Air Conclusion

The President's Aircraft Inquiry Board (TIME, Sept. 28 et seq.), headed by Dwight W. Morrow, concluded its busy hearings last week. The list of men it heard was very long, the more important including: Martin B. Madden, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee; Orville Wright; Admiral S. S. Robison, commanding the U. S. Fleet; Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum, Assistant Chief of Staff; Postmaster General New; General Mason M. Patrick, Chief of the Army Air Service; Rear Admiral William S. Sims, retired; Rear Admiral Robert E. Coontz; Commander Richard E. Byrd just returned from the far north with MacMillan; Grover Loening. High spots in the testimony :

Martin B. Madden. The Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, pointed out that since the War the Government has appropriated an annual average of 86 millions for aeronautics--and has almost nothing to show for it. Said he:

"I can but conclude that millions of dollars appropriated by Congress during the past few years for this development program have been squandered in a purposeless, meaningless, endless experimental orgy. Surely it is not too much to expect that the millions spent should have purchased more than is in evidence in tangible results."

He proposed spending $30,000,000 a year to purchase 1,500 new aeroplanes, supplying ten enlisted men per plane (cost of $22,500,000) and one officer per plane (cost of $7,500,000), appropriating $22,500,000 for maintenance of equipment, and $5,000,000 a year for flying fields-total cost $87,500,000 a year, providing the military branches give up the aeronautical engineering bureaus, aircraft factories and experimental stations, buying all their craft from commercial companies.

Orville Wright. As Mr. Wright came before the Board he was greeted by Chairman Morrow with the remark: "Here is the man who is responsible for all this problem." He urged in his brief testimony that the Government aid civil aviation especially by supplying landing fields, lights, weather reports and other aids to flying. He did not favor Mr. Madden's proposal that the Army and Navy give up their experimental work.

General Patrick, the chief of the Army Air Service, gave the Board figures as to the air establishments of foreign Powers as compared to the U.S.:

U.S.: 15,000 men, with 1,400 serviceable planes.

France: 36,000 men (proposed to be increased to 43,000), with 1,500 planes in service (proposed to be increased to 2,200) and 4,000 planes in reserve.

England: 32,000 men (proposed to be increased to 36,000 men), with 1,000 planes in service (proposed to be increased to 1,600). Reserve unknown.

Italy: 11,000 men (proposed to be increased to 31,000), with 800 planes in service and 830 in reserve.

Japan: 8,000 men, with 800 planes, half very old (proposed to be increased to 1,200 with proportional personnel).

"These are the most interesting figures we have had given us," said Mr. Morrow.

General Drum. The Assistant Chief of Staff appeared to reiterate the view that the Army would suffer if the Air Service were separated from it. He admitted that the Air Service needed more men and larger appropriations, but decared that it suffered merely as the rest of the Army from economies. Said he: "The establishment of a separate air force independent of the Army cannot be justified on any ground whatever. Whether it be an air, corps under the War Department, apart from the Army, a separate air force under a new executive department, or a third co-ordinate arm in a Department of National Defense, the idea behind all is the same and is equally fallacious in every case.

"It means separation instead of union. It means divided effort instead of united effort. It means a dispersion of force instead of a concentration of force. It means aggravating our present difficulties my vessels." In 1920 he said at a banquet given by the Lord Mayor of London: "I believe that if the time ever comes when the British Empire is menaced by an external enemy, you may count on every man, every drop of blood, every ship and every dollar of your kindred across the sea." President Taft had to reprimand him for that.

In 1911 he went to the Naval War College at Newport, and became a scholar there for two years. He left there to take command instead of applying a remedy. It will mean aid and assistance for our enemies instead of their destruction and downfall. It will mean defeat in war instead of victory."

Admiral Sims. Like Colonel Mitchell but in different manner and degree, Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims, retired, has been a stormy petrel. He possibly got his vigorous way of speaking from President Roosevelt, whom he served as naval aide from 1907 to 1909. But earlier than that he had protested to Mr. Roosevelt (in 1902) because his superior officers would not listen to him as he cried: "The protection and armament of even our most recent battleships are glaringly inferior to those of our possible enemies. . . . One or more of our ships would suffer humiliating defeat at the hands of an equal number of ene-of the Torpedo-Boat Flotilla of the Atlantic Fleet. In 1916 he became Commander of the Nevada, then new.

In 1917 he was Commandant of the Narragansett Bay Naval Station and President of the Naval War College, when he was sent abroad with the rank of Vice Admiral, commanding the U.S. Naval forces in European waters. He held that post throughout the War, and for a time was in command of all the Allied vessels in the Irish Sea. His skill and tact were admired by the Allies. Late in 1918 he was given the temporary rank of Admiral.

In 1919 he was called home and returned to his post at the Naval War College, reverting to his rank as Rear Admiral. An attempt was made to get him the permanent rank of Admiral, but it failed through Congressional bickering. He was offered a Distinguished Service Medal, but wrote to Secretary Daniels declining it, saying that in many cases such honors were given without dessert, and in others not given when due.

In 1920 he came into prominence again when he wrote to Secretary Daniels saying that the inefficiency of the Navy Department during the War had cost half a million lives and 15 billion dollars.

The next year he made another speech in London: "There are some people in our country technically American, naturalized or native-born, that are not really Americans at all. Some are now trying to destroy good relations between our two countries. They are Americans when they want money, but Sinn Feiners when on the platform. ... They are like zebras--either white horses with black stripes, or black horses with white stripes. We know they are not horses and some, people think they are assess but each ass can vote; and one of the inconveniences of republican government is that U.S.-born citizens "think it necessary to cater to these votes."

In 1922 Admiral Sims retired but continued his propaganda as scholar, officer, gentleman, for a better Navy and no bunk. Said he in 1923: "Press accounts of 'terrible atrocities' [of German submarines] were nothing but propaganda. German U-boat commanders aided in the rescue of the crews and passengers of ships they sank."

So his testimony was expected to be peppery. He told the Board:

Successive Secretaries of the Navy, have given lip service to the War College, but they have never adopted its product. The result has been very detrimental to the Navy, is detrimental now with reference to the air force. For many years the Navy has been controlled by uneducated and untrained officers--untrained in a military sense--who have been appointed to the most important positions.

These men are earnest and honest and hard-working and able men, always exceedingly busy directing as many details as can be crowded into the working day. Their idea seems to be that as the department necessarily has supreme authority over all operations, it should therefore exercise this authority in deciding a mass of even highly technical matters in disregard of experts in charge on the spot as in the case of the Shenandoah. This is done in the ignorant conviction of duty faithfully performed.

Concerning the kind of air force that would be most efficient in operation with the fleet, it should be one that belongs to, lives with, and continually trains with the fleet; and it should be trained in peace and controlled in action--that is, in battle--by officers thoroughly indoctrinated in the tactics and strategy of the fleet, as developed by the commander-in-chief. A separate air force would, therefore, be impracticable.

"You do not agree with Colonel Mitchell's idea with regard to aviation ?"

"No, sir. For the reason that I have given before. I have great respect for Mitchell. He is a bully good fellow."

Grover Loening. An aircraft manufacturer then gave his opinion of General Mitchell's charges:

"You have had opinions and predictions here some of which were almost as vague as General Mitchell's. His opinions are as hard to pin down as a globule of mercury. What he says is of no professional importance, but his statements are cut out of the papers and sent all over the world. I know of some that have been sent to South America, where we are trying to enter the foreign market. They have done a lot of harm.

"I, for one, deny the inferiority of American aviation. What are they doing in Europe? The French in Morocco are using the Breguet two-seater planes, which are the same as those that they had at the end of the War. The British use the Bristol fighter, which was developed in 1916."

General Conner. Another Assistant Chief of Staff, a finance officer, Brigadier General Fox Conner, estimated the cost of bringing the Army Air Service up to 5,000 officers, 25,000 men and 2,500 machines, as has been recommended by an Army Board. He said the money requirement would be over 90 millions a year for ten years. He pointed out that 90 millions was more than a third of what is now appropriated for the regular Army and "all overhead." The pay for Air Service in the tenth year would be more than a fourth of what is now appropriated for the pay of the entire Army. The cost of a separate Air Service he estimated as even greater.

Having heard this testimony, the Board virtually concluded its hearings, and started to go over the 675,000 words of testimony taken in preparation for its report in November.