 1,750 to 1,400 tons each, submarines 1,600 to 600 tons each.

Limitation of the maximum cruiser gun bore to six inches, destroyer and submarine gun five inches.

Thus the concrete proposals in the British plan dealt only with limitation of the strength of individual ships, and not with limitation of the number of ships or global tonnage. Since something had to be said about this, the British proposal contained a cautious but very interesting observation:

"We also think it would be desirable to discuss the possibility of limiting the number of submarines according to our varying requirements, and it must be borne in mind that any limit placed on the number of submarines would make it easier to limit the number of destroyers, and if agreement were reached on these points with other powers it might be possible also to consider the number of cruisers each of us should possess."

Quintessence. Reduced to simplest terms, the British said, in effect: "Revise the Washington Treaty. Limit the fighting strength of individual future ships. Lastly, it may be found possible to limit total navy strengths."

Contrarily the U. S. proposal was, in essence: "Keep the Washington Treaty intact. Extend its 5-5-3 principle to limit total navy strengths in that ratio."

Japanese Proposal. Chief Delegate Admiral Viscount Minoru Saito made a very elastic and tentative proposal. His apparent purpose was to keep in the background until Britain and the U. S. showed signs of agreement. His keynote was that the present relative naval strengths of the U. S., Britain and Japan should be established as a permanent status quo.

With these proposals on the council table the fireworks began:

Mysterious Stranger. During the naval proceedings last week, a strange man, carrying a small brown bag, slipped past the doorkeeper with an air so secretive that the suspicions of an alert Swiss detective were at once aroused. The stranger, grey-haired, straggly mustached, clad in an undistinguished business suit, pattered the length of several corridors, set his bag down, mopped his face. The Swiss detective, with catlike caution, flattened himself against the wall, watched the stranger closely for signs that his bag contained a bomb. Just then a member of the U. S. delegation appeared, shook warmly the hand of the mysterious stranger, William H. Moran, who is, as everyone knows, Chief of the U. S. Secret Service. He was present in Geneva last week to attend the International Conference to Combat Counterfeiting.

Eggshell Debate. A major Anglo-U. S. point of contention last week, was whether, if the British proposal to limit cruiser guns to a six-inch bore were adopted, the British could transform their fast merchant fleet overnight into a cruiser fleet by mounting these little guns on the Mauretania, Majestic, Berengaria, Olympic, etc.

"Why those ships are only big eggshells!" scoffed British Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Field to correspondents. He continued: "They would be a big target, with guns inconveniently placed and with no fire controls, and which any cruiser would quickly put out of business."

The correspondents hurried over to ask U. S. Admiral Hilary P. Jones about this.

"Eggshell, eh?" he snorted. "Well, give me their Majestic with 30 six-inch guns aboard and I guarantee to sink any 7,500-ton cruiser ever launched."

Thereafter, last week the correspondents hounded both admirals with questions about ships and eggshells, and drew from them practically infinite variations on this safe, discussible, amusing topic. Admiral Jones outdid his rival by declaring explosively, "Why the plates on some destroyers are so thin you could almost poke a finger through 'em!"

5-5-3. The Washington Treaty ratio became the theme of many a jest. When U. S. Chief Delegate Gibson and British Admiral John Rushworth Jellicoe returned from an informal golf match they waggishly remarked that their scores were "in the 5-5 ratio."

Cleverer was a Japanese attache who noted that the ages of the chief delegates closely approximated a 3-5-5 ratio. Mr. Gibson is 43; Mr. Bridgeman 62; and Viscount Saito 69. Japanese thought that a good ratio, a good joke.

Correspondents Snubbed. The chief British delegate antagonized foreign newsgatherers last week, by announcing that he would give interviews only to British correspondents. Vexed, rebuffed, the outcasts turned to open a British Who's Who and fairly gloated over the significant entry describing the man who had snubbed them:

"BRIDGEMAN, RT. HON. WILLIAM CLIVE. . . s. of late Rev. and Hon. John R. O. Bridgeman, Rector of Weston-under-Lizard. . . g. s. of Ven. William Clive, Archdeacon of Montgomery. . . . Educ.: Eton (Captain of the Oppidans). . . . Assistant Private Secretary to Lord Knutsford. . . . Assistant Private Secretary to Sir Michael Hicks Beach. . . ."

After that the record became really distinguished, rising to "Home Secretary, 1922-24"; but the correspondents had read enough to decided that they could not long be snubbed by a man whose father had been Rector of Weston-under-Lizard.

The correspondents were right. Pressure was brought to bear on Chief Delegate Bridgeman by his associates until, on the second day, he invited correspondents of all nations to interview him, and, when they came, thanked them for coming.

False Weight? Although crimination and recrimination moved hot and quick last week, between U. S. and British delegates, via the press, no charge made was uglier than this: that the British Admiralty systematically lists its war boats at about five-sixths of their real tonnage, according to U. S. measurements.

Correspondents drew from a member of the U. S. delegation, who withheld his name, the statement that when Edward of Wales, and later the Duke of York passed through the Panama Canal on British warships, careful computations of the water displaced proved their ships to be nearly 12% overweight.

Progress. The parley sessions were held in secret last week, and the absolute maximum of progress attained seemed to be that the U. S. delegates persuaded the British to put off, at least temporarily, discussion apropos of revising the Washington Treaty and to proceed first with negotiation on other points.

*The U. S. proposal envisioned considerably lower "replacement ages": cruisers 20 years; destroyers 15 to 17; submarines 12 to 13.

/-Britain has two just-completed 35,000 ton capital ships, the Rodney and the Nelson. The U. S. has no ships of equal fighting power.