Security?

While at Geneva for the 34th meeting of the Council of the League of Nations (see Page 8)., it was but natural that Foreign Ministers Austen Chamberlain of Britain and Aristide Briand of France should discuss the all-important question of European security, which means a stable peace in Western Europe. Background to the statesmen's discussions:

Germany, last February, offered to enter into an equal engagement with Britain, France and Belgium to guarantee the Rhine frontier against aggression. This meant two things: 1) That Germany was prepared voluntarily to do what the Allies had been unable to force her to do--renounce all claims to Alsace-Lorraine, accept the present frontier; 2) that Germany, as a disarmed nation, was more in need of security than France, a heavily armed nation. Unfortunately, the offer was complicated by a categoric assertion that the proposed treaty in no way bound Germany to accept the Eastern frontiers between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

Britain, after some hesitation, agreed to range herself against whichever nation violated the treaty by attacking the Rhine frontier, but she flatly declined to be a party to anything more, and stated that Germany must become a member of the League of Nations before the proposed treaty came into force.

France was not satisfied. That Britain would aid her against German aggression was preeminently satisfactory, but that Britain would aid Germany against France if she were compelled to send troops over the Rhineland to aid her ally Poland or Czechoslovakia was unthinkable. Whatever France did, she would not desert her allies in Central Europe.

Belgium ranged herself with Britain.

The Chamberlain-Briand discussions at Geneva, last week, fortunately ended in a preliminary agreement. No definite action can be taken without the consent of the Parliaments concerned. Britain, through Chamberlain, reaffirmed her willingness to place her armed forces at the disposal of the nation defending an attack (i. e., Germany or France). She reiterated the condition that Germany must become a member of the League before the Four Power Pact could come into effect. She pointed out that the treaty would be drawn up within the stipulations of the League Covenant. This means that, if France wishes to send an armed force across

Germany to the aid of Poland or Czecho-Slovakia, she must seek permission from the League Council of which Germany is to be a permanent member. If the Council gives its consent to the French demand, Germany cannot refuse passage, under stated terms, to the French armies.

The French, who at first thought that Britain was merely guaranteeing them against German aggression, cooled when they discovered that the suggested pact was a bilateral affair, capable of being used against them. But the fact that the might of the British Commonwealth would have to be confronted by an aggressor was a factor too important to be ignored. The French agreed; and an answer to the original German proposals was prepared for dispatch to Berlin.

It seemed that at last a solution of the security problem had been found; but that solution was not akin, as some newspapers reported, to the Three Power Pact (U. S., Britain, France) generally attributed to the late President Wilson, which was a defensive compact to guarantee France against a repetition of 1914. The suggested solution is not only a masterstroke of British diplomacy, but a distinct feather in the cap of the League of Nations. But will Germany accept it? It appears that she wanted the U. S. to act as arbiter of all disputes under the proposed treaty; but neither France nor Britain desires this, and the U. S. would certainly not accept such a role. Hence, Britain emerges the real and the League the nominal arbiter of disputes.