Reasons

Reasons--and Russia

The President sent one of the White House cars to fetch Chairman Borah of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There was an hour's conference. When they uncloseted themselves, Mr. Borah alone was in a mood to speak. He announced that, although pessimistic, he is heartily in favor of the President's desire to call an international conference at Washington this autumn. His grounds for pessimism: 1) France has flatly refused to consider land armaments, including aircraft; 2) Great Britain will not curtail her submarines* so long as France's army remains large; 3) Great Britain is going ahead with her Singapore naval base and not even the U. S. is prepared to sacrifice naval bases (e. g. Hawaii) ; 4) capital ships have already been limited; 5) poison gas is part of France's defense. Is it worth while for mighty statesmen to cross oceans to discuss limitation of naval auxiliaries, which seem to be the only instruments of war left, for pacific discussion?

Furthermore, at the time of the 1921 Washington Conference, the U. S. had the world's biggest naval program to offer to the common scrapheap; this year, she has nothing so magnificent to barter for peace.

But Mr. Borah had something else to reiterate to Mr. Coolidge in conference and to the newspapermen afterward. "Russia," said he, "Russia." For four years, he has exhorted the Harding-Hughes, Coolidge-Hughes administration to recognize Russia, For four years, he has been politely snubbed with the answer: "Bolshevism." Last week, he began the sermon again to the Coolidge-Kellogg administration. "Russia," said he, "can upset any world peace arrangement." "Russia," said he, "will not join a peace pact so long as she is not socially received by the pact makers. Even the present interests of the U. S. in the Orient are not safe until the U. S. has compounded with Russia."

*The U. S. has. also taken the position that submarines are coast-defense vessels; hence not subject to restrictions on offensive warcraft.