To The President

Like the maddening rumble of guns that grew louder and louder in the ears of Parisians in 1914, the steady drone of a well-oiled machine has preyed upon the ears of the White House within the last fortnight. That drone was the culmination of the three-year-old groan of the sick farmer. That drone was the work of militant farm organizations, skillful lobbyists, a group of Senators and Representatives from the West and South who have convinced majorities in Congress that the proper medicine for the sick farmer is the McNary-Haugen bill (TIME, Feb. 14). Many who favor this cure say it is bitter; perhaps it is unconstitutional. President Coolidge, though he may not want to, must decide whether this cure is to be administered. Here is how it came to his hands. The Senate, fortnight ago, passed the McNary-Haugen bill, 47 to 39. Party lines were torn to shreds; the vote was almost purely sectional--the West and South against the East. The House, last week, threw aside its own farm relief bill, adopted the McNary-Haugen bill exactly as it came from the Senate. Thus, the delay of a conference was obliterated. The farm bloc, with grey-haired Representative Haugen at the helm, bowled over the regular Republican organization with steamroller tactics that recalled the days of "Uncle Joe" Cannon. The Cabinet. Having been informed that both houses of Congress had passed the McNary-Haugen bill, President Coolidge called for his Cabinet, found that it unanimously disapproved of the bill. Secretary of the Treasury Mellon had already made public his attitude in a detailed statement showing that the bill is unsound, unworkable and highly costly. Secretary of Agriculture Jardine, who would have to direct the farm experiment if the President makes it law, abhors it. Applying the British principle of Cabinet government, it would be necessary for President Coolidge's entire Cabinet to resign if he signs the bill. Certainly, Secretaries Mellon and Jardine would have good reason to resign. But, does the President have any intention of signing this bill? The President, next day, received the official bill duly signed by President of the Senate Dawes and Speaker of the House Longworth; despatched it to various members of his Cabinet for their careful consideration. Later, he read it himself. All the while, messenger boys scurried to the White House with telegrams; mail trucks left many a bag. The office of the President's secretary was a madhouse of messages--irate farmers said: "Please sign the bill"; irate bankers said: "Please veto it." The President can take his choice. 1) To sign it would seem to repudiate every statement he has made on farm relief, would vex his own section of the country and party, would destroy his alleged reputation as a strong silent man. The farm bloc says that President Coolidge can quell revolt in his party and gain enough popularity in the West to be re-elected in 1928, if he signs. But it is a fact that many farmers dislike the McNary-Haugen experiment; and it is an assumption that President Coolidge wants to run again in 1928. The President could, of course, sign the bill, saying he disapproved of it and hoped it would be proven unconstitutional. He could keep it in his pocket, let it become law without his signature.* Both of these possible performances would reveal weak knees.

2) To veto the bill is President Coolidge's expected and logical course. The farm bloc cannot muster the necessary two-thirds majority in either house to pass the bill over his veto, but it can embarrass him by holding up other legislation. Perhaps the next session of Congress will see the alliance which put through the McNary-Haugen bill in full control.

*If the President does not act on a bill within ten days after receiving it, it automatically becomes law, provided Congress is still in 'session. However, if the President receives a bill less than ten days before adjournment of Congress, he can kill it by "pocket veto." Shrewd members of the farm bloc saw to it that President Coolidge received the McNary-Haugen bill eleven days before Congress is to adjourn.